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Abstract 
 
Surviving Nixon: The Politicization of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1969-1974 
 
by 
 
Andrew Hobson Manson 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Professor Christopher Ansell, Chair 
 
 
This dissertation examines politicization in domestic and foreign policy making, using 
approaches that are largely quantitative, including survival analysis and text-as-data 
methods, and the Nixon administration (1969-1974) as its central case.  Politicization – 
the placement of political loyalists into the executive bureaucracy and the use of political 
criteria or pressures to retain them – is an important way modern presidents have 
attempted to control an increasingly large and complex institutional environment.  
Studies of presidential politicization have only in recent years become data-driven, 
supported by a growing number of datasets on the executive branch.  This dissertation 
adds to that growth, first, by assembling a previously unavailable dataset on tenure for 
Nixon officials and advisors, including covariates for individual characteristics and the 
agencies in which they serve.  Second, it assembles a unique corpus of documents from 
the Foreign Relations of the United States series, programmatically pre-processing them 
to make them available for computational analysis. 
 
Using these tenure and textual data, this study finds that politicization, while an important 
dimension of official and advisor control under Nixon, is contingent and conditioned on 
several factors.  Among these are the informational resources available to an official or 
advisor, which stem from characteristics of the agency in which she serves.  Such 
characteristics include the agency’s robustness, its number of high-competence positions, 
and how specialized its policy product is.  A second key factor, anticipated by the long 
literature on the “two presidencies,” is the domain of policy (domestic or foreign) an 
official is responsible for.  In domestic policy, robust agencies with access to private, 
policy-relevant information tend to be politicized on the basis of conventional left-right 
ideology, while coordinating agencies are not.  In foreign policy, left-right ideology is 
deployed when officials differ from the President over preferred policy instruments; 
otherwise, such “instrumental” preferences are more influential than left-right ideology. 
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Introduction: Understanding politicization by studying Nixon 
 
This dissertation examines patterns of politicization in presidential domestic and foreign 
policy making, using approaches that are largely quantitative, including survival analysis 
and text-as-data methods, and the Nixon administration as its central case.  Politicization 
– the placement of political loyalists into the executive bureaucracy and the use of 
political criteria or pressures to retain them – is an important way modern presidents have 
attempted to control an increasingly large and complex institutional environment.  
Studies of politicization have only recently become data-driven, with work supported by 
a growing number of datasets on the executive branch.  This dissertation adds to that 
growth, first, by putting together a previously unavailable, granular dataset on tenure for 
Nixon officials and advisors, including covariates for individual characteristics and the 
agencies in which they serve.  Second, it assembles a unique corpus of documents from 
the Foreign Relations of the United States series, programmatically pre-processing them 
to make them available for computational analysis. 
Unlike much of the research on presidential politicization, which examines 
appointment, this study looks at retention of officials and advisors as a way to understand 
it.  Moreover, while most studies emphasize politicization in domestic policy, here we 
examine politicization in both domestic (Chapters 2 and 3) and foreign policy (Chapter 
4).  Bridging policy domains presents a unique challenge.  The left-right spectrum does 
not capture relevant belief distinctions among foreign-policy makers.  Instead of trying to 
measure an official’s beliefs along conventional ideological lines, we will indirectly 
capture her underlying belief by focusing on one of its byproduct, her preference over 
policy instruments, which will be assessed using a text-as-data methodology. 
 
Why study politicization? 
 
The subject of politicization is, in accounts of the modern presidency, evergreen.  It 
invokes important dimensions of presidential authority – the power to appoint, delegate 
and retain – and evokes consternation about the abuse of that authority.  Early studies of 
the post-war presidency, in what Burke calls the managerial traditions,1 often held up 
politicization as a problematic tendency to contain, either with the right administrative 
culture, an ethos of neutral competence, or proper organization: competitive advisory 
bodies, for example, managed by an apolitical umpire or honest broker.  Later 
institutional studies were more agnostic.  They viewed politicization as the rational, 
maybe inevitable, adaptation to the growth and institutionalization of the presidency.  
More recent studies in this vein, many informed by game theory (especially games of 
strategic information, which we review next chapter), have sought to model politicization 
as a phenomenon that is rational yet contingent.  Patterns of politicization come from, 
among other sources, the type of policy agencies generate, or the balance of power 
between the president and Congress. 
At the heart of concerns about presidential politicization lies a double-edged 
danger.  On the one hand, politicization threatens to aggrandize executive authority.  It 
                                                 
1 John P. Burke, The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White 
House from FDR to Clinton, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 
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raises the image of an overreaching, imperial presidency that cannot be checked as the 
framers of the U.S. Constitution intended.  On the other it threatens the misuse of that 
power.  Substituting neutrally-competent officials for political loyalists, de-
professionalizing the bureaucracy more broadly, can lead to policy development that is 
ill-informed, implementation that lacks proper oversight, executive agencies that are 
poorly managed, and in the worst-case scenarios, irrational, even dangerous, presidential 
policy responses.2 
 
Why study Nixon? 
 
Studies of Nixon emphasize this double danger.  All but the most sympathetic authors 
depict Nixon as loyalty-obsessed and deeply involved in politicizing the policy-making 
environment.  Many see the offensive against enemies that boiled over into Watergate, 
the back-channeling of information and marginalization of cabinet secretaries, and 
misadventures such as the U.S. involvement in Cambodia, as consequences of the echo 
chamber created by Nixon and his closest aides.  In Nixon we see how potentially 
damaging politicization can be.  In fact, these vicissitudes of the Nixon years are at times 
considered so extreme as to make the Nixon case sui generis – an outlier with limited 
general relevance.  There are, however, three important reasons to still draw on the Nixon 
administration to help understand politicization. 
 
1.  Nixon is a pivotal case. 
 
First-hand accounts and media-driven narratives have had perhaps a stronger effect on the 
Nixon presidency than any other, generating cottage industries devoted to revealing the 
president’s excesses, lionizing those who resisted him, or claiming credit for Nixon’s 
often innovative domestic and foreign policies.  In presidential studies the Nixon 
presidency has had a similar outsize influence.  It is a pivotal case: for managerial 
scholars, for example, it provided a high-profile lesson on the risks of personality and 
overreach, raising an even louder call for organizational solutions.  For institutionalist 
scholars, both early and more contemporary, Nixon was the inaugurating case of the 
tendency to politicize that contemporary presidents have held to.3 
                                                 
2 There is a substantial body of literature that connects politicization with poor policy 
outcomes and agency performance; see, e.g. John B. Gilmour and David E. Lewis, 
“Political Appointees and the Competence of Federal Program Management,” American 
Politics Research 34, no. 1 (2006); Hugh Heclo, “The Office of Management and Budget 
and the Presidency: The Problem of Neutral Competence,” The Public Interest 38, no. 
Winter (1975); Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in 
Washington (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1977). 
3 Hult and Walcott (2004) describe the Nixon years as a “tipping point” separating the 
early from the late postwar presidencies.  Numerical growth of the EOP is less a factor 
than the proliferation of responsibilities for aides, advisors and officials is, as well as the 
concentration of activity in the White House Office.  Karen Marie Hult and Charles Eliot 
Walcott, Empowering the White House: Governance under Nixon, Ford, and Carter, 
Studies in government and public policy, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004). 
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It is important to submit these claims to statistical testing.  After all, what histories 
and qualitative depictions tell us, and what practitioners claim at the time or later recall, 
may not be supported by the data.  Luckily, because of post-Nixon legislation meant to 
increase executive-branch transparency and accountability, there are reliable, quality data 
out there.  These include data on tenure, pay, job category and campaign contributions, 
from which we get spatial ideology scores used to assess politicization.  This study draws 
on these, in part to address claims about politicization in the Nixon administration 
specifically, providing a data-supported counterpoint to mainstream and qualitative 
depictions. 
 
2. Nixon is a crucial case 
 
Nixon is important for another reason.  If we assume that Nixon is an exemplary case of 
politicization – if Nixon was deeply involved in politicizing the bureaucracy and policy 
process – then evidence of non-politicization, conditions under which he did not or could 
not politicize, are of special interest.  Nixon is, to use Gerring’s term, a crucial case.  If 
we see evidence that impersonal forces or institutional mechanisms provided a bulwark 
against politicization, despite strong presidential pressures for it, we can assume the 
causal logic linking such forces or mechanisms to outcomes is strong.  Conclusions 
drawn from a crucial case in this way are of general relevance. 4 
This study will show that Nixon – even Nixon – was constrained by institutional 
conditions.  The most important of these are the distribution of informational resources in 
the executive branch, what I call agency robustness, the degree of policy specialization 
among officials, and the level of competence of their agency or policy unit.  Importantly, 
policy domain – whether the subject of deliberation is domestic or foreign policy – has a 
profound impact on patterns of politicization.  Foreign policy is not exempt from 
politicizing pressure, but operates on a different logic, on what we may call policy-
constrained belief, and not only on ideology in the conventional (left-right) sense. 
 
3.  Nixon is a relevant case 
 
Finally, recent presidencies, including the Obama and Trump administrations, point to a 
further strengthening of executive authority, a gradual isolation of the White House, and 
a growing insulation of the executive from legislative and judicial oversight.  The 
parallels with the Nixon period have not been lost on observers in media and government.  
We have seen former Nixon officials return to the public eye, for example, and attempts 
to use history to build the case for congressional push-back, and even impeachment.5  
                                                                                                                                                 
Nathan argues that politicization arose in part to manage these proliferating agendas and 
portfolios among a growing set of coordinating bodies: Richard P. Nathan, The Plot That 
Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency (New York: Wiley, 1975). 
4 John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework (Cambridge ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); John Gerring, “Is There a (Viable) Crucial-
Case Method?,” Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 3 (2007). 
5 Examples abound: Laura M. Holson, “Remember John Dean of Watergate Fame? He’s 
Back in the Spotlight,” The New York Times, Aug. 20, 2018; Tom Brokaw, “What Trump 
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Such argument by analogy is undoubtedly controversial and rightfully so; nonetheless, 
given the trajectory of executive power in the current era of political volatility and 
extreme polarization, the Nixon presidency, and patterns of politicization that took hold 
from January 21, 1969 to August 9, 1974, are vitally important to understand. 
 
Plan of this dissertation 
 
Chapter 1 begins with a broad examination of three bodies of scholarly literature that 
relate to presidential politicization.  The first comprises works in the managerial tradition, 
and includes the most important early works on the post-war presidency.  The second is 
institutionalist analysis, which discarded much of the normative framing of earlier work, 
and viewed politicization largely as rational adaptation.  The third is an “adjacent” 
literature, which come from game theory work in micro- and organizational economics; 
these studies use strategic information models, some of which have been ported into 
political science and even contemporary presidential studies.  They provide a robust 
theoretical framework for understanding politicization, including conditions under which 
the president may choose against ideological allies. 
Chapters 2 and 3 subject theoretical claims to empirical testing, using tenure data 
on Nixon-era officials and advisors in the Executive Office of the President (EOP).  
Chapter 2 details how data were collected and summarizes them.  It separates them into 
two groups.  Core theoretical variables include agency robustness, policy specialization, 
competence, and policy domain.  These are followed by individual-level covariates – 
age/experience, salary level, civil service careerism, and so forth – that serve as controls.  
Chapter 2 also introduces the statistical methodology, Cox proportional hazards models, 
that is further developed in the subsequent chapter.  Chapter 3 provides detailed non-
parametric results as well as those for semi-parametric Cox regression.  The most 
important of these are interactions among or theory variables, which clearly demonstrate 
the contingent nature of Nixon’s politicization strategy. 
Chapter 4 extends a similar logic into the domain of foreign policy.  It pivots 
away from survival models to text-as-data methods, including latent Dirichlet allocation 
and the structural topic model.  The data here are a corpus of documents taken from the 
State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States, which is pre-processed using 
natural language techniques.  The results are estimated topics that are largely 
representative of policy instruments – that is, the specific policy choices, such as 
unilateral military intervention, collective security, negotiation or cultural diplomacy, 
used to address trouble areas and advance the U.S. interest in foreign affairs.  I argue that 
an official’s “menu” of policy instruments, her preference over such policy means, 
reflects her underlying beliefs.  Like left-right ideology, this latent, policy-constrained 
belief serves to discriminate officials from each other and from the president, and serves 
as an important focus of politicization in foreign policy.  
                                                                                                                                                 
and Nixon Share,” The New York Times, March 7, 2019; David Friend, “‘It Turned Out 
Badly For Nixon’: As Mueller Prepares for His Congressional Star Turn, Echoes of 
Another Long-Running TV Tragicomedy,” Vanity Fair, July 22, 2019.  On Nixon Vice-
President Spiro Agnew, see: Rachel Maddow and Michael Yarvitz, Bag Man, podcast 
audio, 2018, https://www.msnbc.com/bagman. 
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Chapter 1: Politicization in domestic and foreign policy 
 
I.  Defining politicization 
 
Politicization refers to a host of separate but related presidential interventions into the 
bureaucratic functions of the office.  Its most common (or commonly recognized) form is 
when presidents replace apolitical bureaucrats with party or personal loyalists.  
Politicization can also refer to the “layering” of political appointees, “on top of the career 
civil personnel.”6  Taken together, these reflect a broader strategy of substitution, of 
political for apolitical officials or actors. 
In the U.S., the insertion of partisans or ideological loyalists into administrative 
positions goes at least as far back as Jackson, who in his 1829 address to Congress 
described such offices as “created solely for the benefit of the people… [and thus] not 
established to give support to particular men at the public expense.” Jackson continued, 
“No individual wrong is, therefore, done by removal, since neither appointment to or 
continuance in office is a matter of right.”7  Jacksonian democracy rid the appointment 
system of its prior focus on social notables, initiating a long migration toward political 
criteria and spoils that gave parties of the second party system, increasingly organized 
and nationally integrated, greater control over public policy.  By the end of the nineteenth 
century, however, competition between parties and volatility within them, as well as post-
bellum growth in bureaucratic capacity (including an unmanageable number of posts to 
fill), gave rise to pressures for civil-service reform.8 
As Gailmard and Patty indicate, these reforms, epitomized by the 1883 Pendleton 
Act, were not motivated by concerns about expertise, but were grounded in patronage 
struggles between presidents and Congress.  The explosion in the size of the federal 
bureaucracy during the New Deal and World War II, and an increasingly sophisticated 
and institutionalized presidential component, now housed in the Executive Office of the 
President (EOP), did little to eliminate policy’s political dimension.  Instead, presidential 
efforts shifting from negotiating legislation with Congress to exerting control over 
administration.  As a result, in the modern presidency, pressures to professionalize and 
                                                 
6 David E. Lewis, “Presidents and the Politicization of the United States Federal 
Government, 1988-2004” (American Political Science Association: The 101st Annual 
Meeting, Washington, D.C., 2005); Ezra N. Suleiman, Dismantling Democratic States 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
7 Quoted in Bernard S. Silberman, Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in 
France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), 238-39. 
8 Sean Gailmard and John W. Patty, Learning While Governing: Expertise and 
Accountability in the Executive Branch, Chicago studies in American politics, (Chicago ; 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013); Silberman, Cages of Reason. 
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rationalize policy on the one hand, and to politicize it on the other, can be viewed as a 
non-monotonic push-and-pull.9 
 
Politicization via retention 
 
As Jackson made clear in 1829, substitution involves not only appointment but retention 
of officials, granting safe harbor to political loyalists and rotating, purging or fatally 
neglecting non-loyalists or civil careerists.  Presidents after Jackson used such retention 
strategies widely, and it was not until the 1890s that arbitrary removals were addressed 
explicitly by presidents.10  Nonetheless, inasmuch as official tenure is not statutorily fixed 
and service largely remains at the president’s pleasure, removal of officials directly or 
indirectly remains a key facet of politicization.  While qualitative studies of politicization 
have focused on episodes of both appointment and retention, quantitative studies have 
been largely confined only to appointment, thus due in part to the relative accessibility of 
data, such as increases in the number of appointees.11  To my knowledge there has been 
little data-driven, quantitative work on politicization via retention, which by definition 
requires granular information on officials’ tenure.12  This study, particularly the next 
chapter, attempts to amend that. 
 
Politicizing, non-politically 
 
Studies of modern-era politicization typically focus on domestic policy, and conforming 
processes in foreign policy are less well understood.  One reason why is a difficulties in 
measurement.  While we generally understand politicization to mean, “playing politics,” 
what politics signifies is not clear in every context.  Does loyalty to the president mean 
shared political ideology, common party identity, or similar preferences on the 
operational details of policy?  When it comes to domestic policy all three tend to overlap.  
Ideology frequently predicts party and vice versa, and both help predict, though 
imperfectly, the operational dimension of policy preference.  Because of this, researchers 
are likely to have success with customary proxy metrics, like one-dimensional (liberal-
                                                 
9 Gailmard and Patty, Learning While Governing; Suleiman, Dismantling Democratic 
States. 
10 Gailmard and Patty, Learning While Governing, 101. 
11 David E. Lewis, “Where do Presidents Politicize? Evidence from the George W. Bush 
Administration,” Working Papers: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions 
(CSDI)  (2009), https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/research/CSDI_WP_02-2009.pdf. 
12 In the comparative field an exception is the measurement of mid-career departures of 
Japanese bureaucrats (the so called amakudari, or descent from heaven). Suleiman also 
indirectly assesses the “revolving door” among U.S. bureaucrats and loss of prestige for 
the civil service, but does not address tenure length of political appointees.  Suleiman, 
Dismantling Democratic States. 
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conservative) ideology scores, to assess just how close to the president (i.e. how “loyal”) 
an official is.13 
In the domain of foreign and defense policy, however, these same metrics are 
likely to falter.  Ideology scores – drawn from well-recognized and structured policy 
practices and preferences on domestic policy – are unlikely to capture preferences we see 
in foreign affairs.  The following analysis suggests that all else equal, we should expect 
politicization to occur in foreign policy as well, albeit one that operates on the basis of 
different cleavages.  The challenge is to identify these relevant cleavages, which may in 
the end resemble what Krehbiel terms “preferenceship,” a stable configuration of policy 
preferences, rather than partisanship or liberal-conservative ideology.14  This challenge 
will also be taken up in the penultimate chapter of this study. 
 
II.  Why politicize?  Inclinations and adaptations. 
 
Modern presidents, including Nixon, have frequently entered office voicing aspirations to 
cabinet-style government, with decentralized authority and principled selection criteria 
for officials.15  In practice, however, they have generally resorted to centralization, 
concentrating decisions in the Executive Office of the President (EOP), politicization, or 
a combination of both.16  
To understand the reasons why, we will review two dominant perspectives among 
studies of presidential policymaking – the managerial and institutional perspectives – 
and how they have contributed to how we think about politicization.17  Thereafter we will 
look at a separate, game-theoretic literature, on strategic information, that has played an 
increasingly important role in contemporary theories of politicization. 
                                                 
13 On this point, see Andrew Rudalevige, Managing the President's Program: 
Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation, Princeton studies in 
American politics, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 37. 
14 Keith Krehbiel, “Where's the Party?,” British Journal of Political Science 23, no. 2 
(1993), http://www.jstor.org/stable/194249. 
15 In an oft-quoted interview from 1968, Nixon voiced his resolve to “disperse” authority 
in his administration.  See Stephen Hess and James P. Pfiffner, Organizing the 
Presidency, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,, 2002); Earl Mazo 
and Stephen Hess, President Nixon: A Political Portrait, 1st ed. (New York,: Harper & 
Row, 1968).  In that same interview Nixon eschewed partisan “labels” in both foreign 
and domestic policy matters, on the latter saying, “On the race issue I’m a liberal.  On 
economics I’m a conservative.  Domestically, you could say I’m a centrist. But really I 
don’t go for labels.  You can’t classify me.  I’m a pragmatist, but not a pragmatist in the 
sense that I’m for anything merely because it works.  I’m a pragmatist with some deep 
principles that never change.  I’m just not doctrinaire.”  Mazo and Hess, President Nixon, 
316. 
16 In Nixon’s case, aspirations to dispersed authority quickly turned to centralization and 
cabinet-balancing.  Only later did the full force of politicization take hold, giving rise to 
what Nathan terms the “administrative state”  Nathan, The Plot That Failed; Richard P. 
Nathan, The Administrative Presidency (New York: Wiley, 1983). 
17 Burke, The Institutional Presidency. 
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The managerial perspective 
 
Managerial studies comprise the most important early work on postwar presidents.  
Inaugurated by Neustadt’s Presidential Power (1960), they include studies of advisory 
systems, group choice and response to international crises.18  Managerial accounts vary 
by how systematically they are framed, but they typically involve similar units of 
analysis.  Independent variables are the individual (president and advisor/officials) or the 
small group.  Personality or small-group factors connect through intervening variables – 
bad management, flawed cognition, biased or incomplete information – to the dependent 
variable, policy success or failure.  The fly-on-the-wall perspective of managerial studies 
is akin to the microfoundational level of analysis, though these studies usually lack 
formal theories of choice.  Finally, they are largely composed in the vein of “prescriptive 
management”19, and it can be difficult to disentangle their normative and analytical 
claims. 
Managerial studies use thick, naturalistic accounts to frame actors, motivations 
and choice dynamics.  Actors are complex, perhaps contradictory, and so are their 
interactions.  Two assumptions simplify this terrain.  The first is that presidents’ power 
and prerogatives force other actors to conform to them.  Managerial expertise and the 
power it creates is corollary to presidential personality, and decision is both cause and 
consequence of that power.  Despite a cast of relevant actors, therefore, analysis centers 
largely on presidents themselves.  A second convenience is that, despite its richness, 
presidential motivation must, as a practical matter, accommodate to the informational 
needs of the office. 
This is clear in Presidential Power.  Neustadt praises FDR’s competitive style, 
which involved giving subordinates overlapping responsibilities and forcing them to 
compete for his attention.  Rooted in Roosevelt’s “insights, his incentives, and his 
confidence,” such management enriched the president’s access to high-quality 
information.  Similar later analyses map personality or psychological factors onto 
typologies of management styles.20  
                                                 
18 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: 
Wiley,, 1960). 
19 Alexander L. George, “The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy,” 
American Political Science Review 66, no. 3 (1972). 
20 John P. Burke, Honest Broker?: The National Security Advisor and Presidential 
Decision Making, 1st ed., Joseph V. Hughes Jr. and Holly O. Hughes Series on the 
Presidency and Leadership, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009); Cecil 
Van Meter Crabb and Kevin V. Mulcahy, American National Security: A Presidential 
Perspective (Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1991); Alexander L. George, 
Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and 
Advice, Westview Special Studies in International Relations, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview 
Press, 1980); Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Presidential Personality And 
Performance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998); Richard Tanner Johnson, 
Managing the White House; an intimate study of the Presidency, 1st ed. (New York,: 
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Organizational mechanisms (or what George terms “procedural tools”), used by 
presidents to control the decision making process, express core tendencies in each 
president’s style and are reflected in advisory systems.  Fostering competition through 
overlapping jurisdictions and advisory responsibilities (competitive system: FDR) is one 
such mechanism.  Centralization of information flow within a hierarchy (formalistic 
style: Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon) is another, as is competitive, small-group 
deliberation, with the president working closely with a counselor (collegial style: 
Kennedy, Johnson).  Each mechanism has benefits, in decisional control and high-quality 
information, and costs, in presidential attention and in possibly distorted information.21 
Despite the variation, however, there is a through-line, an ur-mechanism 
suggested first by Neustadt’s appraisal of Roosevelt: Rivalry among advisors, with 
differing opinions and sources of information, will ceteris paribus contribute to better 
policy.22 Too little competition can result in easy, pre-screened answers or, in Neustadt’s 
words, “‘happy thoughts’ in high places”.23  But too much can be bad as well, as 
subordinates vying for a presidential audience introduce bias in their messaging.  For 
Johnson, the middle-ground solution is Kennedy’s collegial approach.  From the center of 
his close-knit network, Kennedy encouraged advisors to “staff out problems and generate 
solutions which… fuse the strongest elements of divergent points of view.”24 
George expands this idea of controlled competition into what he calls multiple 
advocacy.25 He recognizes that advice can be distorted, not only by an advisor’s interests 
but also by specific exploitable strengths: personal or bureaucratic resources.  
Competence or objectivity norms may reduce the problem of interests, but not that of 
strengths or resources.  These “maldistributions” must be equalized, requiring a new role, 
a custodian-manager, to strengthen weak policy advocates, bring in new actors (a devil’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
Harper & Row, 1974); Roger B. Porter, Presidential Decision Making: The Economic 
Policy Board (Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
21 Burke, Honest Broker?: The National Security Advisor and Presidential Decision 
Making; George, Decisionmaking; Johnson, Managing the White House. 
22 There is a long intellectual tradition that views competition among ideas as a logical 
analog to other kinds of market competition, and that “marketplaces” for ideas lead to 
better decision making.  As mechanisms, idea markets do not need to built as much as 
enabled, demanding restraint so as not to discourage their free exchange; see John Stuart 
Mill, On Liberty, 2nd ed. (London: J.W. Parker,, 1859).; also Holmes’s opinion in 
Schenck v. United States, No. 437 (U.S. Supreme Court Mar 3, 1919, 1919).  This is an 
important normative argument in literature on presidential foreign policy, and is a 
commonplace among practitioners.  According to George, for example, multiple sources 
of advice, set into competition with each other, can potentially offer the “functional 
equivalent of a rational model” of policy making, a technique known as competitive 
analysis within the foreign policy community. 
23 Richard E. Neustadt, “Staffing the Presidency,” in The National Security Council; 
Jackson subcommittee papers on policy-making at the Presidential level, ed. Henry M. 
Jackson (New York: Praeger, 1965). 
24 Johnson, Managing the White House. 
25 George, “Multiple Advocacy.”; George, Decisionmaking. 
 6 
advocate, for instance) and ensure the policy team has access to multiple channels of 
information.26 
Assigning a custodial agent presents a moral hazard.  The agent must commit 
voluntarily to a limited process role.  She must not advocate or work to expand her 
portfolio, and most importantly must be unbiased with regard to final decisions.  While 
many could fill this “honest broker” role, in foreign policy a natural candidate is the 
president’s National Security Advisor (formally the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, or APNSA).  There have been many efforts to find correlation 
between positive brokerage by the APNSA and decision quality.  These often point to 
policy failures in post-Eisenhower administrations, when the APNSA tended to trade 
neutrality for advocacy.27 
Finally, while the president is a political actor, her advisors should not be.  They 
should possess both specific, professional expertise and hardy independence in policy 
discussions, even if this means delivering bad news.28  This neutral competence can be 
traced to the politics-administration dichotomy in traditional studies of government 
organization, “grounded in interrelated normative and empirical assumptions about the 
role of bureaucracy in government.”29 
As an empirical matter, neutrality can be “built into” the policy process (for 
example, via delegation, which puts policy control in the hands of non-partisan 
subordinates30), or it may serve as a device of institutional learning.31  Or neutral 
competence can be viewed as normative, valued by presidents and their policy teams as a 
way to increase bureaucratic responsiveness within a given political context.32  In the 
                                                 
26 Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
27 The case of Nixon APNSA Henry Kissinger is illustrative; see Gregory M. Herek, 
Irving L. Janis, and Paul Huth, “Decision making during international crises: Is quality of 
process related to outcome?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31, no. 2 (1987). 
28 Heclo, “Neutral Competence.”; Herbert Kaufman, “Emerging Conflicts in the 
Doctrines of Public Administration,” The American Political Science Review 50, no. 4 
(1956), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1951335; Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and 
Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986); Patrick J. Wolf, “Neutral and Responsive Competence: The Bureau of the 
Budget, 1939-1948, Revisited,” Administration & Society 31, no. 1 (1999/03/01 1999). 
29 Suleiman, Dismantling Democratic States; William F. West, “Neutral Competence and 
Political Responsiveness: An Uneasy Relationship,” Policy Studies Journal 33, no. 2 
(2005). 
30 Gary Miller, “Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design of 
Public Agencies,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART 10, 
no. 2 (2000), http://www.jstor.org/stable/3525646. 
31 Matthew Dull, “Why PART? The Institutional Politics of Presidential Budget Reform,” 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART 16, no. 2 (2006), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3840365. 
32 Matthew J. Dickinson and Andrew Rudalevige, “Presidents, Responsiveness, and 
Competence: Revisiting the “Golden Age” at the Bureau of the Budget,” Political 
Science Quarterly 119, no. 4 (2004), http://www.jstor.org/stable/20202433. 
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context of multiple advocacy, neutral competence is both empirical and normative.  It 
comes about as a consequence of balanced or managed competition (the “functional 
equivalent of a rationality model,” in George’s words).  On the other hand it denotes the 
ethic of custodianship, meant to reduce moral hazard.  Scholars like Neustadt and 
Johnson recognize that neutral competence is often honored in the breach, and presidents 
must face the possibility of infighting, parochialism, even the manipulation of 
information among their subordinates.  Nonetheless, sound deliberation will begin with 
assembling the right team, a highly competent, broad-minded staff embodying what 
Heclo describes as the “loyalty that argues back.” 
 
The institutionalist perspective 
 
Institutional studies arose in part as response to the “crisis” of managerial scholarship, 
portended by Heclo’s observation in 1977 that the subfield had been fueled participant 
accounts and anecdote rather than systematic research.  Cited by critics were its weak 
theoretical foundations, absence of quantitative methods and inadequate hypothesis 
testing; in Edward’s words, it “too often [failed] to meet the standards” of the larger 
field.33  The push to re-align presidential studies has led to a growing emphasis on theory-
building, expressed in the adoption of behavioral models from transaction cost, 
informational, and new institutional economics, and the use of concepts such as asset-
specificity and path-dependence, as well as attempts to discover or build datasets that can 
be subject to statistical testing.34 
Historical developments also contributed to the institutional turn: the growth of 
the presidency in complexity, size of workforce, and budget;35 the apparent decline in 
presidential interest in the office’s managerial dimensions, the erosion of competence 
norms, and the increased willingness of presidents to politicize its policy machinery or to 
act unilaterally.36 In the area of presidential foreign policy, an important shift came with 
the reevaluation of the Eisenhower presidency, following declassifications between 1972 
                                                 
33 George C. Edwards, Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1983); Heclo, Strangers; William G. Howell, “Quantitative 
Approaches to Studying the Presidency,” in The Oxford handbook of the American 
Presidency, ed. George C. Edwards and William G. Howell, The Oxford Handbooks of 
American Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
34 Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
35 John P. Burke, The Institutional Presidency (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1992); Burke, The Institutional Presidency; Lyn Ragsdale and John J. Theis, “The 
Institutionalization of the American Presidency, 1924-92,” American Journal of Political 
Science 41, no. 4 (1997), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2960490. 
36 Terry M. Moe, “The Politicized Presidency,” in The New Direction in American 
Politics, ed. John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1985); Terry M. Moe, “Power and Political Institutions,” Perspectives on 
Politics 3, no. 2 (2005), http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688027; Terry M. Moe and William 
G. Howell, “Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 29, no. 4 (1999). 
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and 1985.  Long accused of “organized absenteeism,” Eisenhower was revealed to have 
worked with a “hidden hand,” concealing adroit management strategies behind a public 
posture of equanimity.37 More importantly, as much as any modern president, 
Eisenhower actively worked within the formal confines of the interagency process – a 
process he was largely responsible for institutionalizing – as well as outside of it, saving 
key decisions for more informal advisory arrangements.  
With Eisenhower revisionism, the variance among administrations that once gave 
analytical bite to managerial approaches weakened.  It appeared that, despite differences 
in personality and style, presidents experience decision making in many of the same 
ways.  Such continuity provided an empirical complement to the analytical and 
methodological turn towards institutions.  Context is important, even for presidents; as 
Moe writes, “certain factors have structured the incentives of all modern presidents along 
the same basic lines.”38 
Presidential scholars focused increasingly on those structured incentives, and the 
relationship between presidents and the institutionalized office.  For some, 
institutionalization suggests a renewed need for administrative efforts.  Presidents who 
could think organizationally, adjusting their management style to the robust 
organizational environment, would fare better than those that do not.  Other scholars held 
that bureaucratic inertia drove presidents to try to enforce responsiveness in executive 
organizations by politicizing them (through appointing political allies, e.g.) or to skirt 
them, centralizing policymaking, for example, within the Executive Office of the 
President.39 
While their starting point are the institutions and organizations that comprise the 
institutional presidency, scholars have sought to strengthen statistical inference in their 
work by considering other units of analysis: presidential vetoes,40 executive orders,41 
appointments,42 public statements,43 agency originations44 and so forth.  More generally 
                                                 
37 Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: 
Basic Books, 1982). 
38 Moe, “The Politicized Presidency.” 
39 B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, “The Dynamics of Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy,” The American Political Science Review 85, no. 3 (1991), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1963851. 
40 Charles M. Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power, 
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); Nolan M. McCarty, “Presidential Reputation and the 
Veto,” Economics & Politics 9, no. 1 (1997). 
41 William G. Howell, Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential 
Action (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,, 2003). 
42 David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and 
Bureaucratic Performance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
43 Brandice Canes-Wrone, Who Leads Whom?: Presidents, Policy, and the Public, 
Studies in Communication, Media, and Public Opinion, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2006). 
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these may be described as “decision points” or discrete “episodes of governance”.45  Even 
as analytical units have proliferated, however, actor motivation has become simplified, 
modeled as implied or explicit cost-benefit analysis, optimization, or strategic choice.  
Especially influential has been Moe’s claim that the institutional presidency presents an 
intractable structure.  Under increasing public pressure, presidents turn to centralization 
and politicization as cost-effective ways to pursue their policy agendas.   
This cost-reduction or optimization logic has been adapted to understand foreign 
policy.  The design of agencies, such as NSC, CIA or the Joint Chiefs, result from 
seminal bargains between the president and the national security bureaucracies.  These 
bargains are sticky (i.e. costly to modify later) and the growing disconnect between initial 
design and later needs of the president, have led presidents to personalize and 
“presidentialize” policy processes, reorganizing and strengthening the professional staff 
of the NSC, for example, and creating close-support positions such as Staff Secretary or 
APNSA.46 
Whether in domestic or foreign policy, presidents seek responsiveness of the 
office’s bureaucracies, and do so in a manner that minimizes transactions or information 
costs, or a combination of the two.47  To achieve this postwar presidents have tended to 
centralize and politicize policy.  The former refers to the concentrating of policy 
decisions within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), particularly the White 
House Office (WHO), but can be extended to include the reliance on staff whose only 
“constituent” is the president.  Politicization refers to the appointment of political allies 
into the bureaucracy, as a means to exert presidential control over various parts of policy: 
agency budgeting, rulemaking, personnel decisions and the internal allocation of agency 
resources.48 
Both mechanisms help presidents overcome the principal-agent problem created 
through shared, or delegated authority.  Allies in bureaucratic leadership positions can 
“monitor bureaucratic activity and communicate the president’s vision to the press and 
agency employees, clients, and stakeholders.”49 Centralizing policy allows presidents a 
more direct monitoring and control over staff efforts and the flow of relevant information.  
It lowers the overall transactions costs of policy bargaining between the White House and 
bureaucracy, but improved surveillance over some dimensions of policy making comes at 
a cost: less access to technical expertise resident in executive bureaucracies. 
Early institutional studies tend to view the growing importance of both 
mechanisms as secular, increasing pari passu growth in institutionalization and public 
demands for presidential performance.  Other scholars assert that use of these 
                                                                                                                                                 
44 David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in 
the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2003). 
45 Charles M. Cameron, “The Political Economy of the U.S. Presidency,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Economy, ed. Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, The 
Oxford Handbooks of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
46 Zegart, Flawed by Design. 
47 Rudalevige, Managing the President's Program. 
48 Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments. 
49 Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments. 
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mechanisms may depend on partisan or ideological differences, or on administrative 
philosophy.  Quantitative studies show, however, that presidents deploy these 
mechanisms on a circumstantial basis, centralizing a policy process, for example, when 
the policies proposed are new, implicated multiple agency jurisdictions, or call for 
substantial personnel changes or bureaucratic organization.  Politicization of agency 
personnel, on the other hand, occur more frequently when the overall policy views of the 
agency differ from those of the president.  Neither centralization or politicization have 
grown in a linear manner, nor is their use strongly predicted by party identification or 
administrative philosophy. 
Finally, a central assertion in the institutional perspective is that neutral 
competence has declined in importance, both as organizational reality and normative 
framework.  In this argument, the complexities of the postwar presidency call for a new 
norm, responsive competence, in which loyalty replaces neutrality and competence is 
reframed as the capacity of personnel to address presidential concerns about the 
“dynamics of political leadership.”50 Responsiveness norms both strengthen, and are 
strengthened by, the mechanisms of centralization and politicization.  Loyalty maximizes 
trust within closed policy circles and, in the case of a political appointee, closes the gaps 
of interests that otherwise may worsen moral hazard.  By early accounts, neutrality’s 
decline, like responsiveness’s rise, has been secular.  However, recent studies suggest 
both norms are potentially useful in promoting the president’s agenda,51 and, like the 
politicization and centralization, are valued in contingent manner, based on political 
circumstances and a policy’s specific requirements. 
 
Politicization from both perspectives 
 
From the managerial perspective, politicization is largely conceptualized as a dangerous 
tendency, a pathology resulting from a president’s personality, poor staffing, badly 
organized policy processes, and faltering behavioral norms.  And while a president’s 
inclination to politicize may not be altogether preventable, the politicization’s effects may 
be: first, by strengthening the policy process organizationally – imposing managed 
competition or multiple advocacy and bringing in an honest broker – and second, by 
strengthening competence norms.  Working together, these safeguards promise a more 
rational policy process, and can, it is hoped, slow the de-professionalization of the 
executive bureaucracy.   
Institutionalism, emerging in the 1980s as the first and still most important post-
managerial perspective, is far more agnostic about whether such reforms will, or should, 
be made to work.  For institutionalists, politicization is not a bug in the postwar 
presidency but a feature, not an irrational flaw but a rational adaptation, intended to 
maximize control over an increasingly complex, institutionalized and unwieldy executive 
branch. 
 
                                                 
50 Moe, “The Politicized Presidency.” 
51 Dickinson and Rudalevige, “Presidents, Responsiveness, and Competence.” 
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III. The strategic information perspective 
 
The same decade as Moe’s seminal work, game theorists working in micro- and 
organizational economics began devising ways to model communication between an 
uninformed principal, such as a manager or CEO, and the experts who advise her.52 
Developed in the context of the private firm, these games of strategic information touch 
on themes that are central to public administration and presidential studies, namely use of 
information by presidents, staff and agency heads to control the policymaking process.  
These formal models have had a growing impact on presidential studies; studies that use 
them, while still drawing insights from managerial and institutional approaches, can be 
thought of as constituting a second, post-managerial perspective.53 
This strategic information perspective, like institutionalism, falls broadly within 
the domain of rational actor perspectives.54  While the latter draws largely on transaction-
cost and new institutional economics, the strategic information perspective developed 
from formal work on games of incomplete information.55  Early work on these Bayesian 
games, in which players lack basic details about the game they are in (namely the 
epistemic type of the player they face) gave rise to literatures on signaling,56 cheap talk57 
and, in theoretic work on financial accounting and bank behavior, to models of strategic 
communication that incorporates hard and soft information.58  These provide a robust 
framework for contemporary work in organizational economics, particularly on questions 
about the nature of principal-agent communication, and prediction of when a principal 
may choose communication or delegation.59 
There are superficial similarities between the handling of information and 
decisional control within a private firm (among CEOs, senior managers and middle-level 
management) and their handling within the White House (between a president and her 
advisory, policy staff and agency heads).  Both principals lack policy-relevant 
information and must avail themselves of informed, possibly biased advisors.  In both 
cases making informed choices means accurately updating one’s prior beliefs on the 
                                                 
52 Vincent P. Crawford and Joel Sobel, “Strategic Information Transmission,” 
Econometrica 50, no. 6 (1982), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913390. 
53 This includes authors already cited, including inter alia Lewis, Rudalevige, Cameron; 
see also Gailmard and Patty, Learning While Governing. 
54 Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, “Foreign Policy Analysis and Rational Choice Models,” 
Compendium Project (International Studies Association)  (2010). 
55 John C. Harsanyi, “Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, 
I-III.,” Management Science 14, no. 3 (1967), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2628673. 
56 Michael Spence, “Job Market Signaling,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, no. 
3 (1973), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1882010. 
57 Crawford and Sobel, “Strategic Information Transmission.” 
58 Jeremy Bertomeu and Iván Marinovic, “A Theory of Hard and Soft Information,” The 
Accounting Review 91, no. 1 (2015). 
59 Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole, “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,” 
Journal of Political Economy 105, no. 1 (1997), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138869; 
Wouter Dessein, “Authority and Communication in Organizations,” The Review of 
Economic Studies 69, no. 4 (2002), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1556723. 
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strength or weakness of advisor information, and failing to do so when necessary carries 
risk – cost or inefficiency, loss of credibility, and in the extreme case, existential crisis.60 
In reality, however, differences between the two environments are more profound, 
from the institutional context, to prevailing norms and organizational culture, to systems 
of accountability, hiring and dismissal, and the specific nature of risk, cost and crisis.  In 
other words, the two have much more in common with the abstract formalization than 
they do with each other.  Such formal models or games are not useful because we can 
credibly treat a public organization like a private firm; they are useful because they say 
something meaningful about the choices faced by principals and agents in either case.61 
                                                 
60 This set-up may remind readers of the traditional agency problem – where a principal 
must rely on a potentially self-interested agent to carry out a task.  Because she cannot 
monitor the agent directly the principal must often rely on some mechanism(s) to 
guarantee the agent’s effort.  The strategic information approach – like many game-
theoretic approaches in political science – falls within this analytic framework.  The key 
distinction here is that agent effort is not (and in fact, cannot be) monitored; instead, the 
focal outcome is the coarsening of messages, which helps overcome communication 
problems that arise from bias.  Both principal-agent and strategic information models, 
however, reach a similar conclusion – principals would prefer ‘good’ (i.e. more 
preference-aligned) agents over ‘bad’ ones.  The advantage of the strategic information 
model, however, is that it better describes the policy development environment, where 
outcomes are not readily measurable or contractible, and where truth claims are difficult 
if not impossible to verify.  See Nolan M. McCarty and Adam Meirowitz, Political Game 
Theory: An Introduction, Analytical Methods for Social Research, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
61 And in fact these games have seen important applications in political science, now 
more than two decades old.  Too many and varied to cover here, notable applications 
include the use of lobbying efforts (David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright, 
“Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote,” Social Choice and Welfare 9, no. 3 (1992), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41106026; David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright, 
“Counteractive Lobbying,” American Journal of Political Science 38, no. 1 (1994), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111334.); the raising of campaign funds to deter entry of 
electoral challengers (David Epstein and Peter Zemsky, “Money Talks: Deterring Quality 
Challengers in Congressional Elections,” The American Political Science Review 89, no. 
2 (1995), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082426.); and in international relations, the use of 
costly signals to establish foreign policy commitments (James D. Fearon, “Signaling 
Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 41, no. 1 (1997).).  Legal scholar Eric Posner attempts to explain social norms 
broadly as signaling equilibria (Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).).  Applications in anthropology and sociology 
include signaling in marriage “markets” (Richard Breen and Lynn Prince Cooke, “The 
Persistence of the Gendered Division of Domestic Labour,” European Sociological 
Review 21, no. 1 (2005), http://www.jstor.org/stable/3559583.), identity signaling and 
mimicry (Michael Bacharach and Diego Gambetta, “Trust as Type Detection,” in Trust 
and Deception in Virtual Societies, ed. Cristiano Castelfranchi and Yao-Hua Tan 
(Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands,, 2001).), and signals used in criminal syndicates. 
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Cheap talk, policy advice and politicization 
 
To understand the choice environment faced by experts and principals – or by 
officials/advisory staff and presidents – we turn to a simplified cheap talk model, based 
on Crawford and Sobel (hereafter CS).62  The setting here is as simple as possible: There 
is a single informed expert (𝐸) and a single uninformed decision maker (𝑃).  The expert 
is privately informed of the state of the world 𝜃, which is uniformly distributed on the 
unit interval [0,1].  The decision maker must make some policy 𝑦.  Her payoff depends 
on her policy choice 𝑦 and on 𝜃, and is given by the quadratic loss function: 
 
𝑈𝑃(𝑦, 𝜃) = −(𝑦 − 𝜃)2 (1.1) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Diego Gambetta, Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate (Princeton 
University Press, 2009).)  Finally, it is worth noting that, in terms of linking game-
theoretic models with an empirical research agenda, no field has been impacted by 
signaling theory more than animal behavior and morphology; see William A. Searcy and 
Stephen Nowicki, The Evolution of Animal Communication: Reliability and Deception in 
Signaling Systems (Princeton University Press, 2005).. 
Cheap talk models, meanwhile, have most frequently been used to model 
legislative phenomena, such as legislative design: David Austen-Smith, “Information and 
Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes,” American Journal of Political Science 37, 
no. 3 (1993), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111575; Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith 
Krehbiel, “Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational 
Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures,” Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization 3, no. 2 (1987), http://www.jstor.org/stable/764831; Vijay Krishna and 
John Morgan, “A Model of Expertise,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, no. 2 
(2001)., as well as lobbying and delegation: Morten Bennedsen and Sven Feldmann, 
“Informational lobbying and political contributions,” Journal of Public Economics 90, 
no. 4-5 (2006); David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction 
Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers, Political Economy of 
Institutions and Decisions, (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999); Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, “Trade Negotiations, Information and 
Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups,” Economics & Politics 8, no. 2 (1996). 
For a summary, see J. Sobel, Giving and receiving advice (2011). 
62 This discussion is based upon CS; Dessein, “Authority and Communication.”; Gilligan 
and Krehbiel, “Collective Decisionmaking.”; Krishna and Morgan, “A Model of 
Expertise.”; Vijay Krishna and John Morgan, “Cheap Talk,” in The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics, ed. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence Blume (Basingstoke, 
Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
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Without knowing 𝜃 or any communication from the expert 𝐸, 𝑃 would rely on prior 
knowledge and choose 𝑦 = 1/2.63  Alternately, she may base her decision on a costless 
message 𝑚 ∈ [0,1] sent by the expert 𝐸, whose payoff is given by: 
 
𝑈𝐸(𝑦, 𝜃, 𝑏) = −(𝑦 − (𝜃 + 𝑏))2 (1.2) 
 
Note that 𝑚 does not appear in any payoff function (i.e. 𝑚 is cheap talk), nor must it refer 
to the state of the world 𝜃 (i.e. it is soft).  Because of this, the decision maker may always 
simply ignore the expert’s message and select 𝑦 on the basis of her prior.  This is the so-
called “babbling” equilibrium; in this case the expert has no incentive to convey any 
information at all, and may as well send messages at random. 
The parameter 𝑏 ≥ 0 is the preference-similarity parameter, sometimes described as 
the expert’s bias.  In the CS version, the decision maker maximizes their payoff at 𝜃 (the 
precise state of the world), but what really matters is the distance between the decision 
maker’s ideal point and that of the expert.  For example, if the decision maker has a 
“biased” ideal, say, at 𝜃 + 𝑏𝑃 the preference-similarity parameter would be simply 
|𝑏 − 𝑏𝑃|.  Play proceeds as follows:  
 
1. The expert observes 𝜃.  “Expertise” is represented here by the expert’s superior 
access to information. 
2. The expert sends message 𝑚 
3. The decision maker chooses some policy 𝑦. 
 
If the preferences of expert and decision maker are perfectly aligned (𝑏 = 0), there are 
multiple equilibria, including the babbling equilibrium common to all costless 
communication.  There are also one in which communication is perfectly revealing, 
?̅?(𝑚) = 𝜃. 
What about equilibria when there is separation of interests between expert and 
decision maker?  For CS, any degree of bias (i.e. when 𝑏 > 0) results in the loss of 
information.  If the biased expert conveyed 𝜃 precisely, then she would have the 
incentive to exaggerate the state to reach her ideal at 𝑚 = 𝜃 + 𝑏.  Anticipating this the 
principal would select 𝑦 = 𝑚 − 𝑏, and the expert would thus send 𝑚 = 𝜃 + 2𝑏, and so 
forth.  Provided 𝑏 is not too large, the only informative equilibria will involve noisy or 
imprecise messaging.  For example, the expert might simply say the state of the world is 
“low” or “high.”  CS express such noisy or coarse messages as partitions over the state 
space: 
 
 "𝑙𝑜𝑤" "ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ"  
 𝑥  
0   1 
 
                                                 
63 CS assume the decision maker holds a prior belief given by a unit uniform distribution.  
Maximizing her utility implies taking an action such that 𝑦(𝑚) = 𝐸[𝜃|𝑚] or, in the 
babbling case, 1/2.  Krishna and Morgan, “Cheap Talk.” 
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Here the unique state 𝑥 partitions the state space; the expert reports “low” when 𝜃 ∈
[0, 𝑥), in which case the decision maker’s optimal policy is the middle of the “low” 
interval, 𝑦𝐿 = 𝑥/2.  The expert reports “high” when 𝜃 ∈ [𝑥, 1], and induces a policy at 
the middle of the “high” interval, 𝑦𝐻 = (1 + 𝑥)/2.  At 𝑥 the expert is indifferent between 
the two induced policies; i.e. they must be the same distance from her ideal point, i.e. 
(𝑥 + 𝑏) − 𝑦𝐿 = 𝑦𝐻 − (𝑥 + 𝑏).  With substitution this simplifies to: 
 
𝑥 = 1/2 − 2𝑏  (1.3) 
 
Given a bias of 𝑏 = 1 12⁄  the state space would be separated at 𝑥 = 1 3⁄ .  A “low” report 
would result in the decision maker choosing 𝑦𝐿 = 1 6⁄ , and a “high” report would result 
in 𝑦𝐻 = 2 3⁄ .  A two-interval partition and the resulting policies are represented 
graphically in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1: Equilibrium and policies when 𝑏 = 1 12⁄ .  
Adapted from Li (2014)64 
 
 
 
At 𝑥 = 1 3⁄ , the induced policies (the bold lines) are equidistant from the expert’s ideal 
𝑦 = 𝜃 + 𝑏.  Note that the resulting intervals are larger (i.e. noisier or coarser) in the 
direction of the expert’s bias.  As bias increases, the “low” interval will shrink and the 
“high” interval will grow in size.  Intuitionally this suggests “bad news” (from the 
expert’s point of view) will be more informative.  Moreover, given 𝑥 = 1/2 − 2𝑏, once 𝑏 
gets “high enough” (that is, 𝑏 ≥ 1 4⁄ ), then there no feasible way to partition the state 
space and the only possible outcome is the uninformative babbling equilibrium. 
In this example there is only a single cut point, with two resulting intervals; at low 
levels of bias there are additional equilibria with finer intervals. The maximum number of 
                                                 
64 Tao Li, “Expert advising under checks and balances,” Social Choice and Welfare 42, 
no. 2 (2014), http://www.jstor.org/stable/43662484. 
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possible intervals is finite and uniquely calculated for a given bias parameter.  As the 
interests of sender and receiver converge, the messages potentially conveyed in 
equilibrium become finer and more informative, as given in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1. Example calculations for different levels of preference separation.  Note that utility to the 
principal from delegation (far right) exceeds centralization with communication.  
Preference 
separation: 
Maximum number of partitions:
 65 Principal’s expected utility under 
centralization with communication: 
Principals’ utility under 
delegation:66 
𝑏 𝑁(𝑏) = −
1
2
+
1
2
√1 +
2
𝑏
 𝐸𝑈𝑃 = −
1
12𝑁2
−
𝑏2(𝑁2 − 1)
3
 𝑈𝑃 = −𝑏2 
1
4
 1  -0.0833 -0.0625 
1
12
 2 -0.02778 -0.0069 
1
60
 5 -0.0056 -0.0003 
1
120
 8 -0.0028 -0.0001 
1
1000
 22 -0.0003 -0.0000 
1
5000
 50 -0.0001 -0.0000 
1
1,000,000
 707 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
At 𝑏 = 1 4⁄  there is at most one partition.  This is the babbling equilibrium.  With smaller 
preference separation maximum partitions increase, although noisier equilibria (those 
with fewer partitions) are still possible.  The decision maker’s expected utility (𝐸𝑈𝑃) 
increases, however, as the partitions become finer; such communication benefits both 
expert and principal, and it is assumed that both parties will coordinate on these finer, 
more informative equilibria.  We can summarize the findings of the simplified model as 
follows: 
 
1. Noisy, informative messages and uninformative babbling.  When communications 
involve messages that are unverifiable – i.e. when it is cheap talk or soft information 
– only an unbiased expert can convey a fully informative message.  When interests of 
the expert and the principal diverge, however, there are two possible outcomes.  
Either the expert conveys messages that are informative but noisy, and the principal 
chooses a policy that incorporates elements of the communication, or expert messages 
are uninformative, an outcome called the babbling equilibrium, in which case the 
principal relies on their prior beliefs to select a policy. 
                                                 
65 The maximum number of intervals for any 𝑏 is the smallest integer greater than or 
equal to the equation given here.  For this proof and that of principal’s expected utility, 
see CS (1982). 
66 Dessein, “Authority and Communication.” 
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2. Greater bias means more noise, and ‘bad news’ is more believable.  There are three 
key observations relating expert bias to the noisiness of messaging.  First, if expert 
bias is large enough then all messages will be uninformative – the babbling 
equilibrium.  Second, as bias decreases, messages become more precise until, when 
expert and principal interests align, they are perfectly informative.  Third, in the case 
of noisy communications, messages about the state of the world will be more 
informative in the direction contrary to the expert’s bias.  Intuitively, we might say 
that bad news (from the expert’s point of view) is more credible than good news that 
confirms their bias (pandering, i.e.).  For example, reports from firms of a loss in 
value will be seen by observers as more believable than positive reports. 
 
3. More informative equilibria are preferred by principals and experts.  Cheap talk with 
bias always involves a loss of information, sometimes described as the coarsening of 
information.  Whenever they are feasible, however, equilibria using noisy signaling 
are Pareto superior to the babbling one, and therefore preferred by both expert and 
principal.  A decision maker will always receive a higher payoff from an advisor with 
a smaller bias.  This can be described as the ally principle.67 
 
4. Delegation is nearly always preferred to centralization with communication.  We 
expect the principal to maintain control (and act according to her prior beliefs) when 
advisors’ or officials’ biases are large.  Under nearly all circumstances, however, 
when biases are small enough to make meaningful communication possible 
delegation will result in higher payoffs, shown in the right-most column in Table 
3.2.68  
 
Strategic communication in practice 
 
The CS model suggests that presidents and their subordinates communicate strategically, 
and always with an eye to the policy preferences or bias dividing them.  Managerial 
accounts and administration histories abound with evidence of such calculative behavior.  
From Truman’s “constant consideration” for the personalities and positions of his policy 
advisors,69 to Eisenhower’s use of “personal equations” to adjust his interactions with 
officials and staff,70 to Nixon’s obsessive efforts to decode their motivations – it is clear 
                                                 
67 See John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, “Politics, Delegation and Bureaucracy,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, ed. Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. 
Wittman, The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
68 Dessein (2002) argues that delegation dominates communicative wherever informative 
communication is possible (i.e. when 𝑁(𝑏) ≥ 2).  With an informative prior and a 
smaller bias (𝑏 < 𝐿/2), communication dominates delegation where 𝜎(𝑚) < 𝑏.  For 
centralization with communication to dominate delegation, then, requires a highly 
informative prior (small 𝜎) and relatively noisy (but informative) level of bias. 
69 Johnson, Managing the White House, 53. 
70 Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand, 236. 
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that understanding individual motivations and engaging them in strategic communication 
is an important, even indispensible, presidential skill.  We also see anecdotal evidence of 
noisy signaling, particularly in the context of policy committees, and its impact on the 
resulting quality of advice.  Truman’s Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote, to wit:  
 
… it is always possible to get agreement in a committee by increasing the 
vagueness and generality of a conclusion…  The result can be to provide the 
President with ‘agreed’ papers, when what is he needs is ‘disagreed’ papers, and 
in the end to ask him to give his blessing to platitudes.71 
 
Similarly, Eisenhower’s Staff Secretary General Andrew Goodpaster, suggested that 
building consensus on policy often involved a deliberate averaging, with Eisenhower 
drawing from his advisors opposing points of view before “[developing] the area of 
common interest, frequently setting them in a broader context, to see if agreement 
couldn’t be reached on some more fundamental basis.”72 Shallow consensus on 
fundamentals, however, can mask divisions on more granular issues.  See for instance 
Eisenhower’s remarks on his presidential rival and arch-conservative Senator Robert 
Taft: 
 
On the foreign field, Senator Taft never disagrees with me when we discuss such 
matters academically or theoretically… However, when we take up each 
individual problem or case, he easily loses his temper and makes extravagant 
statements.73 
 
When policy required sharp lines, Eisenhower, like other modern presidents, would avoid 
cabinet-style consultation.74  In crises, Eisenhower would tap a few close advisors whose 
motivations he knew well, including his brother Milton, Robert Cutler (APNSA), 
Sherman Adams (Chief of Staff) and, most famously, his Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles.75 
                                                 
71 Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere, eds., The President and the Management of 
National Security: A Report by the Institute for Defense Analyses (New York,: Praeger, 
1969), 220. 
72 Andrew J. Goodpaster, “Organizing the White House,” in The Eisenhower Presidency 
: Eleven Intimate Perspectives of Dwight D. Eisenhower, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson, 
Portraits of American presidents (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), 67-
68, 77. 
73 Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand, 75. 
74 Karl Harr, “Eisenhower’s Approach to National Security Decisionmaking,” in The 
Eisenhower Presidency : Eleven Intimate Perspectives of Dwight D. Eisenhower, ed. 
Kenneth W. Thompson, Portraits of American presidents (Lanham, MD: University Press 
of America, 1984). 
75  For a detailed account of Milton Eisenhower, Dulles and others’ roles in an applied 
case, see David A. Nichols, Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis, Suez and 
the Brink of War, 1st Simon & Schuster hardcover ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2011). 
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Politicization from the strategic information perspective 
 
The managerial literature clearly advocates for policy-preference diversity, strengthened 
by competition or brokerage mechanisms.  Given the ally principle (#3 above), the 
strategic information approaches suggests we should be tentative about these 
mechanisms’ long-term viability.  While advisors with non-conforming beliefs can in 
theory balance out policy discussions, in practice they may find themselves unable to 
deliver granular, accurate policy advice in a convincing fashion.76   
The key mechanisms identified in the institutional literature fare somewhat better.  
There is, on the one hand, little theoretical support for centralization in the institutionalist 
sense – i.e. bringing decision-making into the EOP.  On the other hand, delegation to 
agents with small bias is closely related to politicization.77  Considering #3 and #4 above, 
and with the proviso that the costs of appointment or retention are not too high, we 
should expect delegation/politicization to be presidents’ preferred strategy of control.78 
 
                                                 
76 In addition, recent experimental studies of markets for unverifiable information 
indicate they are inefficient, and prone to collapse into babbling equilibria. See Antonio 
Cabrales et al., Can there be a Market for Cheap-Talk Information? An Experimental 
Investigation (CESifo Group Munich, 2018). 
77 Does delegation always imply small bias?  Historical accounts give a mixed 
impression: Eisenhower, for example, was known to be contemptuous of officials who 
could not makes decisions independently.  But Immerman points out that delegation “was 
not the same as encouraging independent action…. The subordinate who is making a 
decision must make that decision through the eyes of his commander.” Richard H. 
Immerman, “Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?,” Political Psychology 1, 
no. 2 (1979), http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791100.  On the other hand, Greenstein (1982) 
argues the president gave officials, those whose expertise on complex matters far 
exceeded his own, substantial independent discretion, including Treasury Secretary 
Robert Anderson and Budget Director Joseph Dodge. 
78 A final alternative mechanism is contracting – that is, providing “payment” for 
information.  In most of organizational economics and the contracting literature, hard 
signals alone are considered “observable and verifiable,” and thus enforceable contracts 
can be written on their value: Oliver D. Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, 
Clarendon Lectures in Economics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
Cheap or soft messages are non-contractible.  Importantly, so are messages that 
aggregate both hard and soft information.  Since the soft piece’s value is unknown to the 
principal, the hard piece’s contribution to the overall value is also unknown; all messages 
that aggregate hard and soft information are therefore soft.  Bertomeu and Marinovic, 
“Hard and Soft Information.”  This implies that policy makers operate in an environment 
that is predominantly soft, despite advisors’ and officials’ routine deployment of hard 
numbers – precise measures, numeric asset values, temporal or geospatial data, and the 
like.  Numeric data does not by itself allay the challenges of fostering effective 
communication. 
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The nature of expertise 
 
Strategic information models provide a powerful, parsimonious argument for the ally 
principle, delegation, and, in a similar vein, presidential politicization.  Such models, 
which in simplified form ignore institutional costs or effects, can be readily extended to 
incorporate them.79 
An important consideration in the context of this study is how the literature 
conceptualizes expertise.  In the simplified model expertise is exogenous, a fixed, binary 
characteristic of the agent or expert that is expressed in their knowledge of the state of the 
world, 𝜃.  Fundamentally, however, “expertise” – what is really the possession of private 
policy-relevant information – is an institutional phenomenon.  Institutions define it and 
provide avenues for its transfer, whether through education, training or credentialing.  
Most importantly, institutions have the capacity to generate additional private 
information about the world.  No institutions, so to speak, means no expertise, no 
asymmetry, and no informational advantage to generate the choice dynamics modeled 
above. 
Looked at from this perspective, administration officials’ informational advantage 
may not be a matter of education or professional experience, nor the direct effect of a 
choice to inform themselves.  Nor does it necessarily involve normative commitments.  It 
will be linked to what I call the robustness of their policy unit or agency – its 
institutionalized capacity to produce private policy information.  Personal characteristics 
(level of education, public-sector experience or commitment to competence norms) are 
therefore likely to be important only insofar as they strengthen the official’s attachment 
to their respective agency. 
 
IV. Points of departure 
 
This discussion can be summarized with four general hypotheses.  While these are largely 
exploratory propositions, they will be sharpened as they are operationalized in the 
chapters that follow.   
The first and most basic proposition is that the ally principle will generally hold.  
Notwithstanding the principled criteria presidents adduce on taking office, or the promise 
of competitive analysis and honest brokerage, presidents have good reason to wield 
politicization in the staffing and retention of officials.  This is not due to the ideological 
comfort or partisan shibboleths loyalists provide, but to the counter-intuitive dynamic of 
cheap or soft advice: advisors and officials with conforming views are better able to 
provide quality information. 
Secondly, ideology will be operative in politicization, at least in domestic policy.  
New presidential administrations are built in the main on partisan identity.  Nixon 
administration officials included a few stand-out Democrats, including former Texas 
Governor John Connally (Treasury Secretary) and Assistant on Domestic Policy Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan.  But their presence was the exception.  Ideology score, capturing how 
extreme or moderate an official is within the same party cohort, is like to be an effective 
                                                 
79 Gailmard and Patty, Learning While Governing; Gilligan and Krehbiel, “Collective 
Decisionmaking.” 
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measure of affinity to the president.  However, we need to keep in mind that on issues of 
policy what matters is not party or ideology by themselves, but the underlying policy 
preferences.  In domestic matters, ideology can stand in for this “preferenceship,” but in 
foreign affairs it may not. 
This leads to the third hypothesis: Patterns of politicization will be impacted by 
policy domain.  This offers a version of the “Two Presidencies” hypothesis,80 but the 
underlying mechanism is different.  Here it is not constitutional prerogatives or the 
constellation of outside interests that divides domestic from foreign policy.  Rather, the 
primary cause is the composition of policy preferences, and their loose affiliation with 
ideology and party identity. 
Fourth, expertise is institutional, and agency robustness gives officials their 
informational advantage.  We should expect that the tendency to politicize is strongest – 
and preference distance most causative – when officials reside in agencies that can 
produce independent, policy-relevant information.  This is not strictly a matter of agency 
size.  Robustness is defined by the portion of the agency (the number of positions) in 
excess of the layer of policy-determining positions.  “Coordinating” agencies, such as the 
Domestic Council or the Council on International Economic Policy (under Nixon), are 
often held up as examples of presidential efforts to centralize.  But such coordinating 
bodies possess little if any bureaucratic musculature beneath a cadre of decision makers.  
They have little capacity to generate policy-relevant information, and therefore do not 
confer informational advantage (“expertise”) on officials residing within them. 
Finally, as I stated at the outset, this study predominantly examines retention of 
officials, not appointment, in order to reveal patterns of politicization.  This requires a 
granular dataset of tenure length for officials in the Nixon administration, and additional 
covariates (such as officials’ experience, age, salary, et cetera) that may impact retention 
or tenure.  It also necessitates a statistical approach, survival analysis, that is appropriate 
for handling potentially censored temporal data.  The tenure dataset, covariates and 
methods are the subjects of the chapters to follow. 
  
                                                 
80 A.B. Wildavsky, “The Two Presidencies,” Trans-Action/Society 4 (1966); S.A. Shull, 
The Two Presidencies: A Quarter Century Assessment (Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1991); 
Brandice Canes-Wrone, William G. Howell, and David E. Lewis, “Toward a Broader 
Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis,” 
The Journal of Politics 70, no. 1 (2008), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s0022381607080061. 
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Chapter 2.  Tenure of advisors and officials in the Nixon EOP, 1969-1974 
 
On August 3, 1972, President Nixon, Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman and John Erlichman, 
Assistant for Domestic Affairs, sat gaming out the possibility of using the Internal 
Revenue Service’s investigatory authority against administration opponents.  White 
House counsel John Dean had already gone so far as to present IRS Commissioner 
Johnnie Walters with a list of individuals for a field investigation.  Walters had brought 
the issue to Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz, who told him to inform Dean that all 
such requests had to be made through him.  Nixon was furious at Shultz’s resistance: 
 
One thing about Shultz – Shultz is not long for this life, because he’s not being 
political enough.  I don’t care how nice a guy he is.  I don’t care how good of an 
economist he is.  We can’t have this bullshit.81 
 
In fact, Nixon was wrong.  Shultz, who became Labor Secretary two days after the Nixon 
presidency began and went on to serve as OMB director and Secretary of the Treasury, 
would last another twenty-one months after this Oval Office conversation was recorded.  
Shultz would resign just 63 days shy of Nixon’s own departure, on August 9, 1974.   
Despite an at times rancorous relationship with the president, Shultz proved a 
surprisingly resilient presence.  Part of this survivability was owed to the fact that Nixon 
was wrong on a second count: Shultz was “political enough.”  An academic and political 
neophyte, he was scarcely known by Nixon when he was tapped for his first cabinet post, 
a move brokered by Nixon’s close economic counselor, Arthur F. Burns.  At the time 
friends and professional confidants warned him of the risks of political inexperience.  
Once at Labor, however, Shultz showed a formidable political acumen: He modernized 
the department’s manpower administration, something his Johnson-era predecessor tried 
but failed to do; in what Shultz later described as his “first big battle in Washington,” he 
and Assistant Secretary Art Fletcher launched the revised Philadelphia Plan, imposing 
racial hiring goals on construction unions receiving federal contracts.  Both called for 
considerable political maneuver, including building bipartisan support in Congress.82 
From early on it was clear that such maneuver did not mean tacking to 
presidential preference.  At Labor, Shultz chaired Nixon’s cabinet-level task force on oil 
import quotas; its final report called for “a substantial change in both the method and 
direction” of the president’s preferred controls.83  At OMB he worked against Nixon’s 
proposed cuts in federal funding for elite universities, including the largest recipient and 
Shultz’s alma mater, the Massachusetts Institution of Technology.  At Treasury he 
                                                 
81 Michael Koncewicz, They Said No to Nixon: Republicans Who Stood up to the 
President's Abuses of Power (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2018), 
1. 
82 A.H. Raskin, “Said Nixon to George Shultz: ‘I Track Well With You’,” The New York 
Times (New York), August 23, 1970; George. Shultz, “George P. Shultz: Problems and 
Principles: George P. Shultz and the Uses of Economic Thinking.,” interview by Paul 
Burnett, 2015. 
83 Vilma L. Kohn, “The Oil Import Question: Research, Report, Reaction,” Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 3, no. 1 (1970). 
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resisted the Nixon’s attempts to deploy the IRS against political enemies, leading to the 
president’s angry criticisms in the August 1972 conversation.  This, along with Nixon’s 
re-imposing price controls over Shultz’s objections, led to Shultz’s resignation in May 
1974.84 
As policy advisor and agent of executive authority, Shultz had fused the 
advantage, conveyed by expertise and access to information, with political adaptability.  
The result was a relationship with Nixon that was sometimes acrimonious but nonetheless 
durable.  And we can describe its benefits as mutual.  Shultz was not just retained.  His 
portfolio within the administration grew, particularly once he was brought into the West 
Wing of the White House.  It was a relocation that, even while (as Nixon explained at the 
time) it consolidated the president’s control over the budget, strengthened Shultz’s 
advisory presence overall.85 
Nixon for his part did not get in Shultz a perfect “ally,” in the sense of an agent 
who does not require costly monitoring.86  Their policy disagreements make this clear.  
But Nixon found in Shultz an operator whom, in Nixon’s comments in 1971, he 
“track[ed] well with,” a bit of faint praise that suggests the complex give-and-take 
between the two, and the ambiguity in advisory relationships, in which a decision maker 
submits herself to the partial ‘capture’ by a better-informed subordinate.87  There is more 
than a hint of bitter recognition in the passive construction – “Shultz is not long for this 
life” – as though Nixon thought himself unable to remove his Secretary directly. 
George P. Shultz’s career is one of a host of similar stories within the Nixon 
presidency.  Many have been studied in detail.  But while we may think of it as 
emblematic of the dynamic tension between advisors and presidents, we should take care 
not to generalize too much from it.  The combination of expertise and political 
gamesmanship appeared to work in Shultz’s case – but did it work for others?  More 
importantly, how do expertise and political belief interact in this context more generally?  
When a president sets out to “control” figures like Shultz – what parameters help 
determine success or failure? 
To get at these questions we may turn to a quantitative investigation that 
incorporates many alternative cases.  While data-supported analyses are no longer the 
exception in the presidential subfield or in studies of politicization, they have typically 
focused on political appointment.  However, the interaction between Nixon and Shultz 
not a story of appointment per se; the latter’s selection owed more to accident than 
deliberate politicization.  More important is Shultz’s survival – his length of tenure, the 
politicizing pressures he faced over time, and how he negotiated them. 
The first section of this chapter is a review and adaptation the logic of games of 
strategic information transmission, in particular operationalizing its two core concepts –
policy preference and informational advantage.  The second section then describes our 
dataset, of the policy preferences and tenure length of Nixon-era advisors.  It describes 
                                                 
84 Koncewicz, They Said No; Shultz, interview. 
85 Shultz, interview. 
86 Jonathan Bendor and Adam Meirowitz, “Spatial Models of Delegation,” The American 
Political Science Review 98, no. 2 (2004), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4145313; Gailmard 
and Patty, Learning While Governing. 
87 Raskin, “Said Nixon to George Shultz: ‘I Track Well With You’.” 
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how it was collected, and addresses important substantive and methodological concerns it 
may raise. 
 
I. Does information insulate officials against politicization? 
 
While formal authority – the right to select actions affecting part or the whole of an 
organization88 – lies unequivocally with the president, real authority or effective control 
over decisions, is widely dispersed.  This comes from the basic fact that the boss who has 
decision rights (or who can delegate them) generally has less information than her 
subordinates.  Because of this the exercise of executive power is a shared enterprise.  The 
president’s subordinates wield power where they have none – at least in the formal sense.  
They leverage informational advantage to effectuate their preferred policies.  And while 
presidents have the authority to make policy ‘in the dark,’ without relying on outside 
expertise, they are more likely to achieve their first-best outcomes if they do. 
From strategic information perspective, two factors determine if the relationship 
between an advisor or official and the president is beneficial.  The first is bias, or 
closeness of policy preferences between the advisor and the principal; the second is the 
informational advantage the advisor has over her principal.  The most intuitive version of 
information advantage is expertise, drawn from an official’s personal qualities – talents, 
intelligence, education level or technical knowledge, years of professional experience, 
and so on.  For reasons laid out at the end of last chapter, however, information 
advantage is just as likely to come from institutional sources, for example, from the 
robustness of the unit or agency within which an advisor serves. 
 
Interactions between bias and information advantage 
 
An important question is how information interacts with bias.  CS treat expertise as 
exogenous and binary – you either have it (the expert) or you do not (the principal).  
Under those conditions the ally principle follows: it is always better to consult or delegate 
to the official with a smaller bias. 
In the real world, however, “expertise” is an institutional phenomenon and a 
continuous quality.  Policy units or agencies with better resources will produce more of it 
than poorer-resourced ones.  What happens when an official accesses comparatively 
better information?  How does it influence presidential pressure to politicize? 
One possibility is that it exacerbates it: Loyalty demands, and actions to 
marginalize or remove non-conformists will increase with the information gap.  Not 
wanting to fall captive to an official or advisor’s superior “insider” information, the 
president installs an official whose preferences more closely align with her own.  A 
second possibility is that it does nothing.  Bias is the controlling parameter, filtering all 
communications such that, despite having higher-quality information, a biased expert is 
                                                 
88 Aghion and Tirole, “Formal and Real Authority.”; Herbert A. Simon, “A Formal 
Theory of the Employment Relationship,” Econometrica 19, no. 3 (1951), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1906815. 
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unable to express it effectively.  A third possibility is that information insulates an 
official from loyalty demands. 
Why would better information insulate an official?  Dessein (2002) offers a model 
in which informational advantage is a function of the dispersion of the distribution of 
world states an expert can know.89 The wider the interval of this probability distribution 
(and the higher its standard deviation), the more informational advantage the expert 
possesses, since the principal stands to lose more by selecting an uninformed policy.  
More importantly, a wider interval means that a greater range of bias can be informative.  
The conclusion is clear and intuitive:  All else being equal, better-advantaged advisors 
can have higher biases relative to the principal and still communicate effectively. 
While it is useful, Dessein’s formulation begs an important question.  How can 
we operationalize or measure this ‘interval’ – the standard deviation of the distribution 
over which the advisor has knowledge about the world?  At heart these intervals are 
mathematical abstractions, and in the theoretical literature are treated somewhat 
arbitrarily.  For example, for the sake of computability Crawford and Sobel pick a unit 
uniform distribution (i.e. uniform over [0,1]), with informative equilibria possible if bias 
𝑏 < 1/4).  Similarly, Dessein selects an interval that can be easily parameterized and 
understood ([−𝐿, 𝐿], with informative communication possible if 𝑏 < 𝐿/2). 
 
Assessing informational advantage 
 
In real world cases we cannot assess intervals directly.  One possible workaround is to try 
to assess the scale of the ‘world’ over which the agency has policy responsibility.  We 
may ask: Is an agency generalist in purpose or it is specialized?  Does it provide 
information or recommendations on a set of policies with high levels of uncertainty and 
possible interdependences (e.g. NSC or OMB) or is it more narrowly tasked (e.g. CEQ or 
SAODAP)?  The resulting claim is that generalist agencies, whose efforts are more 
diffuse, confer less informational advantage to their resident advisors than specialized 
ones, whose resources are more efficiently utilized. 
A second, less intuitive way to measure the theoretical interval involves flipping 
the order of our concepts.  Instead of saying that interval width represents informational 
advantage, we can infer the theoretic interval width from what we know about agency 
robustness.  Robust agencies – those with bureaucratic resources apart from their policy-
determining layer – will offer greater informational benefits to advisors than less-robust 
“coordinating” agencies.  Officials serving within robust agencies will be able to observe 
and pick policies from a wider interval of world states. 
All else equal, for a generalist agency to provide the same informational 
advantage to its advisor as a specialized one would require a higher degree of robustness.  
Specialist agencies meanwhile can do more with comparatively less.  We can think of the 
informational advantage an advisor receives from his or her agency as some additive or 
multiplicative combination or weighted average over these measures, as summarized in 
Table 2.1.  (In this case, we have assumed they average together and have omitted 
possible effects of personal advantage measures.) 
  
                                                 
89 Dessein, “Authority and Communication.” 
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Table 2.1.  An advisor’s informational advantage as a function of her agency; 
theoretic intervals and hypothesized pressures to politicize.  Here we assume that 
better quality information insulates against politicization. 
  Low robustness High robustness 
Generalist agencies 
Agency informational 
advantage: 
Low Moderate 
 
Theoretic interval 
width: 
Narrow Moderate 
 
Hypothesized 
politicization 
pressures: 
High Moderate 
 Examples: 
WHO, Domestic 
Council, CIEP 
NSC, OMB, 
cabinet agencies 
Specialized agencies 
Agency informational 
advantage: 
Moderate High 
 Theoretic interval 
width: 
Moderate Wide 
 Hypothesized 
politicization 
pressures: 
Moderate Low 
 Examples: OST, CEA 
CEQ, SAODAP, 
OSRTN 
 
Keeping the theoretic interval of world states in our model lets us hypothesize the role 
bias plays in an advisory relationship.  Officials with low informational advantage – that 
is, who offer advice on choices over ‘narrow’ intervals – must be more aligned to their 
principal in belief or else be ignored, falling into an uninformative, babbling equilibrium.  
On the other hand where we see high informational advantage (i.e. a wider theoretic 
interval), advisor and principal can reach informative equilibria despite greater policy 
dissonance between them.  In terms of politicization, we can put these possibilities as 
three testable claims:  
 
1. Exacerbation.  Specialization, agency robustness and other measures of information 
advantage strengthen the effect of bias on advisor survival. 
 
2. No effect. Such measures of information advantage do not interact with bias. 
 
3. Insulation.  Politicizing pressures are at their height when an official’s advantage is 
great enough to distinguish her from the president but no more.  Beyond that, 
information advantage should insulate her against politicizing pressures. 
 
Advisor effectiveness, tenure and survivability 
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Like intervals, the effectiveness of an advisory relationship – the potential ‘payoffs’ it 
brings to an advisor and her principal – cannot be measured directly.  However, it is 
possible to infer it by looking at the persistence of the relationship over time.  Effective 
relationships, yielding higher mutual payoffs in expectation, should survive longer (and 
bear less risk of departure, i.e.) than ineffective ones, certeris paribus.90 
For the sake of simplicity we define advisory official tenure as the time an 
individual spends in a policy-determining role within the Executive Office of the 
President (EOP).  This assumes that high-ranking EOP officials are likely to advise the 
president directly. We also include high-ranking figures outside the EOP whose role 
includes direct advice.  This includes cabinet officials at the secretary or under- or deputy 
secretary level, and other outsiders who participate in EOP units or coordinating agencies 
(such as the NSC or Domestic Council). 
We will not include informal, family or close personal advisors (such as Charles 
Rebozo or Bob Albplanalp, in Nixon’s case).  There is no easy reason for this.  Canonical 
models do not distinguish between formal and informal advisors, since either can possess 
superior private information and policy bias.  However, later models (particularly those 
involving delegation91), apply less well beyond a formal context.  For our purposes, 
drawing advisors from the same context makes measurement easier and more consistent 
across observations. 
There are two other elements that fall outside the scope of this study.  First, we 
largely ignore an advisor’s initial recruitment.  How and why advisors enter the 
administration can clearly shape their subsequent success.  The most important factor 
here is how closely her policy preferences align with the president.  And while we will 
include it and other variables that influence recruitment – education level, party 
affiliation, prior government employment, role in presidential campaigns, etc. – our 
ultimate interest is their impact on an advisor’s survivability afterward. 
A second omission is the type of departure.  Turnover studies commonly ask 
whether a departure is voluntary or involuntary, for example.  During Nixon there were 
public firings (of Johnson-era OEO officials, for example) and resignations (Richardson 
and Ruckelshaus, e.g. after the 1973 “Saturday Night Massacre”).  There were less public 
but nonetheless troubled departures.  Advisors retired.  Others were demoted or promoted 
into non-advisory positions.  Many left voluntarily.  At least two left and later returned. 
While such details offer insights into those advisory relationships, including 
expert and presidential satisfaction, there are two reasons we will ignore departure type.  
First, as a variable, departure type is the downstream product of another phenomenon that 
                                                 
90 We can consider the expected utility of an advisory relationship here to be a latent 
mediator, such that determinants of utility we have already identified (informational 
advantage and policy preference) predict the expected utility of the advisory relationship, 
which then raises or lowers the risk for departure.  For ease of interpretation, and at some 
risk of specification error, we will consider utility a complete mediator, such that there 
are no direct effects of these two determinants on advisor survivability.  Tyler 
VanderWeele, Explanation in Causal Inference: Methods for Mediation and Interaction 
(New York: Oxford University Press,, 2015). 
91 Attila Ambrus, Eduardo Azevedo, and Yuichiro Kamada, “Hierarchical cheap talk,” 
Theoretical Economics 8, no. 1 (2013); Dessein, “Authority and Communication.” 
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interests us more – advisor effectiveness – for which tenure length is a more informative 
and continuous measure.  Second, because information transmission models describe 
principal-expert relationships in terms of shared equilibrium outcomes, it may be hard to 
draw a bright-line distinction between voluntary and involuntary departures.  Ultimately 
principal satisfaction matters most, but advisors receive utility too, by achieving or 
approaching their policy aims under constraint.  Dissatisfaction with an ineffective 
relationship is likely to be experienced mutually, regardless of how participants may 
characterize it.92 
 
II.  Assembling the dataset: Policy preference 
 
To construct the dataset I began with a list of individuals with official titles within the 
Nixon EOP during the years 1969-1974.93  Additional sources provided names and 
positions for special assistants, counselors, and consultants within the White House 
Office and well as under- and deputy secretaries at the cabinet level.94  The result was a 
master list of 398 individuals in the EOP and other relevant executive agencies. 
Since policy preference distance or bias lies at the heart of the strategic 
information model, I began by assigning policy preferences to each individual.  The 
greatest impediment to empirical research on cheap-talk and strategic information effects 
is the lack of measureable policy preferences for advisors and their principals.  I proxy 
policy preference by using ideology scores, ideal-point estimates that are widely 
available, understood and validated. 
These scores are commonly used for elective officials with roll-call histories.  For 
EOP appointees and outside officials, most of whom have no such histories, I turned to 
the DIME database.95  The DIME database comprises ideal-point estimates for 
contributors and recipients of campaign finance in the period 1979-2014.  It has been 
repeated validated across studies.96  Using public-source biographical information, I was 
able to identify CFscores more than two-thirds of all officials on the initial list. 
                                                 
92 We treat advisory departure as a single endpoint here, coding it as 1 if the advisor 
departs, 0 if the study ends before a departure.  An alternative to single-endpoint analysis 
are competing risks models, in which a terminal event is coded according to its type (e.g. 
0 for a non-observation, 1 for voluntary departure and 2 for involuntary).  While such 
studies are robust and well understood, single-endpoint analysis is more common, 
straightforward, and sufficient to test our claims here. 
93 “Officials of the Nixon Administration,” Richard Nixon Presidential Library and 
Museum, accessed February 2018, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/research-
reference/officials-nixon-administration. 
94 Shirley Anne Warshaw, Powersharing: White House-Cabinet Relations in the Modern 
Presidency, SUNY series on the Presidency: Contemporary Issues, (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1996). 
95 Alternately known as the common-space CFscore database.  Adam Bonica, “Database 
on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections,” (Public version 2.0, Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Libraries, 2016). <https://data.stanford.edu/dime>. 
96 Adam Bonica, “Are Donation-Based Measures of Ideology Valid Predictors of 
Individual-Level Policy Preferences?,” The Journal of Politics 81, no. 1 (2018). 
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Using these scores is not without potential pitfalls.  Not all scores are equally 
supported by underlying contribution data.  Some are calculated from a small number of 
contributions, and those for individuals with single contributions are inferred from similar 
contributors.  In at least one case, there was clear measurement error. 
There are also issues of missingness and what Hill and Huber (2015) call the 
“upper class” bias of donor data.97 The DIME database performs well for those with the 
will and money to make repeated contributions.  Known figures, those with long public 
careers, and those who lived or remain in the Washington, D.C. area are well represented.  
Missing, however, are officials from the Johnson-Nixon OEO whose public careers 
continued in local or state agencies outside Washington.  Missing as well are older 
figures who may have died without leaving a record of contribution.  Finally, some 
individuals may have professional or personal reasons to not contribute (former 
intelligence officials, journalists or academics, e.g.), and therefore do not appear. 
There are important substantive concerns as well.  One is that individual ideology 
may be unstable over time.  Thus individual scores taken in later periods may reflect 
changed beliefs; in our dataset there are at least two liberal scores that seemed likely to 
reflect a post-administration swing.  Congressional research by McCarthy, Poole and 
Rosenthal, however, suggests that roll-call estimates are consistent over time, and that 
shifts in distributions are replacement, not conversion, effects.98  Whether and how this 
applies to non-legislators is an open question, although elite-belief studies suggest time 
consistency.99 
A second concern is that contributors tend to skew more extreme compared to the 
non-donating mass public.  This means that missing ideal-point estimates in our dataset 
may lead our data to collect at the wings.  These ‘missing moderates’ should not be too 
concerning, however.  Huber and Hill’s work compares contributors with non-
contributors, finding the former, which they consider elites, to be older, richer and more 
polarized than the general population.  Our missing observations, however, do not come 
from the general public but fall into a different category, of non-donating policy elites.  
And while (elite) donors may differ from (non-elite) non-donors, research suggests that 
belief among elites is largely consistent.100 
Moreover, our analysis focuses on the distance between ideal-point estimates 
from the same elite cohort, not between elites and non-elites.  Since most of our 
observations fall largely within the same party and within a similar score range (see 
Figure 2.1 below), we should not expect too significant an impact on our distance 
                                                 
97 Seth J. Hill and Gregory A. Huber, “Representativeness and Motivations of the 
Contemporary Donorate: Results from Merged Survey and Administrative Records,” 
Political Behavior 39, no. 1 (2017). 
98 Nolan M. McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The 
Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, The Walras-Pareto Lectures, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2006). 
99 Shoon Kathleen Murray and Jonathan A. Cowden, “The Role of “Enemy Images” and 
Ideology in Elite Belief Systems,” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 3 (1999), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600938. 
100 M. Kent Jennings, “Ideological Thinking Among Mass Publics and Political Elites,” 
The Public Opinion Quarterly 56, no. 4 (1992), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2749200. 
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measures.  More significantly, a visual comparison between our advisor CFscores and 
legislator ideology scores from the same period show that the scores we use here are 
consistent with roll call-based estimates (see Figure 2.2, below). 
A more fundamental and potentially troublesome question is whether donor-based 
ideology measures can serve as a substitute for policy preference.  After all, it is policy 
preference (i.e. bias) that is central to strategic information models, not ideology.  Can the 
former be reasonably proxied by the latter?  For years political psychologists have used 
surveys to relate generic beliefs to specific policy preferences, in the general public, 
among elites, and across policy domains.101  One important finding is that generic beliefs 
relate to policy in a top-down hierarchy.  Abstract values constrain generic postures or 
ideologies, which in turn constrain specific policy preferences.102 
These results suggest that, in general, ideology may credibly substitute for policy 
belief.  Roll-call-based scoring (like DW-NOMINATE) has the additional advantage that 
legislative votes by definition reveal an individual’s policy belief.  For donor-based 
estimates, however, the relationship between ideal points and policy preferences is less 
clear.  Hill and Huber, for example, find that, within the same party, CFscore variation 
does not explain variation in policy preference, which they validate with survey work.  A 
more thorough treatment of the same data in a response by Bonica, however, concludes 
the contrary – that CFscores strongly predict policy preference, even within the same 
party.103 
Given the evolving research on donor-based ideology data, we should bear in 
mind their limitations here.  Even if they are strongly predictive, such scores do not 
translate directly to policy belief, but affect the probabilities of an individual’s support for 
a policy or bundle of policies.  On the other hand, evidence of strategic information 
effects in models that utilize CFscores (such as ours here) can serve as indirect evidence 
that that these scores really do encode policy belief. 
Figure 2.1 displays the percent of former Nixon-administration advisors, defined 
by those in EOP and related agencies, by range of CFscore, including a kernel density 
estimate (the solid curved line).  The obtained scores show significant left- or 
conservative skewness (-1.219), leptokurtosis (3.4403) and slight bimodality.  The long-
dashed curved line provides an estimated normal curve for comparison. 
  
                                                 
101 Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, “The Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of 
American Leaders,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, no. 2 (1988), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/174046; Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, “The Structure 
of Foreign Policy Attitudes among American Leaders,” The Journal of Politics 52, no. 1 
(1990), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131421. 
102 Brian C. Rathbun, “Hierarchy and Community at Home and Abroad: Evidence of a 
Common Structure of Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs in American Elites,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 3 (2007). 
103 Adam Bonica, “Inferring Roll-Call Scores from Campaign Contributions Using 
Supervised Machine Learning,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 4 (2018); 
Bonica, “Donation-Based Measures.” 
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Figure 2.1. 
 
 
CFscores range from -2, most liberal, to 2, most conservative.  The mean CFscore 
obtained here (the vertical short-dashed line) is .5318 (SD=.681), with a median of .8045 
(shown on the box plot) and a right-side or conservative mode at 1.013, which is close to 
the CFscore obtained for president Nixon himself (1.077). 
The upper quartile – a concentrated bloc of conservative Republicans – are those 
scoring near or above the presidential value, including appointments secretary Dwight L. 
Chapin (.997), Secretary of State William Rogers (1.269), counselor Anne Armstrong 
(1.229), Office of Economic Opportunity official Max Friedersdorf (1.236), security 
advisor Daniel I. Davidson (1.093) and presidential assistant Robert Ellsworth (1.037).   
In the interquartile range above the median is a major concentration of what might 
be termed establishment Republicans, including OMB officials William Morrill (.809) 
and George P. Shultz (.878), Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus (.827) and 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (.791).  In the interquartile below the median, 
between .239 and .8045, we find moderates, including aide Patrick Buchanan (.465), 
administration factotum Elliot Richardson (.476), Labor Secretary Peter J. Brennan (.394) 
and White House counsel Henry C. Cashen (.642).  The lower or ‘liberal’ quartile 
contains our likely converts Bud Krogh (-.939) and Special Counsel Chuck Colson (-
.833), Commerce Secretary (and self-described liberal Republican) Peter G. Peterson (-
.883), and Nixon’s advisor and Treasury Secretary John B. Connally (-.597), who 
switched from the Democratic party to the GOP in 1973. 
While we expect conservative skew in data for a Republican president, its degree 
here may be somewhat surprising.  It appears inconsistent with revisionist histories that 
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make the case for a moderate, or relatively liberal, Nixon presidency.104  When we 
compare these advisor scores with similar ideology scores for legislators of the period, 
we can see just how conservative the administration is (Figure 2.2). 105 
 
Figure 2.2. 
 
 
Here the modal GOP legislator (the red-dashed maximum on the right) is noticeably more 
moderate than the modal conservative advisor.  Importantly, the Democratic legislator 
mode sits very close to the mode for our liberal advisor (the small ‘hump’ on the left-
hand side). 
Given these observations, and given that the DW-NOMINATE score for Nixon 
(.548) is close to his CFscore (1.077) when scaled, it is unlikely that the shape of our data 
results from measurement error or bias of donor data toward the extremes.  Instead, our 
data concentrates near or slightly below our presidential ideology score.  This distribution 
of scores is consistent with the starting-point of all strategic information models: That 
principal preferences matter, or more specifically here, that the roster of advisors in the 
administration reflects the president’s policy beliefs. 
 
Tenure length 
 
I have argued that tenure within the EOP is a reasonable proxy for the effectiveness of an 
advisor-President relationship.  Unfortunately, most publicly available information on 
                                                 
104 Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: BasicBooks, 1994). 
105 Royce Carroll et al., ““Common Space” DW-NOMINATE Scores With Bootstrapped 
Standard Errors,” (Updated version, Sept. 2, 2015). 
https://legacy.voteview.com/dwnomin_joint_house_and_senate.htm. 
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advisors during the Nixon presidency gives tenure in years.  (Even a small dataset of 
officials provided to this author by the Nixon Presidential librarians had predominantly 
yearly data.106) 
Year data are not nearly informative enough.  They are interval-censored (i.e. we 
cannot know when in the recorded year an advisor starts or leaves) and do not allow us to 
treat tenure as a continuous measure.  Instead daily data for individual entries and 
departures were compiled by hand for each advisor.  I drew these from contemporaneous 
sources, particularly newspapers (and the New York Times and the Washington Post in 
particular), presidential announcements (from the Nixon Public Papers, 1969-1975) and 
exit interviews.  In a number of cases, Senate confirmation dates (where required for the 
position) were used, taken from the CQ Almanac, and several dates from internal 
administration documents.  A partial bibliography is given at the end of this study, in 
Appendix A. 
Sources frequently contained exact dates, especially for cabinet-ranked or other 
highly visible officials.  In a few less visible cases dates had to be inferred (for example, 
from a news item about a different official switching into the same job).  In one case 
arrival and departure days were estimated outright.  Daily tenure-length data were 
assembled for 164 individuals, a little more than half of the initial list.  Two individuals 
(James Keogh and Lawrence Eagleburger) departed early before returning.  These are 
each treated as unique observations, bringing the total number of observations up to 166. 
In a large portion of cases (62 of 166) the Nixon presidency ended before the 
official or advisor departed.  We cannot accurately measure tenure length for these right-
censored cases, since had Nixon stayed in office they may have survived longer.  Since 
these are time-to-event data with right-censoring (see below), mean and median are 
calculated using the Kaplan-Meier estimator.  Mean tenure length is 1201.64 days 
(SE=51.46) or 3.3 years, with a median of 1278 days (SE=129.76) or 3.5 years.  The 
shortest non-censored tenure is 81 days.  Eleven advisors serve the maximum or nearly 
the maximum period (2028 days).  These enter with the president on January 20 or 21, 
1969, and either leave when Nixon resigns on August 9, 1974, or are still in their position 
when he departs. 
Combining these data with CFscores we can start to discern influence of ideology 
on the pattern of entry and departure for different years.  Figure 2.3 shows kernel density 
estimates for entries (black lines) and departures (dashed blue lines) for each of the years 
between 1969-1974. 
  
                                                 
106 Personal Communication, 2018. 
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Figure 2.3.  Kernel estimates, advisor entries and departures (by year) 
 
 
 
With the exception of 1974 most yearly arrivals resemble the overall distribution from 
Figure 2.1.  First-year departures concentrate near the liberal hump or mode (this includes 
Johnson-administration holdovers), and later departures tend to concentrate near or 
slightly above the median of .8045.  By 1974, this revolving door of advisors leads to an 
ideological distribution that shows no bimodality.  By then liberals have largely left, a 
fact reflected in the yearly mean ideology for the whole dataset, which steadily grows 
more conservative, from .4414 (SD=.7555) in 1969 to .7059 (SD=.4957) in 1974. 
 
Modeling advisor survival: the Cox proportional hazards (PH) model 
 
To more thoroughly understand the relationship between Nixon and his advisors we can 
turn to regression analysis.  In our case it is useful to think of advisor tenure as time-to-
event or survival data – temporal periods bounded at the beginning and end by sharp, 
qualitative disjunctures – or in our case, entry and departure from an advisory position.107 
We will consider the time period of our study (that is, the time during which we 
record observations) to be the calendar time of the Nixon administration: January 20, 
1969 to August 9, 1974.  These are reasonable bounds given this is the period in which 
                                                 
107 Paul D. Allison, Event History Analysis: Regression for Longitudinal Event Data, ed. 
Sage University Papers, Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, (Beverly Hills, 
Calif.: Sage Publications, 1984); Paul D. Allison, “Survival Analysis,” in The Reviewer's 
Guide to Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences, ed. Gregory R. Hancock and Ralph 
O. Mueller (New York: Routledge, 2010); Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. 
Jones, Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press,, 2004). 
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the principal (i.e. Nixon) is continuous, and during this period we can assume his 
preferences impact advisor survival. 
Each of our observations begins when the advisor enters an advisory role, after 
which point they are considered ‘at risk’ of departure.  The observation ends when they 
depart.  As we have seen already, for 62 of our 166 advisors the study time ends before 
we record a departure.  Right-censored observations like these pose a problem for 
multiple regression analysis, but are readily handled by event-history or survival 
models.108  Here the analyst tries to assess the impact of a matrix of covariates on the 
hazard rate, which is formally expressed as: 
 
 
ℎ(𝑡) = lim
∆𝑡→0
Pr(𝑡 + ∆𝑡 > 𝑇 > 𝑡|𝑇 > 𝑡)
∆𝑡
 (2.1) 
 
Let 𝑇 be a random variable denoting time to failure, and ℎ(𝑡) the (limiting) probability 
that a failure occurs during the interval [𝑡, 𝑡 + ∆𝑡], conditional on the subject surviving to 
the beginning of that interval.  Survival models assess how this hazard – which we can 
loosely think of as the “intensity” with which our failure event (or departure) occurs109 – 
is shifted up or down by a matrix of covariates, 𝑋𝑗, for a particular subject 𝑗: 
 
 ℎ𝑗(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp (𝛽0 + 𝐱𝑗𝜷𝒙) (2.2) 
 
The hazard faced by 𝑗 at time 𝑡 is the baseline hazard, ℎ0(𝑡), the hazard faced by all 
advisors, modified by some predictors (given by the row vector 𝐱𝑗) and their regression 
coefficients (the column vector 𝜷𝑥).  A key problem for survival models is estimating the 
functional form of the underlying hazard, ℎ0(𝑡), misspecification of which can result in 
erroneous estimates.  The most common way around this is to use the Cox model (1972): 
 
 ℎ(𝑡|𝐱𝑗) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp (𝐱𝑗𝜷𝑥) (2.3) 
 
The Cox model has the benefit that the baseline hazard is given no specific 
parameterization (with the intercept 𝛽0 from the parametric model (2) subsumed into it). 
It is thus considered semi-parametric, and is most appropriate when our primary interest 
is covariate effects and not the nature of the baseline hazard or underlying impact of time 
on departure events.   Although the baseline hazard is not specified, however, the Cox 
model assumes that whatever its shape it is same for every subject.  Given subjects 𝑗 and 
𝑚: 
 
 ℎ(𝑡|𝐱𝑗)
ℎ(𝑡|𝐱𝑚)
=
exp (𝐱𝑗𝜷𝑥)
exp (𝐱𝑚𝜷𝑥)
 (2.4) 
 
                                                 
108 Allison, Event History Analysis. 
109 Mario Alberto Cleves, William Gould, and Yulia V. Marchenko, An Introduction to 
Survival Analysis Using Stata, Revised third edition. ed. (College Station, Texas: Stata 
Press, 2016). 
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This proportion is constant, provided that 𝐱𝑗  and 𝐱𝑚 are time-invariant.  Equation 2.4 is 
known as the proportional hazards assumption.  While non-proportionality can cause 
significant errors in estimation, there are a variety of diagnostics to test for it and 
techniques to deal with it, as there are for time-varying covariates (TVCs) as well.  For 
these reasons the Cox model has become the dominant approach for event-history 
analyses, particularly in political science research.110 
 
III. Core theoretical variables 
Policy distance from the president 
 
The hallmark of strategic information effects is that preference for a policy outcome 
determines the expected utility of communication about that policy.  More precisely, it is 
the difference between what the principal wants and what the advisor wants, expressed as 
the distance between their ideal points.  In our case, let 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡Pres be the absolute value of 
the difference between the CFscore for Nixon (1.077) and any advisor 𝑗’s CFscore: 
 
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡Pres = |𝐶𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒Pres − 𝐶𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗| (2.5) 
 
Our distance measures are thus a ‘folded’ dataset, with our original CFscores reflected 
across a vertical line at 1.077.111  Bias, the term often to describe this distance, is always 
greater than or equal to zero, which is perfect alignment.  We can see the results of 
folding our data in Figure 2.4, which also displays right-censored observations: 
  
                                                 
110 Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, Event History Modeling. 
111 Where raw CFscores should be folded is not a trivial question.  Using a different 
individual as a reference point yields different distance measures.  These measures, taken 
from fixed points on the line, are linear transformations of each other and cannot be 
regressed together.   
There is a possibility that the president is not the relevant reference point.  
Preference could be measured relative to another official, such as chief of staff Bob 
Haldeman or National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (Hult and Walcott 2004; 
Kimball 1998).  While testing for Kissinger is feasible, testing the influence of the chief 
of staff is more complicated: We have data for Alexander Haig (Chief of Staff from 
1973-1974), but Haldeman is missing. We might proxy him through his personal aide, 
Alexander Butterfield (.704), or generalize from members of his notorious “beaver 
patrol” for which we have data – Chapin, Higby and Ziegler – but the theoretical 
justification for this is less than clear.  See, Hult and Walcott, Empowering the White 
House.  
Ultimately, while we cannot rule out alternative sources of power or influence 
entirely, we will rely on the conventional measure – distance from presidential CFscore – 
that is backed by both theory and evidence. 
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Figure 2.4. 
 
Advisors’ informational advantage: Personal advantage measures 
 
To assess how an advisor’s personal qualities impart an informational advantage, I 
include variables conventionally associated with human capital investment: years of 
experience measured in calendar age and level of education.  For the former, I have 
advisor age when they first enter the study by taking an advisory position (what in 
epidemiology is often termed the “baseline age”).  The mean age of the advisors in our 
dataset is 43.02 years (SD=9.324) with a median age also of 43.  This is much younger 
than Nixon, who took office having just turned 56, although the cohort that is 
ideologically close to the president (e.g. above the lower bound of the interquartile range) 
skews older.  And perhaps contrary to conventional thinking, the more liberal range of 
advisor scores shows no correlation with age.112  To measure educational attainment I 
include indicator variables for higher educational attainment: whether an advisor has a 
Ph.D., a law degree, or is Ivy-league educated. 
 
Agency advantage: Robustness 
 
The informational advantage conferred by an advisor’s agency is calculated for each EOP 
policy unit as well as for cabinet agencies.  The first key metric here is what I term 
                                                 
112 In four of our 166 cases linear interpolation was used to supply missing ages.  These 
were predicted by regressing age on CFscore and the indicator for participation in the 
1968 campaign. 
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agency robustness, given by the proportion of overall positions in an agency that are not 
either policy-determining or directly supporting policy development.113  This provides a 
measure of an agency’s information-producing and implementing capacity, and 
quantitatively distinguishes coordinating bodies (like Nixon’s Domestic Council) from 
medium- and large-size full-service bureaucracies.  To measure this, I first took each 
unit’s size (provided in the OPM’s Annual Report of 1972) and subtracted out the policy-
determining and support positions in each agency or policy unit.  (Numbers for these 
positions came from several sources: the Plum Book of 1968 and 1972, and a 1972 
Congressional report on the growth of the EOP.114)  Dividing this difference by the 
agency’s total size gives a continuous measure ranging from 0 to 1.  Figure 2.5 displays 
resulting robustness scores over their size.  Their relationship appears nearly exponential. 
 
Figure 2.5. Agency robustness relative to size.  Robustness is measured by the proportion of non-policy-
determining positions in the agencies in our dataset.  Y-axis is the log of agency size, measured in 1972.  
CIA measure was estimated; in similar cases, where information was not available, precursor or similar 
agencies were used.  This is shown by hyphenated labels.  (The exception is SAP-OVP, the Office of the 
Vice President.) 
 
 
 
This robustness measure captures the distinction between coordinating agencies (such as 
the NSC, DC and CIEP), which are primarily arranged along the horizontal, and larger 
                                                 
 
114 Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, A Report on the Growth of the Executive 
Office of the President 1955-1973; Prepared Under the Direction of Congressman Morris 
K. Udall,  (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 1972). 
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executive agencies, concentrated vertically along the right side.  At the elbow (between .8 
and 1) we see small and middle-sized agencies with substantial bureaucratic resources of 
their own; these include the White House Office (WHO), the OMB, the Special Action 
Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP), and the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO). 
There are three concerns in using these scores: First, including cabinet officials 
among our advisors creates a potential problem – cabinet agencies, USIA and CIA all had 
similar robustness measures of nearly 1 (as did the large EOP units and independent 
agencies: OEO, e.g. and FPC).  To help distinguish cabinet from non-cabinet agencies, I 
include a dummy for cabinet officials.  Second, to control for confounding effects of 
agency size, I included a (log) size variable.  Finally, many advisors work within more 
than one agency.  In these overlapping or multi-serving cases, I gave the advisor the score 
of the most-robust agency in which they served. (The same was done for the largest 
agency in which they served.) 
 
Agency advantage: Policy Scope 
 
The second measure of agency advantage is the scope of policy.  To give a policy-scope 
measure for each advisor, I started by coding each agency as either a specialized or 
generalist.  Choices here are subjective, but I based them on four qualities: First, how 
specific are the responsibilities of the agency when it was established?  The policy scope 
of an agency is generally given by the legislation, presidential statement, memorandum or 
executive order establishing it.  The Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP), 
for example, is created to give “a clear top level focus for the full range of international 
economic policy issues; deal with international economic policies—including trade, 
investment, balance of payments, finance—as a coherent whole.”115  By contrast, 
SAODAP is created in part to centralize a relatively narrow policy purpose – the 
prevention of drug abuse – under a single director.116 
Second, are agencies created through the integration of other, specific agencies, or 
are they decomposed into more specific agencies or units later on?  For example, at its 
creation the Domestic Council absorbs the responsibilities of the Council for Urban 
Affairs, the Cabinet Committee on the Environment and the Council for Rural Affairs.117  
By contrast, the Office of Science and Technology (OST) is abolished in 1973, with its 
                                                 
115 Richard M. Nixon, “Memorandum Establishing the Council on International 
Economic Policy. January 19, 1971,” in Richard Nixon: 1971: Containing the public 
messages, speeches, and statements of the president. (Ann Arbor, Michegan: University 
of Michegan Library, 1972; reprint, 2005). 
116 Executive Office of the President [Richard Nixon] United States, “Executive Order 
11599 — Establishing A Special Action Office For Drug Abuse Prevention,” (Federal 
Register, June 19, 1971). 
117 Executive Office of the President [Richard Nixon] United States, “Executive Order 
11541 — Prescribing the duties of the Office of Management and Budget and the 
Domestic Council in the Executive Office of the President,” (Federal Register, July 1, 
1970). 
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national-security and research responsibilities given to the NSC and the National Science 
Foundation respectively.118 
Third, must appointees meet expertise or educational requirements?  Both the 
Council of Economic Advisors and the Council on Environmental Quality require 
officials with credentialed expertise; this suggests a more specific range of 
responsibilities.119  Fourth, do they have a high composition of multi-serving or 
overlapping officials?  Overlap, like that which we see in Nixon’s Domestic Council, 
suggests that policy discussed or originated within the agency is general enough to 
involve otherwise unrelated units.  Finally, cabinet agencies are considered generalist.  
Otherwise specific unit scores are given at the end of the chapter. 
Individual advisors are scored with a binary indicator.  As with agency 
robustness, officials who serve in multiple agencies are scored according to their highest 
level of information advantage.  Thus they score 1 if they belong to any specialist units 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
Agency competence 
 
Finally, I assessed the competence of each agency, measured by the percentage of policy-
determining positions filled with non-political appointees.120  Using the Plum Book of 
1968 and 1972, I totaled the number of leading and support positions that were political 
in nature.  These were defined by appointment type and pay grade: For political positions 
I included presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation (PAS); those that were 
president-appointed without confirmation (PA); excepted positions (PL), Schedule C and 
Non-career Executive Assignment (NEA) positions. 121  With the exception of PAS and 
NEA appointments, to be included positions had to receive pay according the executive 
                                                 
118 Richard M. Nixon, “Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973,” (Federal Register, July 1, 
1973). 
119 David E. Lewis and Jennifer L. Selin, Sourcebook of United States Executive 
Agencies, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C.: Administrative Conference of the United States, 
Office of the Chairman,, 2012), http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo37402. 
120 David E. Lewis, “The Politics of Institutionalizing the Presidency: Neutral versus 
Responsive Competence in the Executive Office of the President” (Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association, August 29-September 1, 2002 2002). 
121 Eisenhower created Schedule C as a “class of federal employee who was directly 
responsible to the president, outside the civil service and yet not subject ot advice and 
consent by the Senate.”  Gailmard and Patty, Learning While Governing, 126.  NEA 
positions were created by President Johnson in 1966, with the express goal of “extending 
and adapting merit principles in recruitment, selection, and development, combined with 
improvements in the identification, assignment and utilization of key personnel.”  
Executive Office of the President [Lyndon Johnson] United States, “Executive Order 
11315 — Amending the Civil Service Rules to authorize an Executive Assignment 
System for positions in grades 16, 17, and 18 of the General Schedule,” (Federal 
Register, November 17, 1966). 
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or so-called “supergrade” schedules.122 Summing these and dividing by the total number 
of leading and support positions, provides a competence measure ranging from 0 to 1.  
Again, officials serving multiple agencies were given their highest competence score, and 
I included an indicator variable for officials or advisors with public-service careers prior 
to appointment. 
 The variables above – policy preference distance, personal information advantage 
measures and agency advantage measures (policy scope, robustness, and competence) – 
constitute our core theoretical variables.  For the agency measures used in this analysis, 
see Appendix B. 
 
IV. Other contributors to departure risk 
 
To avoid specification error we also collected measures on other possible predictors.  Of 
these the first, policy domain, is, as we will see, the most likely contender for inclusion 
with those variables previously mentioned into a complete theory-driven model.  Others 
given below will be considered ‘control’ variables. 
 
Policy domain (foreign or domestic) 
 
An important claim in presidential studies is that there are “two presidencies.”123  
Presidents exercise power differently when conducting foreign versus domestic policy, 
and power is at its zenith in foreign affairs.  While the two presidencies thesis is not a 
direct concern here, we ask whether this distinction of policy domain influences the 
giving and receiving of advice.  The strategic information literature provides no rationale 
for distinguishing among such functions or domains of policy expertise.  However, we 
can think of domestic and foreign policy domains as each defined by a set of general 
conditions that differ, and which interact with the logic of strategic communication.   
There is no easy way to theorize the precise nature of that interaction because, 
from an informational point-of-view, we can characterize these domains in equally 
credible but opposing ways.  For example, we might suspect that advisors working in 
foreign policy have more informational advantage than domestic advisors, since foreign 
affairs involves highly-specialized if not arcane knowledge, complex policy 
interdependencies and uncertain implications for domestic politics.  Experts should 
therefore be mostly immune from the dynamics of ‘politics’ or policy preferences.  On 
the other hand, in the context of ongoing engagements, such as the war in Vietnam, 
policy might be sufficiently routinized to involve a narrow band of incremental or easily-
                                                 
122 “Policy-determining” positions, whether political or not, were nearly all paid at 
supergrade or above; see Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Short A Report on 
the Growth of the Executive Office of the President 1955-1973; Prepared Under the 
Direction of Congressman Morris K. Udall.  Excluded from calculations were Schedule 
A, B, lower-grade C or PL positions, and agency-specific exempted (PL) positions, which 
were by-and-large competitive. 
123 Wildavsky, “The Two Presidencies.” 
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calculated choices.  In this case advantage would be low and policy consensus more 
salient. 
Overall, given Nixon’s reassessment of Vietnam, however, his broad rethinking 
of détente and embrace of an ideologically fluid strategic posture,124 we predict that the 
former is largely true, and that foreign-policy expertise provides insulates against policy 
dissonance.  To test this, I use an indicator variable (1 is an advisor is part of any foreign-
policy unit or agency, 0 otherwise) as an interaction term.  It is considered alone as a 
main-effect variable.  This is to address confounding, but is of perhaps less theoretical 
importance.  Our question is not to see if foreign policy expertise by itself has 
consequence (and the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates suggest it may not; see Figure 3.4 
below).  Our concern is whether and how it interacts with our other theoretically-
grounded predictors, preference and competence. 
 
Start year, the 1968 campaign and Johnson-era holdovers 
 
Advisors that enter as part of the transition team usually have a strong rapport with the 
president.  In many cases these relationships begin years before in personal or political 
interactions or on previous campaigns.  Starting early in a presidency also provides an 
advisor with the chance to establish themselves as a reliable source of advice.  Given 
limited presidential time and attention this can equate to cornering presidential attention.   
We predict a path dependence here – that departure risk for early entrants to be 
lower than those coming later into the EOP.  We measure this by the number of days to 
entry, taken from January 20, 1969, converted to years for ease of interpretation.  In order 
to assess the importance of campaign service, we use an additional indicator, 1 for those 
advisors who served in Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign, 0 otherwise.  Early-serving 
advisors may be vulnerable, however, when they are held over from the previous 
administration.  Research suggests that presidents and administration officials work hard 
to eliminate personnel, especially if the prior administration is from the other party.  Here 
we use an indicator variable – 1 for Johnson-era holdovers, 0 for non-holdovers. 
 
Serving in more than one agency 
 
Forty-two of our 166 observations are advisors who serve on more than agency.  Eleven 
advisors serve on four or five.  We predict that such multi-serving advisors – who are 
more likely to have a presidential audience, greater responsibilities and potential control 
over the policy agenda – will have lower risk of departure than those serving in one 
agency.  We include a variable for the number of agencies in which each advisors serves. 
 
Personal economic motivations: Salary and opportunity costs 
 
                                                 
124 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American 
National Security Policy During the Cold War, Rev. and expanded ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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Research generally points to non-monetary motivations for those in public service, 
including altruistic intentions or value congruence between individuals and 
organizations.125  While unlikely to be determinative, level of pay, or the lure of outside 
employment, may raise or lower an advisor’s commitment to her position.  To test the 
impact of this I have included two measures: The first is each advisor’s yearly salary.  
The second is an opportunity-cost measure given by the ratio of the salary of comparably 
skilled private-sector employment, to an advisor’s governmental pay.   
Salaries or pay-grades for many EOP officials are given in the Plum Book or the 
“A Report on the Growth of the Executive Office of the President 1955-1973.”  In cases 
where data were missing, pay was inferred from comparable officials.  Calculating 
salaries for outside employment involved two steps: first, to determine the industry an 
advisor would likely enter when leaving (law, academia, science, foreign service, 
management, media and communications, etc.), then to compile pay estimates for these 
industries based on experience or grade.  After the passage of the Federal Pay 
Comparability Act of 1970, the Bureau of Labor Statistics made an effort to match 
public-sector pay with comparably skilled private-sectors jobs.  Occasional reports allow 
comparison across public and private sector work in some occupations.126  For other 
occupations pay was estimated using BLS yearly reports. 
Advisors, like Defense Secretary David Packard, for whom the ‘outside option’ 
involved personal fortunes or CEO-level pay, neither of which are generally reported, 
were given an arbitrary high opportunity-cost ratio.  Career civil servants, for whom there 
is no real private-career alternate, were given a ratio of 1.  The resulting ratios range from 
.335, in which government salary is three-times higher than the private option, to 2, in 
which the private salary is twice as great.  I also include a binary indicator for those who 
would likely seek private-sector jobs as an alternative – in the words, non-career civil 
service employees. 
 
Presidential priority measures 
 
Another potential influence on advisor survival is whether they serve in an agency that is 
prioritized (or de-prioritized) by the president.  One way to assess presidential interest in 
an agency is to measure whether an agency’s budget is increasing or decreasing over the 
administration.  I measured percentage change in budget for each agency between 1970 
and 1973, using The Budget of the United States Government (BOB/OMB 1969-1973) as 
the primary source.  For several units (the CIEP, OEO and FPC) budgets were given by 
                                                 
125 James L. Perry, Annie Hondeghem, and Lois Recascino Wise, “Revisiting the 
Motivational Bases of Public Service: Twenty Years of Research and an Agenda for the 
Future,” Public Administration Review 70, no. 5 (2010), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40802365; James L. Perry and Lois Recascino Wise, “The 
Motivational Bases of Public Service,” Public Administration Review 50, no. 3 (1990), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/976618; Leonard Bright, “Does Public Service Motivation 
Really Make a Difference on the Job Satisfaction and Turnover Intentions of Public 
Employees?,” The American Review of Public Administration 38, no. 2 (2008). 
126 See, e.g., Mark S. Sieling, “Occupational salary levels for white-collar workers, 
1982,” Monthly Labor Review 105, no. 10 (1982), http://www.jstor.org/stable/41841702. 
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Congressional sources.127  Advisors were scored with the largest (positive) change among 
agencies in which they served. 
Three other priority measures were included here as well.  The first is for units 
created by Nixon himself.  This includes units such as OMB (from the BOB), the 
Domestic Council, the Council on International Economic Policy, and the offices of 
Telecommunications Policy and Consumer Affairs.  We assume that these units will be 
high priority.  Second, units that are casualties of Nixon’s 1973 Reorganization Plans, 
including the Office of Science and Technology, the Office of Emergency Preparedness 
and the National Aeronautics and Space Council, are assumed to have low policy 
priority.  Binary indicators are included for both types of unit.  Finally we consider 
advisors whose positions require Senate confirmation (PAS).  Coordination outside the 
executive demands relatively more attention, energy or priority on the part of the 
president and team.  Because of these ‘investments’, we expect them to have lower risk 
of departure, and we have included a binary indicator for PAS positions. 
 
Agency indicators 
 
To control for otherwise unmeasured fixed effects of agencies themselves, we include 
indicators for each.  A 1 indicates an advisor served within the unit, a 0 otherwise.  These 
are not dummy variables, since there is overlapping membership.  In a few cases unit 
indicators had very high pairwise correlation with other predictors (e.g. the indicators for 
agencies created after 1969, and for agencies impacted by the 1973 reorganization), and 
at least two agencies (the Federal Energy Office and the Office of Telecommunication 
Policy) had too few observations to produce estimates.  In such cases, models were 
estimated separately. 
 
Watergate 
 
Finally, in order to assess the impact of the Watergate scandal on advisor survival, we 
include a time-varying indicator variable.  Any portion of an advisor’s tenure that extends 
into the Watergate period is coded as 1, with portions falling before it coded as 0.  While 
the scandal can be traced to the Watergate Hotel break-in and arrests of June 17, 1972, 
given the extreme secrecy of administration figures involved its general impact on 
advisors would not likely be felt until later.  I have chosen the start of televised hearings 
by the Senate Watergate Committee, on May 17, 1973, as the point after which advisors 
are undeniably operating in the context of Watergate.  
  
                                                 
127 For example, the CIEP budget is alluded to in: Report (to Accompany S. 1636): To 
Amend the International Economic Policy Act of 1972, Report No. 93-190, 93rd 
Congress; 1st Session 1-3 (June 4, 1973 1973). 
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Chapter 3: Patterns of politicization in official retention 
 
Last chapter laid out our tenure-length dataset, variables and the statistical methodology, 
survival analysis, that is most appropriate approach for data that measure time to a failure 
or ‘death’ event (i.e. advisor departure) with censored observations.  In this chapter we 
present our results.  We do so in two ways: The first are non-parametric estimates of 
survivor functions for various groups defined by the covariates in our data.  Comparing 
survivor functions allows us to test some basic claims about our data, including the effect 
of advisor policy preference and competence.  However, it is a usually considered a first 
step toward estimating more meaningful parametric or semi-parametric models.  In this 
chapter’s latter half we will estimate several semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards 
models, and explore our results in detail. 
 
I.  Kaplan-Meier survival estimates 
 
Before turning to model specification, it is useful to provide a descriptive overview of our 
data.  The most common starting place is to use a Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor 
function, 𝑆(𝑡), which in our case is the probability that an advisor survives past time 𝑡.  
Let us assume that an advisor’s tenure is the observed value of the random survival-time 
variable 𝑇 (from equation (1) above) whose distribution is described by the probability 
density function 𝑓(𝑡).  The probability that a death occurs before 𝑡 is therefore 
 
 
𝐹(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 ,
𝑡
0
 (3.1) 
 
and the survivor function, or probability of survival past 𝑡, is 
 
 𝑆(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡) . (3.2) 
 
This is most often estimated using the product-limit, or Kaplan-Meier estimate: 
 
 
?̂?(𝑡) = ∏ (
𝑛𝑗 − 𝑑𝑗
𝑛𝑗
)
𝑗|𝑡𝑗≤𝑡
 (3.3) 
Here 𝑛𝑗  is the number of individuals who are at risk at any time 𝑡𝑗, which falls between 
an interval defined as the period between distinct failure times.128  During an interval 
survival probabilities are constant, and then decrease with each failure.  The result is a 
step function as shown in Figure 3.1.  Here we see the survivor function for all advisors 
(not adjusted for any covariates).  Right-censored observations, incorporated into the 
Kaplan-Meier estimation, are indicated here by tick marks. 
  
                                                 
128  For a thorough treatment see, David Collett, Modelling Survival Data in Medical 
Research, 3rd ed., Chapman & Hall/CRC Texts in Statistical Science Series, (Boca 
Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2015). 
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Figure 3.1.  Kaplan-Meier estimate of survivor function for Nixon officials and 
advisors (1969-1974) 
 
 
 
Meaningful comparison across groups or data subsets is also possible using Kaplan-
Meier estimates, with differences between groups tested using a log-rank test.  Figure 3.2 
presents estimate comparisons for policy preference (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠) and our non-personal 
theoretical variables: agency robustness, policy scope (specialist versus generalist), and 
cabinet-level position.  Continuous variables have been recast as factor variables or 
dummies: 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠 is given in increments of 1, while agency robustness is given as below 
or above the median robustness measure.  Also shown are log-rank test estimates for each 
comparison. (P-values given here represent the strength of evidence against the null 
hypothesis of no group difference.)  
 
Figure 3.2. 
 
Pol. pref. distance (P = 0.000) Agency robustness (P = 0.087) Policy scope (P = 0.000) Cabinet position (P = 0.521) 
  
  
 
Figure 3.3 presents Kaplan-Meier survivor estimates for our personal theoretical 
variables: baseline age, here separated into groups above and below the median age of 
43), advance degree type (Ph.D., J.D.), and Ivy-league education. 
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Figure 3.3. 
 
Official age (P = 0.167) Official with Ph.D. (P = 0.911) Has law degree (P = 0.093) Ivy-educated (P = 0.425) 
 
  
 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 present the policy domain variable.  Figure 3.4 shows the policy 
domain indicator by itself, which is not statistically different from the null hypothesis (P 
= 0.798).  I have hypothesized, however, that foreign policy may be more meaningful in 
interaction with our other theoretical variables.  While regression modeling provides 
more robust tools to estimate interaction effects, non-parametric estimates can offer 
preliminary insights, between an indicator variable (policy domain, e.g.) and other 
important predictors (policy preference and agency robustness).  In Figures 3.5.a-b I have 
divided my dataset into foreign policy and domestic advisors, and have estimated 
survivor functions by policy preference distance and agency robustness for each 
subgroup. 
 
Figure 3.4. Kaplan-Meier survivor estimates by policy domain.  (P = 0.798) 
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Figure 3.5.a.  Policy preference distance 
 
 Figure 3.5.b.  Agency robustness 
domestic policy (P = 0.000) foreign policy (P = 0.005)  domestic policy (P = 0.502) foreign policy (P = 0.074) 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such non-parametric survival estimates are useful, but we must bear in mind that those 
given here are not adjusted for other covariates.  We should consider these largely 
descriptive, therefore, and not a substitute for a semi-parametric or parametric models.  
Subgroup estimations for domestic and foreign-policy advisors (Figures 3.5.a-b) is 
especially inefficient, although the results are more intuitive than, for instance, stratifying 
our estimates on policy domain.129  And recasting continuous variables as factor or 
dummy variables leads to a significant loss of information. 
Despite these limitations, Kaplan-Meier estimates shed light on relationships 
among groups in our dataset, and point to potential choices in variable selection later.  
Among our theoretical variables, for example, we find that differences among groups 
defined by policy preference distance (or the factor-variable version of it) are highly 
significant.  Advisor subsets with higher levels of bias have correspondingly lower 
survivability (resulting in steeper downward-sloping curves).  Two other theoretical 
variables – agency robustness and policy scope – affect survival in the direction we have 
proposed, although the difference in survival brought by higher agency robustness is 
weakly significant (p < .10).  Also weakly significant is having a law degree (P = 0.093). 
Finally while the policy domain indicator itself has no effect on advisor survival, 
it does appear to condition the impact of other variables.  Among foreign policy advisors, 
for example, policy preference distance, or bias, has a significant effect on the survival 
function once it is large.  While log-rank test for difference between groups with small 
(0 ≤ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠 < 1) and medium (1 ≤ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠 < 2) preference distances is not 
significant (P = 0.813) for domestic advisors the same log-rank test is highly significant 
(P = 0.000).   
In other words, foreign policy advisors are relatively insulated from the effects of 
preference distance, but domestic advisors are not.  Moreover, we see that agency 
robustness, while significant in the full dataset, is not significant when we estimate only 
for the domestic subgroup.  In the domain of foreign policy, by contrast, robustness 
matters (P = 0.074), and in the direction we have predicted.  This and other non-
parametric findings presented here are suggestive, but may or may not stand up when 
                                                 
129 Collett, Modelling Survival Data; Cleves, Gould, and Marchenko, Survival Analysis 
Using Stata. 
 49 
adjusted for other covariates.  For this more robust and detailed assessment we turn to 
Cox regression. 
 
II. Cox regression results 
 
Three basic principles guide our model specification.  The first are theoretical concerns.  
The theory variables given in the previous chapters – policy preference, robustness, 
specialization, agency competence and policy domain – are given priority.  Theory and 
our non-parametric evidence also suggest that interactions, especially among our 
theoretical variables, are essential to advisor longevity.  These are prioritized as well.  
The second is interpretability.  Survival regressions can present challenges to 
interpretation, particularly when covariates are interacted; easing understanding implies 
parsimony in modeling and visualization results.  Finally, we must be concerned with 
model efficiency.  This entails paying attention to the number of variables we include, but 
also how we address group effects, either through stratification, use of robust errors or 
both.130 
 
Control variables 
 
Handling control variables requires somewhat a more exploratory approach.  To select 
control predictors, I estimated a trimmed controls model via a stepwise process, including 
variables based on likelihood-ratio tests at the p < .15 level.  Results are presented in 
Table 3.1, including hazard ratios and confidence intervals for each variable and the 
Aikake Information Criterion (AIC) for the model.  I also present an additional summary 
measure of model agreement, given by −2 log ?̂?, where ?̂? is maximum partial likelihood 
for the model.131. 
Interpreting results for Cox regression may not seem straightforward at first.  Let 
us rewrite the Cox model (Eq. 2.3) in scalar form, for a subject 𝑗 with covariates 
𝑥1𝑗 , 𝑥2𝑗 , … , 𝑥𝑘𝑗, 
 
 ℎ(𝑡|𝑥1𝑗, 𝑥2𝑗 , … , 𝑥𝑘𝑗) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp (𝛽1𝑥1𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑗 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑗𝑥𝑘𝑗). (3.4) 
 
If we have a second subject 𝑚, this time with the covariate 𝑥2𝑚 incremented by 1, the 
ratio of the hazards for the two subjects reduces to exp (𝛽2).  If the estimated hazard ratio 
                                                 
130 Because right-censored observations contribute less information than do departure or 
failure events, conventional wisdom restricts survival models to no more than one 
predictor for every ten such observations.  Given our 104 observed departures in our 
dataset of 166, our models ideally should include no more than 10-12 predictors (i.e. an 
events-per-variable score, or EPV, of 8.5-10).  Simulation studies have shown that this 
rule may be too conservative.  For a discussion of EPV guidelines, see Eric Vittinghoff 
and Charles E. McCulloch, “Relaxing the Rule of Ten Events per Variable in Logistic 
and Cox Regression,” American Journal of Epidemiology 165, no. 6 (2006). 
131 For stepwise selection as well as measures of model agreement, see Collett, Modelling 
Survival Data.. 
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exp(?̂?2) is greater than 1, the hazard rate (or failure risk) is greater for 𝑚 than for 𝑗.  
When exp(?̂?2) is less than one, 𝑚’s hazard rate is lower; finally, a hazard ratio of 1 
means the covariate 𝑥2 has no effect. 
 
Table 3.1.  Estimates for trimmed controls model for Nixon 
advisor survival.  The center column shows hazard ratios for each 
covariate; the right shows 95-percent confidence intervals. 
 
 (1) Trimmed controls 
   
Control variables HR CIs 
   
 Start year 1.19* (0.98 - 1.44) 
 1968 campaign (1=yes) 0.61 (0.32 - 1.16) 
 Johnson holdover (1=yes)  2.14*** (1.23 - 3.74) 
    
 Number of agencies served in 0.67*** (0.52 - 0.86) 
    
 Presidential priority: PAS (1=yes) 1.51* (0.99 - 2.32) 
    
 observations 247  
 subjects 166  
 failures 104  
 time at risk (days) 164,894  
    
 AIC 875.7  
 −2 log ?̂? 865.7  
    
 𝜒2Test model v. null (5 df) 30.25***  
    
All estimates were performed using Stata 15.1 for Mac.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
 
We see that a one-year delay in an official’s entry raises the hazard substantially (19 
percent), as does being held over from the Johnson administration, which increases the 
risk of departure by more than twice over baseline.  We see a decrease in an official’s 
hazard ratio by a third for each additional agency she serves in, and positions requiring 
Senate approval (PAS) have much poorer survivability. 
 
Theory plus controls and interactions 
 
Building on this simple controls model I estimated two models, a theory plus controls 
and interactions model, to assess the importance of our primary theoretical variables of 
interest.  Fit can be measured by comparing model AIC scores, and since the proposed 
models are nested we can use likelihood-ratio (LR) tests as well.  Both are reported in 
Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2. Cox regression estimates for Nixon advisor survival, theory plus controls and interactions.  
Center columns show hazard ratios; the right columns give 95-percent confidence intervals. 
 
      
      
 (2) Theory plus controls  (3) Interactions 
      
Theory variables HR CIs  HR CIs 
      
 policy preference distance (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠)
† 1.29* (1.00 - 1.68)  2.08*** (1.50 - 2.90) 
       
 personal information advantage      
  age 0.74** (0.56 - 0.99)  0.74** (0.55 - 0.99) 
  Ph.D. (1=yes) 0.87 (0.47 - 1.62)  0.95 (0.50 - 1.80) 
  J.D. (1=yes) 1.15 (0.67 - 1.98)  1.11 (0.64 - 1.93) 
  Ivy-educated (1=yes) 0.90 (0.55 - 1.48)  0.73 (0.43 - 1.26) 
       
 agency information advantage      
  robustness 0.74* (0.53 - 1.03)  1.05 (0.57 - 1.92) 
  log of agency size 1.10 (0.94 - 1.28)  0.96 (0.81 - 1.15) 
  policy scope (1=specialized) 1.03 (0.58 - 1.83)  0.97 (0.49 - 1.91) 
  cabinet official (1=yes)  1.40 (0.56 - 3.49)  1.86 (0.75 - 4.60) 
       
 agency competence 1.10 (0.82 - 1.48)  1.18 (0.86 - 1.62) 
 public career 0.74 (0.38 - 1.45)  0.96 (0.48 - 1.93) 
       
 policy domain (1=foreign pol.) 0.85 (0.49 - 1.46)  0.74 (0.40 - 1.35) 
       
Interactions      
      
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠  ×  robustness — —  1.58* (0.99 - 2.50) 
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠  ×  policy domain
 — —  0.24*** (0.14 - 0.42) 
       
 policy domain  ×  robustness — —  0.64 (0.37 - 1.11) 
       
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠  ×  policy domain  ×  robustness — —  0.45*** (0.27 - 0.74) 
       
 agency competence  ×  public career — —  0.42** (0.21 - 0.86) 
       
       
Control variables‡      
       
 observations 247   247  
 subjects 166   166  
 failures 104   104  
 time at risk (days) 164,894   164,894  
       
 AIC 882   858.3  
 −2 log ?̂? 848   814.3  
       
 𝜒2Test model v. null (17, 22 df) 47.93***   81.65***  
 𝜒2Test model v. trimmed controls (12, 17 df) 17.67   51.39***  
 𝜒2Test model v. theory plus controls (4 df) —   33.72***  
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
† Except for agency size, continuous variables have been standardized for ease of interpretation: 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠, age, 
robustness, and agency competence. 
‡ Estimated but not reported; results for control variables do not vary substantively across these models. 
 
Like the trimmed controls, these models substantially improve over the null, but the 
interactions model is clearly the best of the three; this salience of interactions is 
consistent with our expectations.  There are two additional takeaways here.  First, policy 
preference has a crucial impact on official survivability, both in its main effect and in 
interactions with our other focal variables, robustness and policy domain.  In the theory 
plus controls model, for example, a one standard deviation increase in policy bias raises 
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an official’s hazard ratio by nearly thirty percent (the effect of bias in our interactions 
model we will take up in detail below).  Second, apart from age, our proxy for 
professional experience, other personal advantage measures – education level and type – 
are unimportant.  This supports our claim that ‘expertise,’ or access to private, policy-
relevant information, largely derives from institutional sources, and not personal 
endowments.  This is also reflected in the substantial, and significant, effect of public 
careerism: When they serve in high-competence agencies, public servants’ survivability 
is significantly higher than that of non-public servants serving in those same agencies. 
  These preliminary findings are consistent with our descriptive and non-parametric 
findings in previous chapters, and at first glance seem to confirm the core logic of the ally 
principle – that president Nixon preferred to surround himself with ideological allies.  
However, the theoretical logic is more complex than a straightforward homophily claim: 
We expect policy preference to have an interactive or moderating effect on informational 
advantage.  Our interactions model gives a powerful clue that the more complex logic of 
politicization holds.  However, assigning more specific interpretation to these interactions 
requires additional footwork, which we will take up below. 
 
Policy-domain effects 
 
Before we do, however, we turn to another key theoretical claim, that policy domain 
matters.  In the social sciences, group effects – heteroskadisticity or correlated errors, for 
example – are common, and our dataset, which takes observations from thirty-six 
individual agencies and across two policy domains, is a reasonable candidate for such 
effects.  One way to address group effects is to include indicators or dummies for each 
relevant group, as we have done with policy domain.  However, including a large number 
of factor variables is likely to hurt our estimates’ reliability while adding little, since we 
have already accounted for agency variation in other covariates. 
A common alternative to a fixed-effects approach is to use robust or clustered 
standard errors, allowing errors to vary across groups.132  Additionally, in survival 
analysis we can devise models with random group effects (frailty models), or can allow 
the unspecified hazard function to vary across groups (stratified models).  We evaluated 
several possibilities, including random effects and stratified models on agency and policy 
domain, robust standard errors (i.e. errors adjusted for each observation) and robust errors 
adjusted for clustering on both agency and policy domain.  Once extraneous covariates 
have been removed, a robust-error interactions model, with fixed effects and clustered 
errors for policy domain, is more efficient than our previous models.  (Table 3.3.)  
  
                                                 
132 Peter J. Huber, “The behavior of maximum likelihood estimates under nonstandard 
conditions” (paper presented at the Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on 
Mathematical Statistics and Probability, Volume 1: Statistics, Berkeley, Calif., 1967 
1967); Halbert White, “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator 
and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity,” Econometrica 48, no. 4 (1980), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912934. 
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Table 3.3. Estimates for Nixon advisor survival, clustered policy model 
with interactions.  The center column gives hazard ratios; the right 
shows 95-percent confidence intervals. 
 
 (4) Clustered policy 
   
Theory variables HR CIs 
   
 policy preference distance (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠)
† 2.09*** (2.04 - 2.13) 
    
 personal information advantage: age 0.84*** (0.77 - 0.91) 
    
 agency information advantage   
  robustness 1.04 (0.96 - 1.14) 
  policy scope (1=specialized) 0.87*** (0.86 - 0.89) 
    
 agency competence 1.31*** (1.30 - 1.32) 
 public career 0.89 (0.58 - 1.36) 
    
 policy domain (1=foreign pol.) 0.88 (0.73 - 1.07) 
    
Interactions   
   
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠  ×  robustness 1.52*** (1.47 - 1.58) 
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠  ×  policy domain
 0.25*** (0.23 - 0.26) 
    
 policy domain  ×  robustness 0.73*** (0.66 - 0.80) 
    
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠  ×  policy domain  ×  robustness 0.47*** (0.42 - 0.53) 
    
 agency competence  ×  public career 0.47** (0.23 - 0.96) 
    
    
Control variables‡   
    
 Johnson holdover (1=yes)  3.43*** (2.76 - 4.27) 
 Number of units served on 0.64*** (0.56 - 0.74) 
    
 observations 247  
 subjects 166  
 failures 104  
 time at risk (days) 164,894  
    
 AIC 827.5  
 −2 log ?̂? 825.5  
    
 𝜒2Test model v. null (1 df) 4.308**  
    
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Covariates have been pared based on fitness, with main effects for all interacted 
variables kept in regardless of fit.  Standard errors estimated using the sandwich 
variance estimator [Huber and White 1980; Lin and Wei 1989], adjusted for 
clustering on policy domain. 
 
A closer look at interactions 
 
We will use this clustered policy model to untangle the interaction between policy 
domain, policy preference, and agency robustness.  While the interpretation and 
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significance of non-interactive Cox models is clear, interactions are not as 
straightforward as they are in linear regression.133 
A useful approach to interactions in survival models is to calculate predictive 
margins at specified values on variables of interest, while holding other covariates at their 
observed values or at their means.  We may also calculate conditional marginal effects, 
by computing the first derivative of a continuous variable while assigning values (usually 
the average) for all other covariates.134  Figure 3.6 gives the conditional marginal effects 
of agency robustness as a function of policy preference and domain. 
  
                                                 
133 To see why, let us specify a Cox model with two continuous predictors and an 
interaction between them.  Recalling equation (6), the model for the jth individual would 
be 
 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑥1𝑗, 𝑥2𝑗) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp (𝛽1𝑥1𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑗 + 𝛽12𝑥1𝑗𝑥2𝑗). (3.5) 
 
Dividing by the baseline hazard gives us j’s relative hazard, 
 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑥1𝑗 , 𝑥2𝑗)
ℎ0(𝑡)
= exp (𝛽1𝑥1𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑗 + 𝛽12𝑥1𝑗𝑥2𝑗) = exp (∙). (3.6) 
 
It is clear here that the coefficient on the interaction term, 𝛽12, does not represent the 
interaction component or ‘effect’ in the intuitive, linear-regression sense – that is, the 
cross derivative of the expected value of our dependent variable.  Instead the 
interaction’s effect on the relative hazard in the model is given by the cross derivative of 
the exponential function, 
 
𝜕2exp (∙)
𝜕𝑥1𝜕𝑥2
= 𝛽12exp (∙) + (𝛽1 + 𝛽12𝑥2𝑗)(𝛽2 + 𝛽12𝑥1𝑗)exp (∙). (3.7) 
 
The presence of the exponential link function implies that all other coefficients will 
impact an interaction’s effect in some way, and we cannot rely on a simple reported 
coefficient, or even its sign, as a measure of effect; this is a common feature of nonlinear 
interactive models.  See Chunrong Ai and Edward Norton, “Interaction terms in logit and 
probit models,” Economics Letters 80, no. 1 (2003). 
134 Richard Williams, “Using the margins command to estimate and interpret adjusted 
predictions and marginal effects,” Stata Journal 12, no. 2 (2012). 
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Figure 3.6. Conditional marginal effects, agency robustness.  Here we see computed 
margins across standardized values of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠, keeping other variables at their means.  
The x-axis shows multiples of the standard deviation (s) of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠. 
 
 
 
What we see is the impact that agency robustness has on an official’s survival (hazard 
ratio) depending on policy preference distance or bias.  As we shift from domestic 
policymaking to foreign policymaking, the difference in the two variables’ relationship is 
stark.  In the domestic case, agency robustness – the capacity to produce private, policy-
relevant information – initially improves survival for officials that are ideological close to 
the president.  Then, as an official’s policy bias increases (as we move right along the x-
axis), agency robustness hurts their survival (drives up their hazard ratio) dramatically.  
This clearly represents a strong logic of politicization in action, and access to better 
informational resources (robustness) exacerbates politicization pressures.  
The same is clearly not true in foreign policy, however.  Here we see that serving 
in a robust agency is nominally harmful at small biases, then improves survival as an 
advisor’s or official’s preferences diverges from the president.  Why do liberal foreign-
policy officials have better survivability?  And why would being in a robust, more 
informative agency further insulate them?  This is clearly contrary to the mainstream 
vision of a controlling, loyalty-fixated Nixon.  It is, however, consistent with a basic 
quality foreign policy: There tends to be much more continuity of operation, personnel 
and purpose across administration.  Including an interaction between holdover status and 
policy domain displays this clearly (Figure 3.7).  
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Figure 3.7. Survival of Johnson-era holdovers, by policy 
domain.  Legacy advisors and officials have poorer 
survivability than new entrants.  The effect, however, is 
worse in domestic policy. 
 
 
 
This finding also adds a dimension to research on agency survivability: Lewis points out 
(2003) that foreign-policy bodies are far more subject to presidential control than 
domestic ones.  The overall weakness of politicization (or its de-ideologizing) may stem 
from this fact – that presidents already exercise unparalleled discretion over such 
agencies, and therefore do not need to politicize them.135  Finally, by Nixon’s own 
admission, his foreign policy beliefs were not orthodox or easily categorized.  In a 1968 
interview, Nixon described himself as neither a traditional isolationist nor progressive 
internationalist, but somewhere between.136  (Nixon’s complex foreign-policy 
preferences, and their effect on politicization will be treated in depth next chapter.) 
There is a final interaction term included in our clustered model that deserves 
attention.  This is the relationship between public careerism and agency competence.  
While their respective main effects are not significant, their interaction is.  To better 
assess this dynamic I estimated a separate model for domestic-policy officials and 
advisors only.  In this case I used robust standard errors clustering on the White House 
Office, an agency that accounts for roughly half of all domestic officials in our dataset.  
Figure 3.8 gives the marginal effect of having a public career, conditional on agency 
competence. 
  
                                                 
135 Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design. 
136 Mazo and Hess, President Nixon. 
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Figure 3.8.  Conditional margin effect, public career, with 95-percent CIs.  
The x-axis gives multiples of the standard deviation (s) of agency 
competence. 
 
 
 
As the graph shows, the effect of a public career is to raise an official’s hazard ratio when 
agency competence is low, and lower it when competence is high.  In other words, the 
survival of public-career official improves when they ‘match’ with high-competence 
agencies.  When they mismatch – for instance, when public servants serve in political 
agencies, or when an individual coming from the private sector serves in a high-
competence unit – their survival suffers. 
 
Watergate 
 
Finally, it is worth noting the lack of a Watergate effect in these data.  In none of the 
models was the time-variant Watergate indicator significant.  Non-parametrically, a log-
rank test shows no difference in Kaplan-Meier survival estimates between officials who 
serve or start after the Senate Watergate hearings begin and those that do not (Figure 3.9). 
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Figure 3.9.  K-M survival estimate for advisors serving or starting after 
the Senate Watergate hearings (May 17, 1973).  (P = 0.3623) 
 
 
 
If we assume advisors are more likely to “jump ship” after May 17, 1973, this might 
come as a surprise.  A counter argument may be that policy or ideological alignment, 
demonstrably important in shaping tenure here, is also likely to impact how Watergate 
was perceived and processed.  What’s more, lower and higher policy biases can both 
militate against departure.  Those most aligned with Nixon’s preferences are likely to 
stay, all else equal, while the less-aligned hold out for an improved situation.  Advisors 
with even greater biases are likely to have departed already.  In Figure 3.10, we can see 
this bimodality among advisors who last through the Ford transition. 
 
Figure 3.10.  Kernel estimate of tenure length for advisors lasting 
through the Ford transition. 
 
 
 
III. What we have found 
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In the main this chapter offers evidence to support the strategic information perspective.  
It is clear, however, that institutionally-related factors such policy domain, competence 
and expertise – often omitted or exogenized in the game theory literature – cannot be 
ignored in the applied context.  What do our survival analysis say about the nature of 
official tenure, and the role politicization plays in retention?  We can answer this in three 
broad observations: 
 
1. Policy preference distance is a powerful determinant of tenure.   
 
Consistent with expectations and theory, in all models an official’s bias is a significant 
factor in how long she serves the president.  This effect is dramatic and negative in 
domestic policy, where bias will weaken an official.  This indicates a politicization logic 
at work in official retention. 
In foreign policy, however, bias has a significant mitigating effect.  Three 
conclusions flow from this last, somewhat counter-intuitive observation.  First, foreign 
policy officials generally survive better than domestic officials; a foreign-policy role can 
be a powerful insulator against both attrition and politicization.  Second, foreign policy 
development has much greater continuity than domestic policy, particularly when the 
previous administration was of a different party (Figure 3.7).  Finally, it is reasonable to 
assume that ideology or bias, as measured by CFscore, does not function equally across 
policy domains.  We will examine the last of these claims in greater detail next chapter. 
 
2. Non-ideological, personal considerations are generally poor predictors of tenure. 
 
Many of our covariates were not important, including economic variables that may 
motivate an individual to stay (salary level, or the opportunity costs of government 
service, e.g.), factors related to personal history – prior campaign work, for example, and 
the personal choice to stay, or to leave, in the wake of the Watergate revelations.  As we 
know, president Nixon relied on a core of most-trusted officials.  Yet contrary to 
mainstream portrayals of Nixon, loyalty itself does not appear to be a management 
strategy – apart from allegiance that grew out of, or could be attributed to, policy 
preference.  There are exceptions (Nixon’s personal regard for John Connolly, e.g.) but 
overall we observe a strong tendency to politicization, and not personalization, of 
executive power. 
 
3. Institutional sources of informational advantage are more important than personal 
ones.  
 
There is little evidence that personal information advantage measures, such as level or 
type of education, are important in lengthening tenure.  There are two exceptions.  The 
first is baseline age, our proxy for professional experience.  This may be due in part to the 
fact that, in most administrations, younger, greener staffers are customarily placed in 
subordinate roles closer to the president, where patterns of retention can be more volatile.  
The second is public service.  Although public careerists overall are no less likely to 
leave than their private-career counterparts, their survival improves when they serve in 
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high-competence organizations.  Similarly, non-careerists perform poorly when placed in 
those same agencies. 
By contrast, agency advantage is important.  Specialization, whether an agency is 
specialist or generalist, improves survivability overall.  Meanwhile an agency’s 
robustness – its ability to generate proprietary information – can weaken ideologically 
distant officials, or strengthen loyal ones.  It is worth noting that the latter measure, 
robustness, performs better than agency size, which is not significant in any of our 
models.   This implies that medium-sized robust agencies (like the OEO, e.g.), perform 
the same in our models as large robust executive or independent agencies.  What do these 
differently-sized robust agencies have in common?  Not the ability to implement policy, 
where cabinet bureaucracies and independent agencies clearly have the advantage.  More 
importantly, they share the ability to produce of private, policy-relevant information.  
This is what the president responds to, and it indicates what is at stake in political control 
of agency resources: Politicization strategies are less about controlling downstream 
outcomes, than rather controlling the upward flow of information, into the process of 
policy development. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
As I suggested in Chapter 1, retention is one part of the larger politicization strategy of 
substitution – the appointment of political figures into power, along with the removal or 
attrition of non-political or non-conforming ones.  This chapter shows that under Nixon, 
retention is clearly a mechanism of politicization.  But it also demonstrates that 
politicization is contingent, conditional on institutional characteristics: agency robustness, 
for example, which tends to exacerbate pressures, and specialization or competence, 
which tend to weaken them.   
These dynamics are clearest in domestic policy.  In foreign policy, however, 
politicization does not work the same way.  It seems, at the very least, to be less driven 
by conventional ideology.  We cannot conclude, however, that politicization is not 
operative in foreign policy.  Instead, we must consider that it works according to a 
different logic, through a different kind of bias.  In the next chapter we will examine 
politicization under an alternative measure of bias – policy-constrained belief in context 
of foreign policy. 
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Chapter 4: Nixon foreign policy: policy instruments, belief and politicization 
 
In the last chapter we saw that an official or advisor’s ideological distance from the 
president, the bias or gap between presidential ideology and their own, can profoundly 
impact how long they serve in the administration.  While this follows from the ally 
principle, we found that it is contingent, not universal.  Robustness, for example – an 
agency’s informational resources – can dramatically strengthen the effect of bias.  
Policy domain impacts bias’s effect as well.  When we move from domestic 
policy to foreign policy, biases of Nixon officials affect survival in unpredictable (or 
counter-intuitive) ways.  We have found, for example, that informational resources work 
to improve the lot of ideologically more liberal officials. 
 
I. The “whole-worlder” 
 
It seems unlikely that Nixon would support ideological liberals qua liberals.  After all, 
Nixon entered office in with unimpeachable Republican credentials and forged an 
administration that was in almost all respects conservative (Figures 2.1 and 2.2).  On the 
other hand, Nixon admitted his views on foreign policy eluded easy classification.  When 
asked in 1968 how we would “label himself,” this is how he answered: 
 
Label mean different things to different people… Now let’s take this 
conservative-liberal dialogue as it relates to foreign policy.  The conservatives 
have been considered the isolationists and the internationalists were considered to 
be the liberals.  So looking at my record you would have to say I’m a liberal on 
foreign policy.  Because I recognize America’s role in the world I am not an 
isolationist.  I have supported foreign aid, for instance. 
But the old liberals who were internationalists 20 years ago now are 
turning inward.  They are telling us to get out of Asia and Latin America, that 
we’re overcommitted.  My view, however, hasn’t changed.  While I make it very 
clear that we have to get other nations to assume their share of the responsibility, I 
also believe that we cannot withdraw from the world.  Am I a conservative or a 
liberal?  My answer is that I’m an internationalist. 
By another foreign policy standard it is said that a conservative is basically 
anti-Communist and a liberal does not believe that Communism is a particular 
threat.  By this test I’ve been called a conservative.  But I don’t see the 
Communist world as one world.  I see the shades of gray.  I see it as a multicolor 
thing.  So rather than say I’m a conservative, I say I’m a firm opponent of 
totalitarianism of any kind and a strong proponent of freedom.  If you want to 
describe me, you might say I’m a “whole-worlder.”  Too many people have been 
“half-worlders.”  Some have been able to see the danger in Asia but not in Europe 
and others have been able to see the danger in Europe but not in Asia.  What 
we’ve got to see is the whole world.137 
 
                                                 
137 Mazo and Hess, President Nixon, 315-16. 
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This somewhat tortured triangulation – Nixon’s commitment to internationalism amid the 
growing sense that the U.S. was over-leveraged on its strategic commitments, his 
“multicolor” vision of communism (echoes of his widely-circulated Foreign Policy piece 
of 1967138) – reflects the two central inheritances of the Nixon administration.  The first 
was the war in Vietnam.  Once in office Nixon sought a “just end” to the conflict via the 
transfer of military responsibility from U.S. to South Vietnamese troops 
(Vietnamization).  While transfer and peace were strategic goals, Nixon, Kissinger and 
other administration officials believed that forcing the Communists to the bargaining 
table on favorable terms would depend on a complex layering of operations, including 
‘offsetting’ escalations like the CIA-led campaign into Cambodia in 1970 and the 1972 
Christmas bombing of North Vietnam. 
Vietnamization was a reflection of Nixon’s second inheritance: An emerging 
global multipolarity.  Nixon opined that the U.S.’s increasingly qualified supremacy 
meant it could no longer afford to make military intervention its centerpiece foreign 
policy.139  As with Nixon’s approach to Vietnam, what became known as the Nixon 
Doctrine deployed layered, offsetting policies: As U.S. allies, particularly in Asia, were 
asked to supply the manpower needed for their own security, the U.S. would strengthen 
its nuclear guarantee and normalize its relationship with China, thereby repudiating the 
original justification for U.S. involvement in Vietnam and setting the stage for later 
détente policy.140 
 
Domain-specific ideologies or structured beliefs 
 
Nixon was perhaps right to suggest that conventional party or ideology labels were of 
limited use in what diplomatic historian James Chace called the “post-post-war world.”141 
The preceding decade of the Vietnam War had eroded the ideological and bipartisan 
consensus in U.S. foreign affairs.  Yet while Americans and policy elites grew 
increasingly divided on foreign policy, the lines separating them did not hew to 
conventional partisan or ideological cleavages. 
For some scholars, understanding this transition required a ‘new’ lexicon of 
ideology or structured beliefs.  Such alternative categories – isolationism or 
internationalism, e.g. – were specific to foreign policy, and as Nixon himself suggests 
                                                 
138 Richard M. Nixon, “Asia after Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (1967), 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.chapman.edu/stable/20039285. 
139 In global economic affairs, Nixon addressed multipolarity with his five-power or 
“pentagonal” concept, first elaborated in a January 3, 1972 TIME magazine interview.  
Quoted in Alastair Buchan, “A World Restored?,” Foreign Affairs 50, no. 4 (1972), 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.chapman.edu/stable/20037938. 
140 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 272-341; Joan Hoff, “A Revisionist View of 
Nixon's Foreign Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 26, no. 1 (1996), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551553; Jeffrey Kimball, “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of 
Misunderstanding,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2006), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552747. 
141 James Chace, “The Five-Power World of Richard Nixon,” New York Times Magazine, 
Feb. 20, 1972. 
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above, were often only loosely aligned with left-right ideology.  The most well-known 
typology of foreign-policy belief during this period comes from the leadership surveys of 
Holsti and Rosenau.142  They identify two structured beliefs.  The first, cooperative 
internationalism (CI), stresses (in the Cold-War context) détente, international 
institutions, and interstate cooperation.  The second is militant internationalism (MI), 
highlighting the conflictual nature of international affairs, the zero-sum relationship 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the necessity of the use of force, even covert 
action, in U.S. foreign policy.143  Holsti and Rosenau find that liberals at home are more 
likely to favor CI abroad, and conservatives are more likely to favor MI-style policies. 
This MI/CI dichotomy is empirically supported, largely consistent across studies, 
and tracks with the theoretical division in international relations between realism and 
liberalism.  (As we will see it is also partly supported by our analysis here.)  Precisely 
how an individual’s categorization translates into policy preferences is not well 
understood, however, nor are reasons for the coherence between domestic and foreign 
policy beliefs in the first place.  Most importantly, we have no direct access to attitudinal 
data for specific presidential administrations.  Thus while the MI/CI dichotomy can be 
helpful, to understand politicizing behavior we need a more data-supported measure. 
 
Policy-constrained ideology and preferenceship 
 
Other research on the intersection of ideology and foreign policy finds that the 
conventional left-right divide is operative but that its effect depends on characteristics of 
the specific policy or policy area.  Milner and Tingley (2015) show that foreign policies 
with specific distributional outcomes, such as trade policy, will more likely be governed 
by left-right division than policies whose costs or benefits are generally felt.144 
We can think of both “supply” and “demand” explanations for this.  Foreign-
policy outputs often represent benefits that are neither excludable nor rival, and thus tend 
not to encourage the sort of narrow advantage seeking of private or special interests 
endemic in domestic policy.  And the president’s prerogative powers insulate him or her 
                                                 
142 There have been numerous studies of U.S. foreign-policy belief, starting with public 
opinion surveys; see Sidney Verba et al., “Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” The 
American Political Science Review 61, no. 2 (1967), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1953248; Miroslav Nincic and Jennifer M. Ramos, 
“Ideological structure and foreign policy preferences,” Journal of Political Ideologies 15, 
no. 2 (2010).  In the post-Vietnam era survey work extended to opinion leaders and 
policy makers; especially crucial is that sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations, and Holsti and Rosenau’s Foreign Policy Leadership Project; see Holsti and 
Rosenau, “The Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Leaders.”; Holsti and 
Rosenau, “The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes among American Leaders.”; Eugene 
R. Wittkopf, “On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique and 
Some Evidence,” International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 4 (1986), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600643.  
143 Rathbun, “Hierarchy and Community.” 
144 Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley, Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics 
of American Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,, 2015). 
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from what ideological pressures do exist, whether originating from those special interests, 
or from Congress.  Similarly, the impact of party or ideology on foreign-policy votes can 
depend on whether the issues involved constitute high or low politics, with bipartisanism 
more likely in the former.145 
This “policy constraint” suggests that if politicization occurs in foreign policy, it 
should operate on policy areas, a level of specificity not captured in our tenure dataset in 
the last two chapters.146  What’s more, that foreign-policy belief can be disaggregated to 
the level of policy, suggests that it may be more profitable to look for a constellation of 
stable, internally coherent policy preferences, instead of an ideological category.  In other 
words, we might look for what Krebiehl calls “preferenceship.”147 
 
Downstream products of belief 
 
How can we assess a bundle of coherent preferences?  One way is to measure its more 
concrete epiphenomenal or “downstream” products.  Putting aside the task of assigning 
camps or defining categories of structured belief, we can instead evaluate individual 
officials on the policy instruments they select, or how they assess threats and assign 
policy priorities.148 
For Milner and Tingley, area of policy is important because it shapes the 
distributional outcomes of a policy, and these outcomes in turn create divisions (of the 
ideological sort) over the proper policy instrument a president or Congress should choose.  
                                                 
145 James M. McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf, “Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and 
Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988,” The Journal 
of Politics 52, no. 4 (1990), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131683.  Meernik and Oldmixon 
(2004) find that domestic economic conditions put foreign policy’s distributional effects 
in greater relief, making bipartisan consensus less likely; see James Meernik and 
Elizabeth Oldmixon, “Internationalism in Congress,” Political Research Quarterly 57, 
no. 3 (2004), https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290405700310. 
146 An indicator for economic (foreign) policy is not significant in any of our survival 
models either as a main effect or interaction. 
147 Krehbiel, “Where’s the Party?.”  There have been attempts to combine roll-call data 
with a bill’s content, captured via probabilistic topic models, to develop an issue-adjusted 
ideal point model for legislative behavior.  There are to my knowledge are no current 
applications to presidential or administration officials’ behavior.  See Sean M. Gerrish 
and David M. Blei, “Predicting legislative roll calls from text” (Proceedings of the 28th 
International Conference on International Conference on Machine Learning, Bellevue, 
Washington, USA, Omnipress, 3104544, 2011); Sean M. Gerrish and David M. Blei, 
“How they vote: issue-adjusted models of legislative behavior” (Proceedings of the 25th 
International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems - Volume 2, Lake 
Tahoe, Nevada, Curran Associates Inc., 2999442, 2012). 
148 This follows Gerring’s (1997) stress on the concreteness of belief or ideology: Unlike 
political philosophy, they tend to identify “a set of issue-positions.”  John Gerring, 
“Ideology: A Definitional Analysis,” Political Research Quarterly 50, no. 4 (1997), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/448995. 
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For example, in trade policy the use of tariffs will be opposed by ideological 
conservatives as an intrusion in the market, while liberals, who are more concerned about 
workers and inequality, are more likely to embrace them.  Trade policy is one place 
where we should see a strong left-right ideological divide; by contrast, support for 
military intervention tends to map uneasily onto left-right belief.149 
 
Outline and logic of this chapter 
 
Conditional on policy area, then, beliefs tend to create demand for (or rejection of) 
specific policy instruments.  Of course, beliefs do more than that.  Beliefs involve sets of 
temporally stable claims about values (like human rights or free markets), as well as the 
nature and scale of threat posed by foreign actors.  Because of this, beliefs generate 
priorities, dictating the goals and policy instruments to which administration resources 
should be assigned.   
Text-as-data methodology have been used to study both policy instruments150 and 
expressions of policy priority.151  For the sake of simplicity, we will focus on one of these 
– prevalence of policy instruments – to infer underlying belief and assess its effects.  We 
utilize a structural topic model,152 estimated over a corpus of foreign policy-related 
documents – memoranda, policy proposals, speeches, public statements and private 
correspondences – from practitioners in the Nixon administration.  
This chapter continues by laying out the logic of textual representation of belief.  
It will flesh out the details of the text-as-data methodology, describing the document 
corpus, which comprises the Nixon volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States 
series, and the extraction of meta-features (such as a document’s authors, dateline and 
intended audience).  It will describe document preprocessing and model estimation.  We 
will validate the resulting topic model using a number of strategies, including examining 
changes in topic prevalence over time.   
We will then demonstrate how topics can encode choices over policy instrument.  
To generate a distance measure on such choices or preference for policy, however, we 
need to go beyond lone topics, and assess the president and officials over many topics at 
once – in other words, on an official’s distributions over policy-related topics.  This 
summary measure is simple.  We will generate a “representative” or average document 
for our officials, who comprise over sixty-nine members of the Nixon foreign-policy 
team, including inter alia the President, Kissinger, William Rogers, Alexander Haig, 
                                                 
149 Support here may be context-specific; for instance, liberals may generally reject 
military intervention but accept it to protect human rights.  Conservatives, meanwhile, are 
generally more hawkish but may reject intervention out of concern for costs.  See Milner 
and Tingley, Sailing the Water's Edge, 60. 
150 Milner and Tingley, Sailing the Water's Edge. 
151 Justin Grimmer, Representational Style in Congress: What Legislators Say and Why It 
Matters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
152 Margaret E. Roberts et al., “Structural topic models for open-ended survey responses,” 
American Journal of Political Science 58 (2014); M. E.  Roberts et al., “The Structural 
Topic Model and Applied Social Science” (Advances in Neural Information Processing 
Systems Workshop on Topic Models: Computation, Application, and Evaluation, 2015). 
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Elliot Richardson and Melvin Laird.  From these average or representative documents we 
will calculate a probabilistic distance from the president, as well as distances between 
officials.  Finally, bearing in mind Gerring’s (1997) observation that ideology or belief is 
important inasmuch as it “directs, or at least, influence” behavior, we will circle back to 
our tenure dataset, and will show that distance from the president, on choice of policy 
instruments, can impact survival of foreign-policy officials.153 
 
Policy making and the text-as-data perspective 
 
The analysis that follows is based on three key assumptions.  This first is that the texts 
generated by policy practitioners – letters, telegrams, papers, proposals, and so forth – 
offer indirect evidence of the practitioner’s underlying beliefs.  In other words, texts 
capture what Boyd-Graber, Yu and Mimno describe as an author’s “internal state.”154  
We further assume that this internal state – preferenceship or belief – can be inferred 
using unsupervised computational methods.  Language in text is an important medium of 
expressing preference; presidents and others express beliefs in public pronouncements, 
debates, position papers, platforms, and so forth.  Close reading is the most reliable way 
to parse the underlying preferences that motivate texts, but can be labor-intensive as the 
body of texts grows.  For this reason political scientists have begun turning to text-as-data 
methods, allowing them to perform a host of semantic analyses on very large document 
sets.  These analyses include ideological scaling and the classification of texts into known 
and unknown categories.155  The last of these, methods of automated classification, can 
potentially reveal relationships among texts that can escape even diligent and informed 
close reading.156  Finally, we assume that the topics estimated from our model here are 
not just ideational or expressive.  They either constitute political behavior or are close 
corollaries of it.  Within an administration, what practitioners talk about is always more 
than just detached musings; written words are direct efforts to affect policy outcomes. 
What the models estimated here cannot do is establish, via programmatic means, 
specific differences of opinion or policy position.  Gerring characterizes ideology (or, as 
we have termed it, simply belief) as possessing internal coherence, external contrast, and 
stability over time.  While we assume that priorities and so forth are the downstream 
products of internally coherent belief, we are much less able to capture contrast, the 
property of differentiating oneself, apart from our distance measure. 
And even that distance measure may be unreliable.  DW-NOMINATE and 
CFScores are calculated using Congressional roll-call vote, or campaign contributions, 
which are already expressions of contrast or dispute between lawmakers or private 
citizens.  Our distance measure reflects neither of these.  Instead it assesses difference in 
the intensity, or prevalence, of language related to policy instruments. 
                                                 
153 Gerring, “Ideology: A Definitional Analysis.” 
154 Jordan Boyd-Graber, Yuening Hu, and David Mimno, “Applications of Topic 
Models,” Foundations and Trends in Information Retrieval 11, no. 2-3 (2017). 
155 Justin Grimmer and Brandon M. Stewart, “Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of 
Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts,” Political Analysis 21, no. 3 
(2013), http://www.jstor.org/stable/24572662. 
156 Grimmer, Representational Style. 
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II. Probabilistic topic models 
 
Below we will use a method of automated classification known as probabilistic topic 
models.  These are Bayesian generative models that classify documents by the prevalence 
of topics within them.  They assume each document in a corpus to contain a mixture of 
topics, which are a probability distribution over words.157    
In recent years text classification through probabilistic topic models has become 
an increasingly important political science methodology.  While the first and best-known 
topic model is latent Dirichlet allocation,158 other models have been developed, including 
several that are specific to political science.159  Topic models all share a common 
definition of documents and topics.  They first assume each document is a bag of words, 
an order-free group of words or tokens.160  Word frequency in each document is 
conditioned by the document’s mixture of topics, which are defined as a probability mass 
function over words.  The probability that a word appears in a document is given by the 
joint probability that the topic appears in the document, with the conditional probability 
that the word appears given that topic.  The probability of the 𝑖th words in a document 
with 𝑇 topics is given by 
 
𝑃(𝑤𝑖) =   ∑ 𝑃(𝑤𝑖|𝑧𝑖 = 𝑗)𝑃(
𝑇
𝑗=1
𝑧𝑖 = 𝑗) (4.1) 
 
where 𝑧𝑖 is the topic from which 𝑤𝑖 is drawn.  The right-hand terms can be re-written as 
                                                 
157 Further details are provided below.  For a review, see David M. Blei, “Probabilistic 
topic models,” Communications ACM 55, no. 4 (2012); Thomas L. Griffiths and Mark 
Steyvers, “Finding scientific topics,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
101, no. suppl 1 (2004). 
158 David M. Blei, Andrew Y. Ng, and Michael I. Jordan, “Latent dirichlet allocation,” J. 
Mach. Learn. Res. 3 (2003). 
159 Justin Grimmer, “A Bayesian Hierarchical Topic Model for Political Texts: Measuring 
Expressed Agendas in Senate Press Releases,” Political Analysis 18, no. 1 (2010), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25791991; Kevin M. Quinn et al., “How to Analyze Political 
Attention with Minimal Assumptions and Costs,” American Journal of Political Science 
54, no. 1 (2010), http://www.jstor.org/stable/20647980. 
160 A partial exception to the “orderlessness” of the bag of words, is the discovery of 
meaningful collocations or n-grams within a corpus.  Substituting separate terms with a 
collocation, which preserves some word order, may be appropriate in some contexts, 
including where texts use a highly institutionalized, idiosyncratic vocabulary.  Since that 
is the case in this corpus, n-grams of degree two to four were discovered, ranked using 
pointwise mutual information and validated for comprehensibility before substitution.  
See Keh-Yih Su, Ming-Wen Wu, and Jing-Shin Chang, “A corpus-based approach to 
automatic compound extraction” (Proceedings of the 32nd annual meeting on Association 
for Computational Linguistics, Las Cruces, New Mexico, Association for Computational 
Linguistics, 981765, 1994). 
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𝜙(𝑗) = 𝑃(𝑤𝑖|𝑧𝑖 = 𝑗), (4.2) 
 
a multinomial distribution over words for topic 𝑗 that indicates which words that are 
important for that topic, and 
 
𝜃(𝑑) = 𝑃(𝑧), (4.3) 
 
a multinomial distribution over topics for document 𝑑 in 𝐷 documents.  This indicates the 
prevalence or weights of topics in that document.161 
Topic models assume that each document is the result of a multi-step generative 
process.  First, each document’s topic mixture is drawn from a prior distribution.  For 
LDA this is typically a 𝑇-dimensional symmetric Dirichlet: 
 
𝜃(𝑑)~𝐷𝑖𝑟(𝛼1 = ⋯ = 𝛼𝑇 = 𝛼). (4.4) 
 
Thereafter each word is selected by picking topic 𝑗 from this distribution, then picking a 
word from 𝑗 according to 𝜙(𝑗). Since the only data we have are the words in each 
document (and documents in the corpus), 𝜃 and 𝜙 are latent parameters that must be 
inferred, and their estimation is usually the preliminary (and often, the primary) concern 
for the researcher.  And although estimation is unsupervised, in most cases the number of 
topics 𝑇 must be provided beforehand, along with after-fit descriptions or labels for the 
resulting topics. 
Several alternatives to LDA, including the structural topic model (STM) used 
here, substitute a logistic normal prior for the Dirichlet.  Changing the data-generating 
function has the advantage of allowing the incorporation of document-specific covariates, 
such as dates, authors, place of origin, and so forth, to evaluate their effect on topic 
weights.162  These approaches are part of the family of “upstream” topic models, which 
assume that metadata or external variables precede the text, and incorporates them early 
on in the generative process.  “Downstream” models, by contrast, use text estimates to 
predict external variables or metadata, through regression or other procedures. 163  Our 
analysis combines upstream elements (largely thanks to the off-the-shelf functionality of 
STM) with downstream ones: descriptive statistics and regression procedures that help 
contextualize and understand the real-life significance of our topic estimations. 
 
Assembling the corpus: The Foreign Relations series 
 
                                                 
161 Griffiths and Steyvers, “Finding scientific topics.” 
162 David M. Blei and John D. Lafferty, “A correlated topic model of Science,” Ann. 
Appl. Stat. 1, no. 1 (2007); Grimmer, “A Bayesian Hierarchical Topic Model.”; M. 
Roberts, B. Stewart, and D. Tingley, “stm: R Package for Structural Topic Models,” 
Journal of Statistical Software  (forthcoming). 
163 Boyd-Graber, Hu, and Mimno, “Applications of Topic Models.” 
 69 
The corpus we will use is the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series.  
Published by the State Department’s Office of the Historian, FRUS comprises over 450 
volumes spanning from 1861 to approximately the end of the first Bush administration.  
Modern volumes (since 1952) are separated by presidential administration.  The Nixon 
administration comprises 67 total volumes, organized by country or region (Chile or 
South Asia, e.g.) or policy area (European Security or Foreign Assistance, e.g.) and 
currently includes one retrospective volume.164 
We began by downloading all available Nixon e-volumes from the combined 
Nixon and Ford series.  These files are essentially wrappers around HTML, so each 
volume’s documents could be scraped using standard techniques.  Extracting meta-
features from texts required natural language processing, which was implemented in Java 
with proprietary code, as well as the Stanford CoreNLP library.165  This made it possible 
to programmatically determine whether a text was usable (for the study), and to extract 
metadata such as the individual, individuals or agency responsible for composing the text, 
the persons, persons or agency it was meant for, its dateline, and other features.   
I also assumed that each document’s region or geographical focus was related to 
the volume it came from, and coded each document accordingly.  For the sake of 
comparability with the previous chapter, I omitted documents from individuals who had 
no CFScore.  Volumes, text counts and geographical foci are given in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1.  Foreign Relations of the United States corpus. 
 
Volume name # of docs  Geo. focus 
    
Southern Africa  44  Africa 
 subtotal 44   
     
China, 1969–1972  100  East Asia 
China, 1973–1976   24  
Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976   56  
Korea, 1969–1972   57  
 subtotal 237   
     
Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972   129  E. Med. 
Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976   9  
 subtotal 138   
     
European Security   58  Europe 
 Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972   153  
Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972   144  
 subtotal 355   
     
Chile, 1969–1973  83  Lat. Am. 
 Documents on Chile, 1969–1973   9  
Documents on South America, 1973–1976   48  
                                                 
164 Craig Daigle and Nina Howland, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–
1976, vol. I-LXVI (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2011). 
165 Christopher Manning et al., “The Stanford CoreNLP Natural Language Processing 
Toolkit” (Baltimore, Maryland, Association for Computational Linguistics, 2014). 
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 subtotal 140   
     
Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973  126  Middle East 
Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972  154  
Energy Crisis, 1969–1974   89  
Energy Crisis, 1974–1980   1  
Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, 
September 1970   124 
 
 subtotal 494   
     
South Asia Crisis, 1971   117  South Asia 
 subtotal 117   
     
Southeast Asia, 1969–1972   98  S.E. Asia 
 Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970   173  
Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975   34  
Vietnam, January–October 1972   98  
Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972   126  
Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973   166  
 subtotal 695   
     
SALT I, 1969–1972   97  Soviet Union 
 SALT II, 1972–1980   20  
Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976   16  
Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970   81  
Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974   53  
Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971   75  
Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972   73  
 subtotal 415   
     
Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972   126  Unknown 
 Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972   181  
Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976   45  
Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 
1969–1972   216 
 
Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976   55  
Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy, 1969–
1972   79 
 
Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972   50  
Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976   13  
National Security Policy, 1969–1972   92  
Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public 
Diplomacy, 1973–1976  45 
 
Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–
1972   166 
 
United Nations, 1969–1972   148  
 subtotal 1216   
     
overall total 3851   
    
 
Topic modeling can give poor results when texts differ in length and structure, which is 
generally the case here, so the series format imposes a degree of conformity, as does the 
natural-language pre-processing, which roots out texts (conversation transcripts, e.g.) that 
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are hard to interpret.  By the same coin, however, the editorial process used to create the 
FRUS series can impose limitations or interpretations on the data.  Unlike the press-
release corpus used by Grimmer (2013), these texts have undergone substantial prior 
vetting, editing, even censoring, and we will indicate where were think this may impact 
the reliability of our results. 
To ready the corpus for estimation, words with little or no semantic value 
(stopwords) were removed.  Since we are interested in topics that reflect more general 
policy preferences, and not those about staffing, personnel, scheduling, or granular policy 
choices, we also removed proper personal and place names.166  The remaining words 
were then stemmed.167  In cases of organizational or agency names, specific doctrines or 
policies, I substituted individual constituent terms for two- to four-degree n-grams (see fn 
2, above).  Instead of treating “National Security Council” as three separate terms, for 
example, they were collocated into a single trigram.  The resulting corpus has 3,851 
documents, a dictionary of 4,629 unique terms, and 650,023 term tokens. 
 
Number of topics and model estimation 
 
Nearly all topic models require the researcher to provide the number of topics, 𝑇.  Too 
small a number will result in broad topics that aggregate subjects that should be separate.  
Too large a number affects the interpretability of the results.  There are two common 
approaches to selecting the number of topics.  The first is to use held-out likelihood, 
which measures how well the model, estimated over the corpus, fits untrained or “held-
out” documents.168  Chang, et al. (2009) show, however, that better statistical fit may not 
give topics that are comprehensible to human subjects.169  Alternative metrics such as 
exclusivity or semantic coherence can improve results, but in the end these must be 
facially validated, drawing on the researcher’s prior knowledge and judgment.170 
We estimated models for topic numbers ranging from five to 100, selecting a 
range of these based initially on held-out likelihood, semantic coherence and exclusivity.  
                                                 
166 Justin Grimmer, “Measuring Representation Style in the House: The Tea Party, 
Obama, and Legislator’s Changing Expressed Priorities,” in Computational Social 
Science: Discovery and Prediction, ed. R. Michael Alvarez, Analytical Methods for 
Social Research (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
167 Lisa Blaydes, Justin Grimmer, and Alison McQueen, “Mirrors for Princes and 
Sultans: Advice on the Art of Governance in the Medieval Christian and Islamic 
Worlds,” The Journal of Politics 80, no. 4 (2018); Matthew J. Denny and Arthur Spirling, 
“Text Preprocessing For Unsupervised Learning: Why It Matters, When It Misleads, And 
What To Do About It,” Political Analysis 26, no. 2 (2018). 
168 Hanna M. Wallach et al., “Evaluation Methods for Topic Models” (Proceedings of the 
26th International Conference on Machine Learning, Montreal, Canada, 2009). 
169 Jonathan Chang et al., “Reading tea leaves: how humans interpret topic models” 
(Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Neural Information Processing 
Systems, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, Curran Associates Inc., 2009). 
170 Boyd-Graber, Hu, and Mimno, “Applications of Topic Models.”; Edoardo M. Airoldi 
and Jonathan M. Bischof, “Improving and Evaluating Topic Models and Other Models of 
Text,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 111, no. 516 (2016). 
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This subset was evaluated for topic quality, and closely read before selection.  This 
resulted in a 41-topic structural topic model.  Topic descriptions were supplied by hand.  
Results are shown in Fig. 4.1.171
                                                 
171 All topic estimation, distance measurement, bootstrapping and visualizations of 
covariate effects in this chapter were performed in R.  For the summary of cluster means, 
predicted hazard ratios and conditional effects (Figures 4.10, 4.12 and 4.13) I used Stata 
15.1 for Mac. 
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Topic validation and over time prevalence 
 
Since classification is left to the model, post-fit validation by the researcher is absolutely 
essential.  Grimmer and King (2011) offer experimental strategies to test for semantic 
validity (that is, the degree that topics are internally coherent and distinct from other 
topics).  These can be carried out by assistants or via services like MTurk.  We opted 
instead for assessments of predictive validity, whether a topic’s prevalence responds as 
we might expect to external conditions or events.172 
At first read, the topics in Table 4.1 are intuitive and meaningful.  Most frequent 
topics relate to modes of communication (12. internal policy review; 2. diplomatic 
correspondence; 41. consular cables), argumentation or decision-making (1. decision 
analysis, pros and cons; 4. position-taking) or bureaucratic “housekeeping” (14. 
scheduling, official; 6. scheduling, diplomatic).  Despite removal of location terms, 
several topics are clearly region-specific (25. east-west politics; 26. quadripartite); others 
are clearly organization-specific (39. UN Security Council; 31. NATO). 
To further validate these topics, we examine how external events affect their 
prevalence.  Figure 4.2 shows how topics related to Vietnam theater strategy (24) and the 
U.N. Security Council (39) spike in response to external events.  The Security Council 
topic is largely focused in (southern) Africa, and in part references the management of 
UN reactions to Portuguese colonial war and the status of South West Africa (Namibia).  
Africa remains relevant as, starting with Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971, 
the topic shifts decisively to China’s accession to the UN Security Council’s permanent 
membership.173 
 
                                                 
172 Justin Grimmer and Gary King, “General purpose computer-assisted clustering and 
conceptualization,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, no. 7 (2011). 
173 Of seventy-six votes in favor of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758, twenty-five 
came from African countries. 
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III. Assessing the prevalence of policy instruments 
 
Estimating the effects of document-level covariates provides evidence that topics encode 
our downstream products of belief – policy instruments and priorities.  As we have seen, 
the logistic normal prior used in the structural topic model admits a covariance structure.  
For each document we provided categorical variables for the agency in which the 
document originated, the geographical focus (inferred from its FRUS volume), the 
CFScore of the author (using a spline fit), and indicator variables for whether it was a 
direct communication to the president, or came from him.  The results let us see how 
these covariates affect the topic prevalence, or how intensely it appears in a document.   
As we have seen, several of our topics appear to reference general areas of 
concern (e.g. east-west politics, law of the sea), still others modes of communication or 
bureaucratic housekeeping.  Most, however, clearly relate to specific policy instruments.  
Among these are peace negotiations (in the military and political dimensions), security 
cooperation, nuclear (strategic triad) policy, trade, international monetary policy and 
foreign aid, intelligence gathering and covert operations. 
That our estimated topics primarily refer to policy instruments is convenient for 
our analysis, but should come as no surprise – after all, the corpus documents were 
selected for their relevance on issues of policy.  Nonetheless, we must confirm that topics 
relate to policy and do not just reflect the subject matter of discussions.  (In the following 
we assume, for topics referring to policy instruments, that topic prevalence expresses that 
instrument’s relative fitness or appropriateness to an official.174) 
 
Communicating with the President 
 
To validate our topics as policy instruments, we will examine the interaction between 
their prevalence and document-level covariates, beginning with indicators for whether a 
communication was directed to the president (as opposed to another official) or came 
from him.  In Figure 4.3.a, we see that direct communications to the president tend to 
convey housekeeping or meta-communication-style topics, including internal review (12), 
scheduling (14 and 21), and diplomatic communications (2 and 41).  Substantive topics 
directed most frequently to Nixon are related to treaty language (16) and the strategic 
nuclear triad (22). 
  
                                                 
174 Milner and Tingley, Sailing the Water's Edge. 
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Figure 4.3.a.  Topic prevalence for direct 
communications to President Nixon.  (Thicker bands are 
with 50% CIs; thinner bands are 95% CIs.) 
 
 
 
By contrast, topics coming from Nixon are nearly all substantive.  While confidence 
bands are wider here, the results fit our expectations of policy areas and instruments that 
Nixon prioritized, including terrorism response, military command, intelligence and drug 
trafficking (Figure 4.3.b).  
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Figure 4.3.b.  Topic prevalence for direct communications 
from the president. 
 
 
 
Bypassing the president 
 
Lest we conclude that topics here represent subjects matter, and not policy instruments, 
we can compare the topics that are frequently directed to Nixon to those that come from 
him.  Milner and Tingley show that lobbyists will strategically “bypass” the White House 
on policy instruments with narrow, private-goods-style benefits, and save direct 
administration lobbying for those with broader distributional effects.175  Figure 4.3.a 
provides evidence that administration officials operate in a similar fashion.  Nearly all 
topics related to foreign aid or trade policy fall are infrequently directed at the president 
(i.e. below the zero line).  Topics with no effect or with greater prevalence include policy 
instruments such as the strategic (nuclear) triad or NATO, which imply more general 
costs and benefits.  We know, however, this is not just because foreign economic topics 
do not appear on the president’s agenda: several topics in foreign economic policy that 
are infrequently directed to Nixon, frequently originate with him (Fig. 4.3.b). 
 
                                                 
175 Milner and Tingley, Sailing the Water's Edge, 77-120. 
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National interest and grand strategy 
 
Another policy-related topic is shown in Figure 4.4.  Here we see the topic associated 
with national interest, historical analogy and grand strategy (18).  It is most frequently 
associated, first with the president and vice-president, and executive agencies thereafter.  
Such ‘elevated’ language is common in public statements and speeches; three texts most 
associated with this topic are Nixon’s January 22, 1970 State of the Union Address, in 
which he renewed committed to a “just peace” in Vietnam;176 his 1974 address to U.S. 
Naval Academy graduates; and a February 25, 1971 radio address that reiterated the 
Nixon Doctrine, principles of which he laid out informal remarks in Guam in July 
1969.177 
This topic is associated with the U.S. Information Service (USIA), suggesting that 
public agency’s diplomacy mission is consistent with the President’s public messaging.  
More importantly, it is associated with agencies that lack such a messaging role (CIA, 
Defense, the Federal Energy Organization or the EOP).  In other words, this topic is not 
strictly rhetorical, but references concepts or doctrinal claims underlying policy 
deliberations. 
 
Figure 4.4.  Agency of origin and topic prevalence, 
national interest, grand strategy (with 50% and  95% 
CIs). 
 
 
 
                                                 
176 Robert B. Semple Jr., “Nixon, Stressing Quality of Life, Asks in State of Union 
Message for Battle to Save Environment,” The New York Times (New York), Jan. 23, 
1970. 
177 Kimball, “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding.” 
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Policy instruments and geography 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the effect of geographical focus on topic prevalence for two topics 
related to negotiation policies (8 and 10).  Both are prevalent in regions where the U.S. 
played an active peacemaking or negotiating role: East Asia (the Korean peninsula), the 
Middle East, South Asia (the 1971 succession of Bangladesh), Vietnam, and the U.S.S.R. 
(SALT I/II).  We see that military instruments are more prevalent where the U.S. was 
actively involved in a dispute (SE Asia/Vietnam) or working on military withdrawal 
plans (South Korea178).  Meanwhile, political elements are much more prevalent in 
negotiations where the U.S. has little direct military presence (the Arab-Israeli conflict).  
During the South Asian crisis of 1971, Nixon combined political efforts with military 
signaling (positioning the U.S.S. Enterprise carrier group off of Sri Lanka).  The multi-
dimensional use of policy instruments by the Nixon administration is captured in South 
Asia’s effect over both topics. 
 
Figure 4.5.  Military and political elements in peace settlement and negotiation, by region (with 50% and  
95% CIs). 
 
 
 
Policy instruments and agency of origin 
 
To assess the impact of agency on topic prevalence, a categorical variable for agency was 
included in our estimation.  In Figure 4.6.a, we see how the agency covariate helps 
represent an organizational “division of labor” on policy instruments related to 
international trade and finance (topics 3 and 15).  Prevalence for multilateral trade is 
                                                 
178
 As a reflection of changed priorities under the “Nixon Doctrine,” the U.S. withdrew the 7th Infantry 
Division from South Korea in 1971. 
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highest for the Agriculture, Commerce and Treasury departments, suggesting this 
specifically concerns the GATT policy framework.  Predictably, Treasury is the most 
important agency for international financial policy, given the evolving Bretton Woods 
crisis in the Nixon years.  The persistent importance of the Agriculture Department is 
likely related to the early entangling of convertibility policy with a temporary import 
surcharge.179 
Figure 4.6.b shows agency distributions for two topics on intelligence (32 and 38).  
On the left we see collection and analysis centered on agencies’ technical capabilities, 
with overt participation of Nixon himself.  By contrast, covert action (right) is the 
exclusive province of CIA and – perhaps nonsensically – has almost no discernible 
association with the president or National Security Advisor.  This latter finding is almost 
certainly the result of continued security classification across the corpus.180 
 
Figure 4.6.a.  Agency of origin, prevalence of topics related to trade and international financial policy 
(with 50% and  95% CIs). 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
179 Douglas A. Irwin, “The Nixon shock after forty years: the import surcharge revisited,” 
World Trade Review 12, no. 1 (2013). 
180 Joshua Botts, “FRUS at 150: The Evolution of the Foreign Relations Series” (11th 
International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents, September 20, 2011). 
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Figure 4.6.b. Agency of origin, prevalence of topics related to intelligence policy. 
 
 
 
Left-right ideology has little effect on single topics or policy instruments 
 
Thus far we have seen the interaction between document covariates and the appearance 
of solitary topics related to policy instruments.  To understand officials’ underlying 
preferences, however, we need to move to a multinomial distribution over such topics for 
each one.  Before we do, however, we summarize the effects of our last covariate, author 
CFScore, on topic prevalence.  While ideology showed little overall significance, Figure 
4.7 presents regression results for six topics where it did.  It shows a complex, but 
ultimately inconclusive relationship with topic prevalence.  Most noticeably, the region 
on the x-axis associated with Kissinger and Nixon (the dashed vertical guidelines) tends 
to “warp” topic prevalence – the consequence of their individual priorities and outsize 
presence in the corpus.  A few topics referring to issue-area, like the European theater, 
have positive trend-lines, with conservatives somewhat more likely to author texts in 
which they appear.  In general, however, the marginal effect of ideology is zero or nearly 
zero in all cases. 
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Figure 4.7.  Author ideology and topic prevalence for select topics.  Relationships are summarized with 
loess curves (thick curve) and trend lines (in grey). 
 
 
 
This non-effect of left-rights ideology supports our claim that estimated topics encode 
policy instruments, and do not simply reflect subject matter.  Ideology, structured belief 
or preferenceship can be no more captured in a solitary topic than inferred from an 
individual’s commitment to a single policy instrument.  An official who pushes for 
military intervention in one context, for instance, can turn and advocate for foreign aid in 
another.  A hawk may advocate more often for the former, and a dove may push for 
military action only under an extraordinary casus belli.  For both, underlying belief 
relates to the relative frequency that one policy instruments appear – in other words, each 
one’s distribution over policy-related topics. 
 
IV. Distance from the president 
 
The are several possible ways to summarize each official’s relative commitment to policy 
instruments.  One possibility is to exclude all non-policy topics from each official, 
constrain the remaining topics (such that they sum to one) and average over the resulting 
multinomial distributions.  This assumes that the frequency with which each official 
discusses a policy implies a commitment to it.  What this would leave out, however, is 
the possibility that not discussing a policy instrument contains worthwhile information.  
Given this, it might be better to include non-policy topics as well, either as they are 
already estimated, or combined into a single catch-call category. 
For simplicity’s sake (and at some risk of muddying the inferential power of 
results) we have left our multinomial distributions as they are, and taken the average over 
the documents in each official’s subset.  This generates a representative document for that 
official.  We then assess the probabilistic dissimilarity or ‘distance’ from the President’s 
representative (average) document and each official’s representative (average) document.  
Here we use a discrete-probability Hellinger distance, given by 
 84 
 
𝑑𝐻(𝐩, 𝐪) = 𝑑𝐻(𝐪, 𝐩) =  
1
√2
√∑(√𝑝𝑖 − √𝑞𝑖)2
𝑇
𝑖=1
 (4.5) 
 
where 𝑇 is our number of estimated topics.  The factor of the square root of two 
normalizes its range to [0,1].  A score of 1 means that one distribution assigns probability 
1 to an outcome or outcomes for which the other distribution assigns a probability of 0.  
In words, a document produced with absolute certainty by one representative distribution 
(the official’s policy semantics) will with absolute certainty not be produced by the other.  
Hellinger distance is related to the geometrically-inspired Euclidean distance, as well as 
information-based metrics such as the (symmetrized) Kullback-Liebler divergence and 
Jensen-Shannon distance.181 
Figure 4.8 reports Hellinger mean distances with confidence intervals, 
bootstrapped over the subset of documents for each official.  I have limited measurements 
to officials with five or more documents in the corpus.  Inset is a plot showing a slightly 
positive (but statistically insignificant) relationship between official ideology and the 
Hellinger distances obtained. 
 
“Nixinger” and topic concentration 
 
Kissinger (and deputy Scowcroft) are the closest to the president.  This is consistent with 
the “Nixinger”-style depictions of foreign policy during this period, which stress the 
close (at times fraught) relationship between Nixon and his closest lieutenant.  The next 
closest officials are mostly executive-department heads.  This may stem in part from the 
degree to which they share responsibilities with the president, including both public 
messaging and broad policy assessments. 
A related explanation is that texts produced by these figures broach many topics, 
while individuals farther away from the president focus on fewer ones.  To assess this we 
measured each individual’s topic concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI), commonly used to measure market concentration, ethnic fractionalization, and (in 
applications to LDA) topic breadth.182  Topic concentration does in fact correlate, albeit 
moderately, with the Hellinger distance (𝑟 =  0.63).  
                                                 
181 Alison L. Gibbs and Francis Edward Su, “On Choosing and Bounding Probability 
Metrics,” International Statistical Review 70, no. 3 (2002). 
182 We first assumed that each document was “about” one main topic, defined as its 
highest-frequency topic.  We then calculated percentages (the share of the official’s 
subset of document) represented by each main topic.  The HHI for official 𝑘 is the sum 
over the squares of each of her main-topic percentages: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑘 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑘𝑖
2
𝑇𝑘
𝑖=1
 (4.6) 
Where 𝑇𝑘 is the number of main topics represented in each official’s subset of 
documents.  𝐻 will thus be higher when documents involve around fewer main topics. 
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Figure 4.8.  Distance between average topic distributions for the president and officials in the Nixon 
corpus (with 80% and 95% CIs).  Limited to officials with five or more texts.  Inset plot shows no 
significant relationship between ideological (CFScore) distance from the president and Hellinger distance 
(axes are scaled for comparison). 
 
 
Putting policy substance to probabilistic distance 
 
The distances in Figure 4.8 give intuitive results.  Particularly meaningful is the closeness 
of Kissinger to Nixon: more than any other figure, Kissinger is most likely to commit to 
policy instruments at frequencies that are similar to the President.  As expected, we see 
 86 
that left-right ideology does not strongly predict an official’s closeness to Nixon over all 
choices. 
Despite this, it is difficult to interpret these distances in substantive policy 
terms.183  A useful way to clarify the relationship between distance and policy is to take 
distance measures between all of the officials, including the President, and examine the 
resulting matrix for patterns suggestive of policy domain, instruments or priorities.  To do 
this we use a multidimensional scaling algorithm.184  Multidimensional scaling maps a 
matrix of pairwise values onto a 𝑛-dimensional (usually two-dimensional) Cartesian 
space, preserving the relationship between the points.  Figure 4.9 shows a classic 
multidimensional scaling of the Hellinger distance matrix for all officials in the Nixon 
corpus. 
The challenge of multidimensional scaling is to interpret the resulting axes or 
principal components.  To assist in interpretation of these axes and to provide a rough 
estimate of distance from the president, we used a simple k-means clustering algorithm 
on the results.   The meaning of the horizontal dimension in Figure 4.9 appears clear.  A 
cluster of officials on the left-hand side of our graph are mostly Treasury (Simon and 
Connally), OSRTN (Gilbert, Eberle), OMB (Shultz) and EOP officials tasked with 
economic policy (Flanigan of the CIEP; McCracken of the CEA).  On the right we see 
mostly officials from State, CIA (Helms, Colby), Defense (Packard, Laird, Moorer),   
                                                 
183 Ideology scores on a one-dimension spectrum (DW-Nominate or CFScores, e..g.) are 
defined in terms that we largely understand – “liberal” and “conservative” – and there are 
only two scores that are equidistant from any other point, one more liberal than the 
reference point and one more conservative.  The Hellinger distances, by contrast, are 
measured in 41-dimensional space, and an unlimited number of distributions can produce 
the same measure of dissimilarity. 
184 Grimmer, Representational Style. 
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USIA (Shakespeare, Keogh) and the NSC.  The x-axis divides largely on the basis of 
policy instruments – separating foreign economic policy from the domain of security 
policy.  It also loosely coincides with the dichotomy between cooperative and militant 
internationalism. 
The second dimension presents a greater challenge to interpretation.  A clue is 
that officials closer to the x-axis are typically involved in the either publicity (Nixon’s 
Communications Director Herb Klein), have a significant public messaging role 
(Treasury Secretary Simon), or are involved in diplomacy (the State department officials 
in the orange cluster).  Officials in the top half of the graph are mostly occupied with 
technical details related to military action and intelligence, budgetary details and staff 
coordination.  As an example, the text subset of OMB head Roy Ash, the uppermost 
official, comprises details related almost exclusively to agency budget and 
reorganization. 
We might interpret the y-dimension as dividing ‘softer’ discussions largely on 
policy’s political and multilateral dimensions – responses from foreign leaders, 
diplomacy and reputational consequences, from ‘harder,’ technical or scientific 
discussions related to measurement, implementation, and internal coordination.185  We 
see that defense officials – secretaries, DCIs and NSC staffers, e.g. – are situated halfway 
between external concerns (i.e. foreign actors and powers) and the coordination of 
technical and agency resources.  Nixon’s position on the graph lends credence to this 
interpretation:  We see Nixon prioritizes security instruments here (i.e. sits on the graph’s 
right side), and while he shares concerns with technical or operational details, he also 
appears more involved in political messaging than those situated above him. 
 
Does distance from the president affect survivability? 
 
The clusters in Figure 5.9 capture cohorts of advisors and officials that are closest to a 
local cluster mean.  The “presidential” cluster (3) comprises personal counselors, 
assistants and others who generally share Nixon’s focus on security policy, including a 
significant number who served on the NSC.  We may interpret this as an ‘operations’ 
cluster in the organizational sense, of those who work closely with the president (and 
each other) to articulate priorities, shape messaging and guide policy development, and 
whose topical signatures are closest to the president. 
Thus being ‘far away’ from Nixon means being located in the three other 
‘functional’ or specialized clusters: The “economic policy” (1) cluster contains treasury, 
OSRTN, OMB, CEA and other officials responsible for developing foreign economic 
                                                 
185
 The distinction between hard (quantifiable) and soft (non-quantifiable) information 
first comes from accounting theory.  Its implications have been explored in game theory 
(strategic communications), accounting, business administration, and microeconomic 
organizational analyses.  See Bertomeu and Marinovic, “Hard and Soft Information.”; 
José María Liberti and Mitchell A Petersen, “Information: Hard and Soft,” The Review of 
Corporate Finance Studies 8, no. 1 (2018); Ricardo Alonso, Wouter Dessein, and Niko 
Matouschek, “When Does Coordination Require Centralization?,” American Economic 
Review 98, no. 1 (2008). 
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policy.  The “security” (2) cluster contains various figures from Defense, the national 
space program, the intelligence community and the NSC.  Finally, the “diplomatic” (4) 
cluster, at lower-right, sits at the intersection of external political concerns and security 
policy, and is mostly constituted by State Department officials. 
While findings are not statistically significant, Figure 4.10 shows that were are 
noticeable differences in the tenure length for officials in the clusters we have identified.  
As we might expect, official tenure is greatest in the presidential cluster (3), where 
alignment with Nixon is greatest. 
 
Figure 4.10.  Tenure length in days by cluster.  
Censored observations omitted.  X-axis gives the 
cluster.  1 = economic policy; 2 = security policy; 3 = 
“presidential” cluster; 4 = diplomatic policy 
 
 
 
Survival and ‘tracking’ the president 
 
Measuring officials’ distances across the two terms of the Nixon administration (Figure 
4.11) provides additional validation of these findings.  If we accept that our x-axis refers 
to policy domain, we should expect officials to be largely confined or constrained to it.  
In other words, we should not expect to see officials move laterally, from economic 
policy to security policy (or vice versa) over time. 
We have interpreted our y-axis as measuring how technical, hard-information-
driven and politically neutral an official’s policy semantics are.  Although it is 
theoretically possible for officials to pivot from more technical policy deliberations to 
less technical ones – to go from a data-driven discussion of military posture or spending 
to a focus on its diplomatic or political implications, e.g. – it is less likely that an official 
who starts in a “softer” policy space can rise to the technical side.  In other words, 
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whatever vertical adjustments we see among our officials in our policy space, should be 
largely downward and not up. 
Figure 4.11 shows the positions of officials in our policy space for the first and 
the second Nixon terms.  We see little lateral movement, across policy domains, and 
significant downward migration, including by the president (the red arrow) and Kissinger 
(orange).  Both are consistent with our axis interpretations.  Of the two large lateral 
movements that break the expected pattern, the right-to-left swing represents an official 
with fewer than five texts in the corpus (CEA Chairman Herbert Stein); the other, 
traversing from left to right, represents a change of official position (James Scheslinger, 
who left the Atomic Energy Commission to become Director of Central Intelligence in 
early 1973). 
 
Figure 4.11.  Relative positions across presidential terms.  Here the multidimensional scaling algorithm 
(from Figure 5.9) was used to produce two additional spatial interpretations, for Nixon’s first and second 
terms (1969-1972 and 1973-1974, respectively).  Officials who left during the first term are marked with 
“D”, while those who arrived during the second term are marked with “A.”  Arrows show movement for 
officials who serve both terms.  Nixon’s movement is shown in red, Kissinger’s in orange; officials with a 
small number of texts in the corpus (𝑛 <  10) are greyed-out. 
 
 
 
Most importantly, we see clear politicization effects.  Officials who appear most likely to 
survive from one term to another are those who enter the administration at closer to 
proximity to the president.  Moreover, as we can see by the movement of the arrows from 
Nixon’s first term to his second, there is a tendency for such long-tenured officials to 
“track” the president, either converging or moving in parallel with him. 
 
Alignment on policy instruments and policy-constrained ideology 
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These provide substantial evidence that distance from the president, measuring choices 
over policy instruments, can affect official or advisor survival.  The literature on ideology 
in foreign policy, suggests that ideology can still play a role in policy, although it may be 
constrained or conditioned by policy area, or a policy’s distributional effects.  
To assess the importance of left-right ideology by policy domain, and to test 
whether alignment on policy instruments (cluster membership) moderates the effect of 
ideological distance, we performed a simplified Cox regression, interacting our 
ideological distance from the president (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠) on our clusters.  Predicted hazard ratios 
are given in Figure 4.12. 
 
Figure 4.12.  Margins showing effects of ideology on official survival by policy cluster (with 95% 
CIs).  Cox regression interacted standardized 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠 on policy cluster; model was estimated with 
robust clustered SEs, adjusted for policy cluster. 
 
Findings shown in Figure 4.12 are consistent with the formulation of ideology as policy-
constrained.  Policy area (captured by cluster membership) interacts with ideology in 
significant ways.  Importantly, we see that for the economic policy cluster (1), left-right 
ideological distance from the president significantly affects survival, while the effect is 
(somewhat) weaker for security (2) and diplomatic policy (4).  This supports Milner and 
Tingley’s claim that dispute over economic policies operate more along conventional 
(left-right) lines than other policy areas.  In general, we see that proximity to the 
president, measured over topic distributions, substantially weakens the role of ideology 
for the survival of foreign policy officials.  Alignment on appropriate policy instruments, 
in other words, provides a substantial buffer for foreign-policy officials who may be 
ideologically different from the president. 
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Robustness and competence insulate misaligned officials 
 
In chapter 2 we found that access to informational resources – that is, the robustness of an 
agency – exacerbated the politicization effect in domestic policy.  Nixon was more apt to 
retain ideological-aligned officials when they possessed greater informational resources, 
dismissing or marginalization non-conforming officials under the same conditions.   
Among foreign policy officials, we see a contrary dynamic.  Figure 4.13 shows 
the marginal effect of agency robustness by cluster.  For all clustered officials, robustness 
or informational resources tends to protect them (the negative effect on the hazard ratio 
implies better survivability). However, it tends to preserve those officials who, located in 
the farther clusters, are least aligned with the president on policy. 
 
Figure 4.13.  Conditional marginal effects, agency competence and 
robustness by cluster.  Simplified Cox regression, competence and 
robustness interacted separately on policy cluster.  Robust clustered SEs were 
used, adjusted for policy cluster.   
 
 
 
We have provided theoretical justification for this insulation effect (Chapter 3).  Another 
possible explanation is that the president tends to have fewer informational resources 
herself in foreign policy (relative to domestic questions), and thus is much less likely to 
achieve a better policy outcomes by “going it alone.”  This places a higher premium on 
informational resources in foreign policy. 
Our competence measure largely mirrors the effect of robustness with the 
exception of the diplomatic cluster.  For that group of officials we see higher competence 
tends to hurt survivability.  Considering the impact of ideology on officials within this 
group (Fig. 4.11) we can consider this the most politicized group of officials, although 
these factors do not result in tenures that are substantially different from the other non-
presidential clusters (Fig. 4.10). 
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V. What we have found 
 
This chapter uses a text-as-data methodology and a unique corpus – the Foreign 
Relations of the United States document set – to investigate patterns of politicization in 
foreign policy.  There is substantial evidence that estimating a topic model on this corpus, 
generates topics that are largely representative of policy instruments.  Moreover, we have 
shown that the frequency with which an individual official presses for the use of a policy 
instrument, or a combination of policy instruments, provides a useful alternative measure 
of distance from the president, or bias.  The effect of that bias, and the persistence of left-
right ideology in foreign policy, can be summarized in three claims. 
 
1.  Ideology can be powerful in foreign policy, but only under the right conditions 
 
This chapter demonstrates two forms of politicization in Nixon foreign policy.  First, in 
economic, diplomatic and security policy – where the choices of policy instruments are 
more limited or domain-specific, ideology continues to have a significant impact in 
whether or not an official or advisor remains in office.  This form of politicization is 
policy-constrained – in a way similar to that found by Milner and Tingley.  It is similar to 
the left-right politicization found in Nixon domestic policy in chapter 3, with one key 
difference: There we found that robustness – access to agency resources – powerfully 
strengthened the politicization effect.  In foreign policy, the reverse is true.  Access to 
agency resources tends to insulate misaligned officials. 
Second, we found that left-right ideology is non-operative for officials and 
advisors who are the most closely aligned officials and advisors, those in what I have 
termed the ‘presidential’ cluster.  These officials tend to track the president over the 
course of his administration, and for them, left-right ideology is in fact inconsequential. 
 
2.  Alignment on policy instruments can trump difference on ideology 
 
The more dissimilar Nixon officials are in preference over policy instrument, the more 
ideologically aligned they must be to survive; on the other hand, relative proximity on 
policy instruments tends to soften the impact of ideological misalignment.  This suggests 
that, while Nixon demanded policy loyalists (i.e. those conformed on specific issues 
policy) where differences on policy choice persisted, left-right ideology could serve as a 
substitute form of control. 
 
3.  Politicization is not just about ideology, although it generally is 
 
Taken with our previous chapters, we see that Nixon used politicization as an important 
tool, with conformity leading to higher retention and longer tenure.  In domestic policy, 
the effect of ideology is clear: Officials with greater access to private, policy-relevant 
information must be ideological aligned or else.  In foreign policy the pattern is more 
complex.  Conformity over policy instruments, which expresses a different kind of 
underlying belief, can be more important than left-right ideology. 
Does this mean that Nixon ultimately defied “labels” in foreign policy, as he 
himself suggested?  As we have seen, the answer is yes, and no.  Did Nixon politicize 
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foreign policy less than domestic policy?   Was the perspective of the “whole-worlder” 
unconventional or non-ideological enough, to admit or tolerate a broader set of belief 
among his officials and advisors?  The evidence suggests no.  Politicization was very 
much a feature of both domestic and foreign-policy development.  If we miss it in the 
latter, it is not because it is not there.  It is because dynamics of politicization in foreign 
affairs can hide in the more complex relationship between ideology and policymaking. 
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Conclusion: Nixon, crucial and constrained 
 
This dissertation has demonstrated throughout that ideological affinity – calculated using 
CFScores and distance from the president – is an important determinant of tenure-length 
for officials and advisors under Nixon.  It is a feature of both domestic and foreign 
policy.  This is consistent with “what we know” collectively about the Nixon 
administration, and supports treating the Nixon administration as a crucial case. 
 
Where is politicization not happening? 
 
Such a crucial case of politicization has general relevance when we have evidence of 
non-politicization.  That politicization does not happen, despite amply demonstrated 
pressures for it, strengthens our conclusions about its general causes and the factors that 
constrain it.  With that in mind, where do we see politicization not taking place?  In the 
area of domestic policy, pressures on officials and advisors for conformity are strongest 
when agencies are most robust – that is, when they have greatest access to private, 
policy-relevant information.  Domestic coordinating bodies or agencies, such as the 
Domestic Council, the Council on Economic Policy, the Council on Environmental 
Quality, among them, are much less subject to such pressures. 
These findings provide a partial answer to a central question in presidential 
studies, one largely unanswered since Moe’s “The Politicized Presidency”: the 
relationship between centralization and politicization.  They suggest that centralization, 
efforts to locate decision making within the EOP or in close proximity to the president, 
does not function in an organic partnership with politicization.  Where centralization 
takes place, politicization does not follow.  This is largely because such non-robust 
bodies do not produce policy-relevant information themselves, and therefore do not 
convey informational advantage on officials who then must be “managed” using 
ideological criteria.  We must use caution here, however.  When we say coordinating 
agencies are less prone to politicization, we mean among officials or advisors who serve 
only within those bodies.  Coordinating agencies comprise more than just single-role 
officials; the most powerful figures in such bodies are those from outside the 
coordinating agency, officials and advisors who come from robust executive, 
independent, or EOP agencies, and these are heavily politicized. 
In the domain of foreign policy, we have seen that politicization on conventional 
ideological lines tends only to occur where officials differ from the president over policy 
instruments.  Where they do not differ, ideological conforming is less apparent.  We 
should issue a second word of caution here.  Where officials and advisors are “closer” to 
the president, as measured by their distribution over preferred policy instruments, such 
closeness replaces left-right ideology as the basis for politicization.  At base, this may be 
a distinction without a difference: presidential control is still control, whether exerted 
through ideological conforming or alignment on specific policy.  Yet we may conclude 
that conventional politicization – the left-right ideological kind – was most often 
deployed when officials served at a “remove,” in terms of access to information or policy 
preferences.  It is a vitally important, albeit condition-contingent, form of presidential 
control. 
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Institutions are important; organizations less so 
 
That politicization is contingent strengthens a more general claim, made in this study, 
about the vital role institutions play, in understanding expertise, presidential behavior and 
the control strategies that shape the modern presidency.  Institutions are central to this 
analysis in two ways.  First, taking the importance of professional experience, of 
matching career to agency competence, and policy bias to agency robustness, leads us to 
a vision of ‘expertise’ that is practical and institutionally-focused.  This is an open 
challenge to analyses that treat official or advisor expertise as given or exogenous (like 
many strategic information models) or as an individual endowment (like many 
practitioner accounts, histories and managerial analyses).  Second, while general agency 
characteristics – of robustness, specialization and competence – are important, specific 
organizational factors are not.  Neither cabinet status nor having a position subject to 
Senate approval impacts survival.  Cuts to agency budgets, or serving in agencies that are 
either president-created or subjected to presidential reorganization, have no measurable 
effect.  In light of this, the conventional focus on advisory structure and specific 
organizational characteristics – a common feature of managerial studies – may be 
misguided.  
Why do general institutional measures perform well while specific organizational  
measures do not?  A tremendous amount of energy has been put into proposing or 
enacting organizational redesigns in the modern presidency.  Advisory-system analyses, 
aspirations to cabinet government, post-hoc assessments like the Brownlow or Murphy 
Commission Reports, or the top-to-bottom redesigns that gave us Eisenhower’s policy 
hill or Kennedy’s working groups approach – these all share a faith that the right 
organizational design will solve the problems faced by modern presidents.  Practitioner 
accounts, managerial studies, and our findings here, however, suggest that interactions 
between a president and her advisors and officials are not readily constrained by 
organizational design.  They tend to occur in a more fluid, open market-like exchange 
space.  In such a space it is not where you sit but what you can “carry with you” that 
matters.  Most important is the private, policy-relevant information that flows from the 
institutional building blocks of the executive branch. 
 
Limitations of this study and future directions 
 
The most obvious limitation of this study is that it is one study of a single presidency.  
While I have argued that because of its peculiarities the Nixon case can teach us 
important general lessons about politicization, using one case nonetheless creates obvious 
blind spots.  Some of our findings may be data artifacts, for example, which may or may 
not be confirmed using a larger sample across administrations.  And we are 
circumscribed in what we can say; for instance, we cannot tell whether the dynamics of 
politicization vary by exogenous conditions, such as the party of the president, the party 
or ideological composition of Congress or, in foreign policy, level of military 
commitment or costs, or the broader strategic environment.  These and other important 
questions call for a richer set of data. 
This study differs from other studies of politicization by focusing on retention and 
not appointment of officials.  Retention, understood through tenure data, captures an 
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important and often neglected dimension of substitution as a method of politicization.  
But substitution does not exhaust the ways presidents may politicize.  Other possible 
strategies are engagement, including the promotion of officials on the basis of party, or 
the allocation of presidential attention to loyalists or favored agencies.  And politicization 
may be achieved through debate control, limiting the semantic content of policy 
discussions to presidential, party or ideological priorities.  These last strategies can prove 
more empirically elusive than either appointment or retention, since they require even 
more granular, individual-level measurements that are costly to collect at scale.  In the 
Chapter 4, we see what may be a possible work-around – using text-as-data techniques to 
measure politicization over policy instruments.  Such computational methods hold 
promise as ways to examine these other, less-studied techniques of presidential 
politicization, and open possible avenues for future research. 
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Appendix B: Agency measures used for Nixon officials and advisors 
 
Shown here is agency size, plus our core theoretical variables used for the analysis in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  Included are policy scope (whether the agency is specialized), policy 
domain (whether it is responsible for foreign policy), and robustness and competence 
measures. 
 
      
 Size* Spec? F.P.? Robust. Comp. 
Executive/cabinet Departments:      
Department of Agriculture 111,285   0.9939 0.8279 
Department of Commerce 34,260   0.9915 0.6289 
Department of Defense 1,030,965  ✓ 0.9998 0.5628 
Department of Justice 47,214   0.9924 0.2717 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare 125,152   0.9982 0.6982 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 17,950   0.9925 0.6618 
Department of the Interior 71,414   0.9974 0.596 
Department of Labor 34,260   0.9972 0.6421 
Office of the Special Trade Representative (OSRTN) 41 ✓ ✓ 0.8537 0.5 
Office of the Vice President (SAP-OVP) 29   0.6897 0.4444 
Department of State 34,421  ✓ 0.9852 0.5725 
Department of Transportation 69,757   0.9978 0.5817 
Department of the Treasury 106,555   0.9992 0.4023 
United States Information Agency (USIA) 9,195  ✓ 0.9979 0.4737 
United States Postal Service 682,120   0.9973 0.951 
Department of Veterans Affairs 194,362   0.9999 0.3529 
      
Other EOP/independent agencies:      
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) 53 ✓  0.4906 0.7407 
Council on Economic Policy (CEP)† 36  ✓ 0.8333 0.5 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 70   0.5571 0.7742 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)‡ –  ✓ 0.9773 0.5628 
Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) 36  ✓ 0.8333 0.5 
Domestic Council (DC) 55   0.6 0.7727 
Federal Energy Office (FEO) 3,585  ✓ 0.9869 0.4043 
Federal Property Council (FPC) 1,251 ✓  0.9664 0.7619 
National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC) 70 ✓ ✓ 0.7714 0.75 
National Council of Marine Resources and Engineering 
(NCMRED) 29  ✓ 0 0.7241 
National Security Council (NSC) 82  ✓ 0.2439 0.9839 
Office of Consumer Affairs (OCA) 51 ✓  0.7647 0.8333 
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) 1,636   0.9364 0.7019 
Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) 475  ✓ 0.9747 0.3846 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 637 ✓  0.9655 0.8182 
Office of Science and Technology (OST) 70  ✓ 0.7 0.8571 
Office of Telecommunciations Policy (OTP) 70 ✓ ✓ 0.8 0.8667 
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention 
(SAODAP) 133 ✓  0.9098 0.75 
White House Office (WHO) 542 ✓  0.952 0.0769 
 
* Size taken from 1972, or from first year data was available (e.g. CIEP in 1976). 
† Data not available.  Used data from the Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) 
‡ Data on size not available; estimated size from various sources.  For the sake of computing robustness and competence, number 
of policy-determining positions and ‘political’ positions taken from the Department of Defense.  CIA is sometimes considered a 
cabinet-level position; during the Nixon years it was not. 
 
 
 
 
